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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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BURKINA

TRANSPORT MINISTER HOLDS MEETING ON AIRPORT MODERNIZATION

AB170657 Ouagadougou Domestic Service in French 0630 GMT 16 Apr 86

[Text] The Minister of Transport and Communications, Comrade Alain Coeffe, held a working session on Monday [14 April] with the technicians of Bobo Dioulasso Airport. Also present at the meeting were the directors of ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar] and the Civil Aviation. They were happy to note that the deadline set by (?Colack) Enterprise concerning the completion of the 3,300 meter long runway has been met. The deadline was fixed for 15 April 1986. At present, the construction of the air terminal is going to be tackled, and its inauguration will probably take place in June.

But that is not all, because a project of such dimension requires not only huge investments, but also ultrasophisticated equipment which are indispensable for the servicing of large transport aircraft like the Boeing-747; yes, precision equipment made to order, will be delivered some time after the completion of construction. Thus, we will have to wait until the beginning of next year, that is, January 1987, before the Bobo Dioulasso International Airport can receive Boeing aircraft in the daytime. From that date, international air traffic will be totally directed toward the economic capital [Bobo Dioulasso]. Incidentally, Ouagadougou Airport will be closed down at the same date, because the facilities are suffering from excessive use. The Ouagadougou repair works, which will be spread over 12 months, will enable the Bobo Dioulasso Airport to make a good start and to maximize the first phase of utilization which runs from 1987 to 1990.

The ASECNA management, which had come to verify the works which it describes as satisfactory, therefore shares the Burkinabe people's desire for the acceleration of the rest of the work. It should be recalled here that the Bobo Dioulasso Airport is of a regional-type airport, thus it is of interest to several African countries which intend to operate flights of their national airlines to Burkina Faso. In any case, we have to wait until 1987 to see this airport completely equipped with all the technical installations which will enable it to receive traffic both night and day, and under all weather conditions, the biggest aircraft of the world.

/12913
CSO: 3400/1602

BURKINA

BRIEFS

WOMEN'S DELEGATION TO USSR--Within the framework of the relations existing between the Soviet and Burkinabe peoples, a delegation of the Burkinabe Women's Union led by Alima Traore today went to Moscow, capital of the Soviet Union. The Burkinabe delegation's visit is at the invitation of the Committee of Soviet Women. [Text] [Ouagadougou Domestic Service in French 1900 GMT 11 Apr 86 AB] /12913

CSO: 3400/1601

CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

NEW PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR--The president of the Republic of Cape Verde, Aristides Pereira, received on Tuesday night at the presidential palace the letters of accreditation of the new ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Portugal to Cape Verde, his excellency Dr Jose Custodio de Freitas Fernandes Fafe. /Excerpt/ /Praia VOA DI POVO in Portuguese 5 Apr 86 p 1 AB/ 12228

NEW ICELANDIC AMBASSADOR--The ambassador of the Republic of Iceland to Cape Verde, his excellency Haraldur Kroyer, presented his letters of accreditation to President Aristides Pereira at the presidential palace on Tuesday, 18 March. /Excerpt/ /Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese 19 Mar 86 p 2 AB/ 12228

CSO: 3400/1604

CONGO

BRIEFS

CAR STUDENTS APPEAL--Brazzaville, 14 April (AFP)--The Association of Central African Students in Congo, ASECA, launched an appeal in Brazzaville on Monday for the release of CAR students who have been detained in Bangui since 10 March 1986 following a strike. In a document entitled, "Motion of Protest," handed over to the international press, the ASECA also called for the removal of "Maoist" personalities like: Jean-Paul Ngoupande, minister of national education; Emile Ndjapou, chancellor of Bangui University; and Sebastien Bassia, vice chancellor. The association considered the main accusations leveled against the arrested CAR students, that is the "attack on state security, serving as intelligence officials for foreign powers" as "fallacious statements aimed at deceiving world opinion." After pointing out the "rise in the colonialist threat characterized by the arrogance, aggressiveness, bestiality, and strengthening of French occupational forces," the text also called for the abrogation of the "anarchist and ostracizing" measures "adopted" by the CAR authorities. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1450 GMT 14 Apr 86 AB] /12913

CSO: 3400/1601

GABON

BREIFS

COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA--The fourth session of the Gabon-Yugoslavia Joint Cooperation Commission will open in Libreville today. During [words indistinct] will discuss cooperation between the two countries and examine concrete ways to strengthen it. [Excerpt] [Libreville Africa No 1 in French 1230 GMT 15 Apr 86 AB] /12913

CSO: 3400/1601

GHANA

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT EDUCATION OF CHILDREN IN CUBA COUNTERED

London TALKING DRUMS in English 3 Mar 86 pp 13-16

[Article by Emmanuel A. Annor]

[Text] *This essay addresses some of the inaccuracies in recent publications about Ghana's educational system and speculates on the reasons behind the PNDC government's acceptance of the scholarships from the Cuban government.*

Perhaps one of the most persistent criticisms of the PNDC administration is its acceptance of 600 scholarships from the Government of Cuba to enable Ghanaian children between the ages of 12 and 16 to study at various levels of education up to the university level in Cuba. The extension of the scholarship program to a further 142 students has again stirred speculations as to the motives of the PNDC government other than the ostensible one of educating our youngsters. Some have even accused the government of actually intending some of the children to train as guerrillas and possibly commandos.

As preposterous as such allegations sound (mind you if such scholarships had been offered by some Western country that would have been fine; but because they were offered by Cuba our children are at risk!) the misperceptions of the government's intentions have persisted because the Ministry of Education and the Scholarships Secretariat in Ghana have not adequately defended the program to allay the fears of many obviously worried compatriots who have somehow come to believe that anything that comes from that part of the world reeks of revolution, guerrillas and commandos.

Because of this silence, some critics of the PNDC seeking to find fault in every

policy of that government no matter how sanguine, have been dispensing pap in place of information and thus leaving the concerned reader more bewildered than illumined. A typical example of such inaccuracies is reflected in a recent letter by one K S Owusu-Appiah (Talking Drums, December 16, 1985).

In the first part of this essay, I will address some of the falsehoods in Mr Owusu-Appiah's letter and then speculate on the reasons behind the PNDC government's acceptance of the scholarships from the Cuban government. In the process I hope to shed some light on the remarkable achievements that the Cuban education system has brought to her people, and to suggest that rather than expending our energies on discrediting a system about which we know little, we should be open-minded about foreign systems and borrow from those which have the potential to benefit us.

Qualitative education

Mr Owusu-Appiah states bluntly that "All the least developed countries, of which Cuba is not excluded have the problem of financing qualitative education." Whatever he means by "qualitative education," is anybody's guess: is it the ability to add and subtract?

to read and write? to speak correct grammatical English? to speak a local language without spicing it with English, French, Portuguese, Spanish or Sanskrit? To be a doctor or a technician?

Of course qualitative education can have all these attributes, but the point is that a considerable number of these least developed countries, particularly countries in Asia — Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand which in the 1960s were in solidarity with Africa (as partners in poverty) (remember the Afro-Asian solidarity conferences?) — have literally left Africa behind largely as a result of their educational systems. Not only are these countries able to feed themselves, they produce enough surplus to export to us.

As regards his specific reference to Cuba, Mr Owusu-Appiah should be informed that barely a month ago, Cuban doctors performed their first successful open-heart surgery. Cuban soldiers handle some of the most sophisticated military weapons from the Soviet Union. Obviously, it takes highly trained technical people to achieve these feats. I shall return to the subject of Cuban education later on in this essay, but Mr Owusu-Appiah should probably be told that contrary to the notoriety that Cuba has acquired in the Western media as exporter of revolutions to the Third World countries like Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada and Nicaragua what is hardly mentioned is that a major component of this "export" consists of physicians, teachers and nurses to people who are in desperate need of their services.

Now, some factual points about Ghana's educational system which the correspondent appeared not to be very familiar with. The National Council for Higher Education has been disbanded since 1983 therefore it could not have sent a delegation to Cuba to verify the "normal standards" before accepting the scholarships (beggars sometimes can have a choice, at least according to the Owusu-Appiah doctrine!) Also the Ghana Education Service (GES) is not an entity separate from the Ministry of Education as Mr Owusu-Appiah implied.

To claim that "Cuban institutions cannot be compared with institutions in the developed countries like Britain and the US, without indicating upon what criteria such comparisons are to be made is to mislead readers who care about such matters. All educational systems have

their problems. In the United States, there are people who graduate from college and are unable to read or write. In 1983, a Presidential commission lamented the 'rising tide of mediocrity' in US education. Other Western countries have reported similar problems. But that does not mean that their entire systems are rotten.

Educational leaders all over the world worry about the future of their societies and are constantly revamping their educational institutions, and finding creative ways of preparing the next generation for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Without a thorough understanding of individual societies and their systems, it is naive to embrace any one system just because we are familiar with it and condemn the other because it is new.

It was quite obvious that Mr Owusu-Appiah was stuck when it came to the Soviet Union. Perhaps Mr Owusu-Appiah needs to be reminded again that the decision by Ghanaian officials to let Ghanaians with Soviet diplomas "go back to school" as a condition for employment was based purely on emotions rather than any assessment of the content of what they had learnt or an evaluation of their competence. The atmosphere prevailing during the post-1966 overthrow of Nkrumah was charged with emotions. So called statesmen who supposedly meant well, lost their heads in the euphoria and substituted vendetta and hype for policy. The result was a frenzied attempt to totally dismantle anything that was remotely related to Nkrumah.

Incidentally, many of the Soviet-trained doctors have proved to be among some of our most competent physicians manning many regional and district hospitals and polyclinics. It is lamentable that some of our educated elite who ought to know better sometimes get so blinded by their marriage to their western diplomas that they fail to acknowledge that other systems have much to recommend to our peculiar environment.

Hopefully, ten years down the line, when our students in Cuba return home, we would not be as stupid as we were during the post-1966 period and reject them because they had their education in Cuba or because they had been sent by Rawlings. Let me now turn to speculate as to why Cuba offered to help Ghana, and why the PNDC readily embraced it.

Speculation

Before I speculate on the underlying motivations of the PNDC for accepting the scholarship offer, it should be pointed out that Ghana has had a long history of accepting foreign scholarships to train needed technical people; therefore, the PNDC's decision should not be seen as any different from others in the past. Viewed in this light, it is possible to shift the focus of the debate on training our youngsters abroad from one of passing judgments on systems to that of how best to adapt those systems which have worked elsewhere for the benefit of our country.

In order to appreciate why Cuba made the offer in the first place and why Rawlings' government accepted it, it is important to understand the circumstances in which Rawlings found himself at the time of the coup on December 31 1981.

Rawlings staged the December 31 coup under the pretext of bringing about social justice in Ghana, which as he saw it, was being compromised because of the Limann administration's inability to continue which had begun as a result of the mutiny in the army in June 1979. It was a 'revolution,' Rawlings claimed, and not a military coup d'etat in the conventional sense.

Many observers who thought that democracy was finally finding a foothold in West Africa were stunned. They complained that the accusations against the Limann government were unfounded since the youth wing of the PNP had almost taken over from the old guard, and had virtually excluded the Chairman of the party, Nana Okutwer Bekoe and his friend the late Krobo Edusei. Therefore the coup could not have been motivated by any larger ideals other than that a bunch of power-hungry youngsters wanted power at all costs.

Not surprisingly, the reaction to the PNDC government was very cold. Nigeria withheld oil supplies because Ghana was behind with her bill payment. Muammar Qaddafi's promise of bankrolling the new regime proved to be a mere promise. On the educational front, trained teachers were leaving in droves for Nigeria to pursue better economic fortunes.

Classrooms at the universities were also being abandoned by lecturers and professors. It is against this backdrop that Cuba came to help, first, because there

was every indication that the new government would pursue the policies of Kwame Nkrumah judged by the heavy dose of Marxist rhetoric of the revolutionary organs, and second because the Ghanaian situation, on the surface at least, appeared similar to the Cuban situation in 1959.

The formation of the People's and Workers' Defence Committees was in a sense a replication of a real revolution which had occurred in the Caribbean in 1959. Since Rawlings found himself without friends, any help was welcome. I would be surprised if anybody claimed that under such circumstances, he/she would not accept aid no matter its origins. Besides, given that the professed ethos of the regime was action, doing something was preferable to doing nothing. Its commitment to the goal of achieving social justice was reflected in the selection of the candidates for the scholarships. It is my understanding that a majority of the first 600 children were the children of those in rural areas who, under our current system, would probably never have gone beyond the middle school.

It is within this context that I believe the decisions to accept help from Cuba was a sound and pragmatic one. This of course should not prevent us from questioning the policies of our governments. However, I think the focus in this respect should be on the long term effect of such a program on educational policy. If the government appreciates that we cannot abdicate the responsibility of educating our children and inculcating in them the values we consider desirable, and would take advantage of such offers as a mere stop-gap respite, then there is every reason to commend them for their foresight.

If on the other hand the government is unable to enact bold policies to make the preparation of the youth a fundamental objective, then we should have every reason to worry. In the meantime, I submit that the Cuban education system has much to recommend it, and in the next section, I will briefly discuss some highlights of Cuban education, and what lessons we might learn from it.

Education in Cuba

Cuba, like all Latin American countries, inherited her educational system from Spain. The educational heritage as reflected in the curriculum was orientated toward the elite. Curriculum content was heavily biased toward

humanistic studies, reminiscent of the scholastic era of 16th and 17th century Spain. Rural education was given short shrift, and when the Jesuit Priests who became the principal advocates of rural education in Latin America appeared too threatening for the establishment, they were chased out of many countries in Latin America.

Cuba's proximity to the United States did not help much with regard to educational reforms and the economic relations which divided the rich and the poor, persisted. If you throw in the right wing dictatorships which were determined to perpetuate the depressing economic systems, you can appreciate how a revolution such as Cuba's became inevitable.

Rather than dwelling on the complex politics of that embattled region, I will limit myself to the role education played in the Cuban revolution of 1959.

After Castro overthrew the Batista regime in 1959, his major objective was to radically transform Cuban society, and to create in essence what has been called the new socialist man, "the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, to whom the different social functions he performs are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers." the motivation for study was to be changed so that "coming generations" would "receive the heritage of education, that is totally devoid of selfish sentiment."

But even more important than the social relations of education, was the realisation that the economy was inextricably linked with education. Like most developing countries, pre-revolutionary Cuba confronted the problem of economic stagnation which was largely attributable to the low level of the nation's technological capacities, its uneducated labour force, and its outdated stock of productive and physical equipment.

Faced with this problem, the Cuban government made an unequivocal commitment to raising the productive capacities of the population through education. As Fidel Castro put it then, "The levels of development that the country will reach can be measured only by the percentage of young people carrying on advanced studies." Consequently, there was a massive expansion in education particularly at the lower levels, just like what happened in Ghana between 1951 to 1961.

But in order to eliminate Cuba's

dependence on outsiders in the scientific spheres, the government committed itself to expanding high level educational, technical, and research facilities. Education was to be a right, and in order to eliminate the class structure, high level education was to be made available to all. According to Castro, "The revolution cannot reconcile itself with the idea that in the future there should always be a minority in society with a monopoly on technical and scientific knowledge and a majority shut out from this knowledge."

Castro's words were not mere rhetoric, for the government went ahead to implement its program of building Cuba's future on a scale unprecedented in Latin American history by investing about one-fifth of its total productive capacity in formal schooling in 1968-1969. As one author described it, education rivalled sugar as Cuba's largest productive sector.

But how did Cuba finance her education? At the time of the revolution, more than 250,000 professionals including technicians, doctors, teachers and nurses had fled the country. Teachers were in short supply. There was shortages of labour to harvest sugar and this is where the ingenuity of the revolutionary leaders came in handy. In the schools, advanced students taught their fellow students who were in difficulty, just like the Lancaster monitorial system in Britain. When there was need for labour to harvest crops, the schools were moved to the countryside (*escuela al campo*). When it was realised that the schools to the countryside concept was not working because students were not concentrating on their studies, high schools were established in the countryside (*escuela en el campo*) and housed in boarding schools. A major objective of educational policy was to link work and education. As Cuban officials outlined at a UNESCO conference in Santiago de Chile in 1962, the Cuban government intended that the pupils

must be brought to have a high sense of duty to work; this is to say, they must be taught to abandon the false notion of work as a punishment and they must be taught the necessity of work... Our plans and programs aim at the elimination of verbalism and learning by rote and making education a living matter, in which theory is identified with practice linked with social labour... Here we see two basic aims of

socialist education: *the linking of education with productive labour as a means of developing men in every aspect.* Educating in productive labour, making the students familiar with the details of production through practical experience, enabling them to learn its laws and organization and processes; that is, educating them in the very root of all cultural, technical and scientific progress, and giving them ideological and moral training leading to an all round education."

As implied in this quote, for the Cuban revolution, education was not perceived as a liability whose financing had become a national burden. It was viewed as an integral part of the country's economic development.

The returns on investment

The returns on all that investment are for the unbiased observer to appreciate. Within a decade of this massive investment in education, virtually all the professionals who fled the country had been replaced to a point where now the hottest items of export from Cuba to Caribbean and Latin American countries are trained professionals. The above sketch may sound like extolling the Cuban system. Far from it. There are no policies without problems, and Cuba has had a lot of problems, but the important point is that it has not served from her objective of using education as an indispensable tool in achieving social integration and economic development.

Lessons

What can we learn from the Cuban experience? In the first place, it should be pointed out that Cuba's strategic location makes it a precious jewel for the Soviet Union. An estimated \$4 billion of Russian money is allegedly pumped into her economy annually. Therefore, Cuba's experience cannot be replicated item by item in a country like Ghana. But there are nonetheless very important lessons that we can learn. The first of these is for a government to recognize education as an indispensable facet in development, and to make an uncompromising commitment to investing in the future.

One may argue that we do not have to go to Cuba to learn such lessons. After all Kwame Nkrumah during the late fifties and early sixties made such a commitment. In fact, most of the GUPPIES

(Ghanaian urban professionals) who are now the main policy makers within the PNDC were all beneficiaries of Nkrumah's educational policy. That is a valid argument, but if it takes Cuba to reinforce that lesson, all the better.

The second lesson is the concept of education and work since it bears directly on financing our education. A lot of lip-service has been paid to this idea, but we have been short on implementation. And even where some effort has been made to let students, particularly college graduates serve the nation, the implementation has appeared as though they were being punished. In Cuba, there is no question in any student's mind as to the integrative nature of education and work.

Again, it must be pointed out that we need not go to Cuba to learn all this. As Dr Ephraim Amu pointed out to Acheampong during the centenary anniversary of the Presbyterian Training College at Akropong, the much touted "Operation Feed Yourself" programme had been known by PTC since its inception. Mawuli Secondary School used to have the lowest boarding fees in the country because earnings from its agricultural programmes made high boarding fees unnecessary. A similar programme at Ghana Secondary in Koforidua under the dynamic leadership of the former headmaster Mr Danquah also lowered student fees. The point of all this is that we certainly have a rich infrastructure to build upon, but if it will take a foreign country to jolt us to appreciate what we have, fine.

Leadership

But perhaps the greatest lesson we can derive from the Cuban example, is the role of leadership in making things happen. Unfortunately, the PNDC administration has not applied as much energy in *educational recovery* as it has with economic recovery. About the only mention of education in the document outlining the PNDC economic recovery programme of April 1983 was to the effect that research scientists should publish or perish. The rhetoric on social transformation has curiously left out education as a critical factor in the equation.

Leadership at the Education Ministry has been gingerly. The first Secretary for Education started by dismantling "international" schools without clarifying in her mind what she wanted as a substitute. She left quietly without leaving a mark on

policy. The second Secretary of Education did not make much of an impact either. The third Secretary of Education has been concerned with the financing of schools, but her focus at the secondary level has been on 'deboardization', a weird neologism which means abolishing boarding schools.

The attraction of this safe policy is that it is economically more viable and will make it possible to spread the education cedi more equitably. Such a theory is based on mere conjecture, and is contrary to available empirical evidence from Kenya, Uganda, and the United States, and of course from Cuba which indicates that students learn better, develop better and acquire the best attitudes in boarding school environments.

And do we need research evidence to confirm our own intuitive knowledge from our experience in boarding high schools? Given the housing shortages in the country, the squalor in most homes, and large families, there is hardly an alternative, in the foreseeable future at least, to nurturing the minds of the future other than in boarding schools. The issue of financing these high schools, as the above analysis has shown, takes leadership and commitment to innovation.

At the elementary school level, the third Secretary of Education has strangely lapsed into histrionics. Whatever the substitution of drums for bells in schools will do for education in Ghana is beyond anyone's imagination. The fact is that drums have been used in many elementary and secondary schools since the early sixties, therefore to make a big deal of such a peripheral issue smacks of shortage of new ideas and initiative.

Finally, as can be deduced from the above, the PNDC's current process will be a non-process if it fails to provide the leadership to make education the cornerstone of social change. There is no question that a viable economy is crucial for educational regeneration. For all the good things said about Nkrumah's educational policies, one important fact is that he had plenty of money to spend. The situation has drastically changed since those halcyon days.

The PNDC has had to deal with unprecedented crises in our national history. Combating the devastating hunger of 1983, and welcoming 2 million Ghanaian refugees from Nigeria within a period of one year are feats worthy of commendation. The renewed international confidence in Ghana's ability to manage her economy, as reflected in the lending countries' willingness to provide \$500 million to help Ghana find her feet, is also unprecedented in history. (Note that in 1971, the Busia Government wanted only \$100 million, but was refused by the lending agencies!)

However, economic recovery efforts will come to naught if education is ignored as a non-productive enterprise. This writer believes that concepts like 'deboardization' are really not the issue. Imagination and leadership are the issue. Those who have taken it upon themselves to shape the future of Ghana have the responsibility to take bold new decisions that will assure a better future for our children and our children's children. If the Cuban education system has any lesson, this is the crux of it.

Epigram: *If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.*

/12851

CSO: 3400/1615

GHANA

BRIEFS

DUTCH DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE--The Dutch Government has granted Ghana 220 million guilders, about \$8 million, toward its developmental efforts. This was announced by the Asantehene [King of Ashanti], Otumfuo Opoku Ware, on his return home from a six week tour of Europe. According to the Asantehene, the grant in aid is in appreciation of the PNDC's [Provisional National Defense Council] efforts at reviving the economy. Otumfuo's visit took him to Holland, West Germany and Britain. In Holland, Otumfuo Opoku Ware, commissioned the waste cocoa processing factory in Amsterdam and launched an appeal for funds towards the rehabilitation of forts and castles in Ghana. [Text] [Accra Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 27 Apr 86 AB] /12913

FRANCE TO INCREASE AID--Accra, 26 April (GNA/PANA)--France is to open a sector office of a specialised rural development agency in Accra in September, the French ambassador to Ghana, Mr Patrick O'Cornesse had announced. Known as the "Central Fund for Economic Cooperation for Africa", its main function would be to assist in identifying areas of possible economic assistance by the French Government to selected areas which had suffered neglect for a long time. According to Mr O'Cornesse, the French Government was highly impressed with efforts by Ghana's ruling Provisional National Defence Council to resuscitate the economy and was prepared to assist where possible. He announced that in its contribution to Ghana's economic recovery programme, his government was taking part in four sectors--transport, communications, rural health and agriculture--which it considered as areas of high priority. Mr O'Cornesse also announced that his government would commit 600 million French francs to the second phase of the economic recovery programme. He said the increase in aid and technical assistance from 15 million French francs in 1984 and 1985 to 600 million for the three-year programme was a testimony of the level of confidence the French have in Ghana's future. [Text] [Dakar PANA in English 1329 GMT 26 Apr 86 AB] /12913

ITALIAN RAILROAD REHABILITATION FINANCING--The Italian Government is to finance the rehabilitation of the Eastern and Central railway lines. The first phase of the rehabilitation will involve about \$19.6 million. This was announced by the secretary for transport and communications, Kwame Peprah on his return home from Rome after attending a conference of transport ministers and experts from five English-speaking African state. The countries are Ghana, Liberia, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. [Excerpt] [Accra Domestic Service in English 0700 GMT 24 Apr 86 AB] /8918

CSO: 3400/1578

LIBERIA

BRIEFS

BANKER ON ECOWAS SYSTEM--Central banking institutions in Africa have been urged to intensify their efforts in research to facilitate the adoption of a single monetary system by 16 member states of the ECOWAS. The deputy governor of the National Bank of Liberia, Mr Linsey Hans, noted that the adoption of a common monetary system would help offset the balance of trade deficits presently experienced by ECOWAS member states as well as stabilize economies of member countries of the subregional grouping. Governor Hans was speaking last night at the recep[tion tendered at the local [word indistinct] in Monrovia by the National Bank of Liberia in honor of delegates attending the ECOWAS central bankers' meeting currently convening at the Unity Conference Center in Virginia [suburb of Monrovia]. Earlier, Mr Christopher Kone, manager for research at the National Bank of Liberia, reminded the delegates that ECOWAS bankers' efforts were in furtherance of the adoption of a common currency and the enhancement of the organization's goal in promoting better trade links among nations. [Text] [Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 2000 GMT 17 Apr 86 AB] /12913

CSO: 3400/1614

LESOTHO

COUNTRY'S POLITICAL SITUATION ANALYZED

London AFRICAN CONFIDENTIAL in English 26 Mar 86 pp 7, 8

[Text]

South Africa cannot be pleased with events in Lesotho. The new government includes known supporters of the *African National Congress* (ANC) and the previous government's anti-Pretoria line remains intact. The reason is that the South African blockade in January had relatively little to do with the coup, which reflected widening splits in the *Basotho National Party* (BNP) and a fight over who would succeed the ageing former prime minister, Chief **Jonathan Leabua**, as leader.

After Chief Jonathan established himself in a South African-backed coup in 1970, many in the BNP leadership grew fat on extraneous activities, including settling up businesses, often with loans from the government's *Lesotho Bank*. Growing divisions within the BNP were often framed in political terms, but in practice reflected squabbling over the jam.

By early 1984 the party's divisions had hardened into a sharp and bitter split between the "right" and "republican" factions. The former was a loose grouping led by **Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana** planning minister since 1972. Many members of this group had business links in South Africa (indeed, it is hard to do business in Lesotho without such links) and were hurt by the sporadic border closures already taking place. They wanted to "normalise" relations with South Africa. As foreign minister, Sekhonyana went to Pretoria and was about to sign a Nkomati-type non-aggression pact with South Africa in May 1984, when he was recalled by Chief Jonathan and demoted (AC Vol 27 No 4).

The "republican" faction, more tightly knit, was to all intents and purposes loyal to Jonathan. Led by BNP secretary-general, **Vincent Makhele**, its apparent consolidation of power was marked by Makhele's appointment as foreign minister in 1984.

Another prominent figure was information minister **Desmond Sixishe**. Chief Jonathan had always been opposed to King **Moshoeshe II**, who was forced into exile in **Holland** for a short period after the 1970 coup and allowed to return only on condition that he stayed out of politics.

The role of the chiefs was curtailed and their power passed to BNP-dominated village development committees. The "republican" faction wanted to abolish the monarchy and the chieftainship system but its rhetoric lacked substance, though it backed the ANC and encouraged the opening of embassies by socialist states.

The 1,500-strong *Lesotho Paramilitary Force* (LPF), had a non-political tradition, believing it should support its government and subdue the *Lesotho Liberation Army* (LLA). However the commander, Maj-Gen. **Justine Lekhanya**, was close to Sekhonyana (who had helped Maj-Gen. Lekhanya expand his business interests) while his deputy Brig. **B.M. Ramots'ekhoane**, was close to Makhele and Chief Jonathan. In 1984 Chief Jonathan sacked Lekhanya, who refused to go; most of the officer corps was loyal to Maj-Gen. Lekhanya, and Chief Jonathan was unable to enforce the dismissal. Without effective control of the military, the BNP "republicans" tried to turn the BNP Youth League into a kind of "red guard". It was armed and trained by the **North Koreans**, and was rapidly becoming an alternative military force. The Youth League was supported by a small section of the LPF, headed by Ramots'ekhoane and Col. **Sehlabo** (who had been involved in a mutiny by a LPF splinter group in June 1984). The Youth League swaggered around the country flaunting their guns and engaging in intimidation and thuggery. This LPF faction was also said to be behind the shadowy "Koeoko" death squad, which was responsible for several assassinations, was linked by rumour to this LPF faction.

Meanwhile, the right wing responded to Chief Jonathan's increasingly republican leanings by making approaches to the King. But members of the banned *Communist Party (CP)* had been putting out feelers to the King too, particularly through the royalist *Marematlou Freedom Party* (MFP). Even Chief Jonathan was joining in. He sent the 47-year-old Oxford-educated King to the UN and other international meetings. But the King was already distancing himself from both factions.

At last year's *Southern African Development Coordinating Conference* (SADDC) he said: "Development cannot take place without democratisation and popular participation of our peoples." He followed up this attack on Chief Jonathan by supporting calls for sanctions against South Africa, which cannot have pleased the BNP right or Pretoria.

By late last year, both the right and the republicans were spoiling for a coup. As the Youth League became more brazen, Lekhanya loyalists were quietly collecting arms and making their own plans. The tide began to turn more rapidly in December. Ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the 9 December 1982 raid were dominated by the BNP republicans and the Youth League, strengthening the army's belief that the Youth League was an opposing military force. In another South African raid on 20 December, six ANC and three Basotho died. At their funeral, the king read at length from the Freedom Charter. The following day the UN Security Council condemned South Africa for the raid and said it should pay reparations.

Pretoria closed its border with Lesotho on 1 January. Any attempt to bring about the overthrow of Chief Jonathan was probably an afterthought. Its main intention was to force Lesotho to expel the ANC.

The five tiny right wing opposition parties, which for some time had been issuing joint statements, moved first by sending a delegation to meet foreign minister **Pik Botha** in Pretoria on 10 January. Initially, they tried to use officials in the Transkei to arrange their meeting with Botha. After their meeting they went to brief KwaZulu's Chief **Gatsha Buthelezi**.

The delegation told **Pik Botha** that both the ANC presence and the blockade could best be solved by negotiations between heads of state, **P.W. Botha** and the King (thus bypassing Chief Jonathan). They probably argued that the King, as a constitutional monarch, had just been delivering Chief Jonathan's speeches and was not genuinely anti-Pretoria. (We understand that the King is responsible for most of his speeches.) The delegates claim that both they and **Pik Botha** saw them as an alternative government. Thus this meeting may have encouraged Botha to push for Chief Jonathan's overthrow.

The four-strong opposition delegation was headed by the founder of BDA, **C.D. Molapo**, Pretoria's strongest ally in Maseru. With him were **C.D. Mofeli** of the *United Democratic Party*; **G.P. Ramoreboli** of the internal wing of the much-splintered *Basutoland Congress Party* (BCP); and **B.M. Khaketla** of MFP. The day after they returned, Chief Jonathan announced that the delegation had been arrested. Others also detained were **A.S. Nqojane**, new leader of the BDA, and **Phako Chaolane**, another BDA founder member.

The BNP right also moved and at a meeting on 10 January, organised a coup for 21 January, the day on which LPF members visit the Kingsway branch of the *Lesotho Bank* each month to collect their pay. The plan was for the Youth League

and troops loyal to Sehlabo to surround the bank trapping the rest of the LPF inside. The BNP republican faction was to take over and dismiss (or, some say, kill) Chief Jonathan, the King and Maj-Gen Lekhanya.

But news of the plan soon reached the army and low-ranking officers surrounded Chief Jonathan's office (which also housed the BNP Youth League headquarters) on 15 January. The Youth League was disarmed without a fight, but it seems Maj-Gen. Lekhanya was reluctant to stage a coup, and Chief Jonathan remained in power. On 17 January Maj-Gen. Lekhanya joined a delegation which went to Pretoria to discuss the border closure. The South Africans were led by **Neil van Heerden**, deputy director-general of foreign affairs.

While Maj-Gen Lekhanya was in Pretoria, fighting broke out between his troops and those loyal to Sehlabo in which seven-17 died and the Sehlabo forces were defeated. Sehlabo and Ramots' ekhoane were detained. A coup was inevitable, but junior officers apparently had to push a recalcitrant Maj-Gen Lekhanya into agreeing. On 20 January, he announced the coup. It was widely popular, because it meant the end of the Youth League and, people hoped, of the blockade.

Within hours van Heerden arrived in Maseru and two trains were allowed through the border - signalling South African support for the coup. But the blockade was not lifted. Sekhonya flew to Cape Town where Pik Botha stressed that the ANC still had to go, and gave him a list of 90 top priority expulsions². The first ANC group did not leave until 25 January and the border remained closed until their plane was in the air.

Under Maj-Gen. Lekhanya are two royal appointments: **Khalaki Sello** as minister of law, public service, constitutional and parliamentary affairs and **Dr. Michael Sefali** as minister of planning and economic affairs. Both are close to the banned Lesotho CP. Sello is a prominent lawyer who served two years in jail in South Africa between 1963-65 for membership of the ANC while he was a law student. He remains sympathetic to the ANC. In 1981 his Maseru home came under South African attack with hand grenades and machineguns. Dr Sefali is Soviet-trained and head of the Institute of Southern African Studies at the *National University of Lesotho*. These two figures are far to the left of any ministers in any previous government. Number four in the government, at Maj-Gen. Lekhanya's insistence, is Sekhonyana, as minister of finance, who South Africa will clearly see as their friend.

Army nominees include information minister **V.M. Malebo**, a former chief of protocol and friend of Maj-Gen. Lekhanya, and three officers: minister of transport and communications Maj. **Phillip Mokhants'o**; minister of water, energy and mining Col. **Alexander Jane**; and minister of labour and manpower development Col. **Blyth Nts'ohi**.

Lesotho accepts that it can no longer protect refugees from South African raids. Fewer will be able to stay and the ANC will need to act less openly, but the King wants to provide at least some space for the ANC. In contrast, the army would like to take a much harder line - if for no other reason than to prevent embarrassing South African invasions which it cannot repel.

There are sure to be other conflicts. The balance of power between the King, Maj-Gen Lekhanya, and the lower-ranking officers who staged the coup is still not settled. Furthermore, the new government is largely inexperienced. This raises the possibility of further South African intervention. South Africa had relatively little to do with the January coup and the result cannot be to its liking. It may decide to push for the dismissal of Sello and Sefali and the inclusion of C.D. Molapo and other opposition politicians. Further blockades and raids cannot be ruled out ●

Footnotes

1 Sehlabo and Ramots'ekhoane died in prison earlier this month in what are apparently the only other deaths in the largely bloodless coup. Makhele, Sixishe, and others were detained and then released. Chief Jonathan was allowed to remain at his country house and even gave interviews, blaming the **United States** for his overthrow (because he had allowed the opening of eastern block embassies).

2 This number included a few from the *Pan Africanist Congress* (PAC) and those killed on 20 December. Some ANC remain, including the chief representative, **J. Ndlovu**. In November the ANC had actually been stopped from evacuating men from Lesotho. It had received warnings of a possible South African raid, and it chartered a *Zambia Airways* jet to fly out 150 members. But while the plane was over South Africa it was intercepted by South African Air Force jets which told it to circle until further instructions. None came, presumably with the intention that the pilot would be forced to land inside South Africa. Instead, he eventually returned to Lesotho. The incident was never explained, and the 150 were flown out on four *Air Lesotho* flights, the last leaving shortly before the 20 December raid.

3 The King announced an amnesty, clearly aimed at Mokhehele, who rejected it, saying the LLA would fight on. In a statement he described the King in disparaging terms. This seems a major political gaffe, likely to undercut Mokhehele's support inside Lesotho where the King remains popular.

MAURITIUS

BRIEFS

FRENCH PRIEST EXPELLED--Paris, 25 Apr (AFPO)--A French Catholic priest has been told to leave the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius on account of alleged agitation for the French Communist Party, Church officials have said here. The Sons of Charity said Father Leonard Diard, a member of the order, had been given until next Wednesday to leave the country. On 11 April, Prime Minister Anerrood Jugnauth had accused the priest of being involved in "undesirable activities" last year. He said an inquiry had been carried out into the alleged activities. Two days later the bishop of the Mauritian capital Port Louis, Monsignor Jean Margeot, issued a circular denying the accusations against Father Diard. The statement was read out in all the country's Catholic churches. The Sons of Charity are part of the so-called "worker-priest" movement, a Catholic tendency which stresses contact with underprivileged people. Numerous petitions against the expulsion of Father Diard have been circulated in Mauritius. /Text/ /Paris AFP in English 1009 GMT 25 Apr 86 AU/ 12228

CSO: 3400/1604

MOZAMBIQUE

USSR SUPPLIES SHOP EQUIPMENT FOR BEIRA INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 31 Mar 86 p 2

[Text] Various types of shop equipment are being installed at the 25 June Industrial School in Beira, as part of the cooperation between our country and the Soviet Union in the area of technical education. The cost of the project is estimated at more than 58 million meticals. It calls for the total rehabilitation of the work shops for electricians, metalworkers, metal lathe operators, auto mechanics, shop foremen, electrical foremen and draftsmen. The current project was initiated in early February and also includes construction of a work yard for civil construction projects. According to technicians assigned to the project, the shop equipment at this establishment will be the most advanced in the country.

According to Julio Mavie, director of the school, all the shops will undergo remodeling. Thus, when the equipment is installed, the students in the electrician's course will, for the first time, become familiar with power lines; in the general mechanics shop, the students will be introduced to plumbing equipment.

The electricity and metalworking shops will be the first to go into operation, since these specialties use materials which are fairly light-weight.

Before the new equipment was installed, the old material was removed and most of it will be sent to the Industrial Institute of Beira.

Most of this equipment is still good, although it has suffered minor damage which can easily be repaired, according to the inventory conducted by the Soviet specialists.

Julio Mavie added that the students have participated in the installations, fulfilling the practical classwork requirements in this way. "This participation has enabled the students to learn in some depth about the nature of the shops. Hence, during the first semester we did not send any groups of students to work at companies, as had been planned," he added.

Creation of Special Classrooms

The project in progress at the Beira Industrial School also includes the creation of special classrooms and laboratories for the various specialties. For this purpose, the existing material from the Soviet Union is enough to fully equip 16 special classrooms.

Results to Date from USSR Accord

The project to rehabilitate the 25 June Industrial School in Beira was part of the second phase of activities under the cooperation accord with the USSR. In the first phase, two schools were built: the Matola Industrial School, in the city of Maputo, and the Matundo Industrial School in Tete Province. Activities at the two schools were initiated by Soviet teachers, using the Soviet-supplied shop equipment.

From 1977, when the accord was signed, until 1981, the Mozambican technicians who had been trained gradually replaced the Soviet instructors; thus, at this time, these two schools are operating almost exclusively with Mozambican instructors.

In the first phase, according to documents in the Secretariat of State for Professional-Technical Education, the schools of Chokwe, the Chimoio Agrarian Institute and the Nampula Industrial and Education Institute were rehabilitated. In addition, the Bilibiza Agricultural School was established in Cabo Delgado.

The second phase of the agreement, now in progress at the Beira Industrial School, also includes the May Day Industrial School in Maputo, the Xai-Xai School of Industry and Trade, in Gaza, and the Montepuez Industrial School in Cabo Delgado.

Current School Year

During the current school year, 617 students were admitted to the 25 June Industrial School in Beira, in 25 terms.

"This year we expect to increase the percentage of students who complete the course successfully," Julio Mavie reported.

Actually, to increase the promotion rate, a strict program was designed by the school's directorate. Thus the preparation of classes by the teachers and their grading system will be constantly monitored.

In this school year, however, the Industrial School did not carry out its plan for new admissions, because of an excessive number of failures in the first year, which occurred in several schools in the city of Beira. A limited number of students were registered for the second- and third-year courses, because of the large number of students who were failed, in accordance with the regulations.

Special Support for Newly Trained Instructors

To permit the effective integration of the new instructors, of various origins (from the Faculty of Education or the Nampula Teaching Institute), a special period was established at the industrial school, in which the instructors take part in so-called self-improvement activities, guided by representatives in their disciplines, and their evaluation is the responsibility of the Pedagogical Section.

"The only shortcoming which we have observed up to now in the recently trained teachers is basically in the shop work; last year, to correct this problem, we placed the new teachers with some companies, to acquire more practical experience," our interviewee commented.

Julio Mavie added that the practical classes for students, aside from those at the school, are also conducted at the CFM-Centro [Mozambican Railways-Central] and at Renab, mainly in civil construction fields, since the school does not have the equipment for this course, other than carpenter's tools.

6362

CS0: 3442/184

MOZAMBIQUE

FIRST TRAINED TEACHERS TO GRADUATE FROM CHINGUSSURA SCHOOL

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 31 Mar 86 p 2

[Text] At the end of this year, the first of the first-degree primary school teachers will be graduated from the Chingassura Training School for Primary Teachers, in the city of Beira, Sofala Province. According to data gathered by our correspondent in that city, the promotion rate at this educational center is growing satisfactorily, having already reached 80 percent, thanks to an awareness campaign, another effect of which was to inspire greater love for the teaching profession.

The finalists, now numbering 139, are interning at the school annexed to the center and at other neighboring schools.

According to Antonio Muchenessa, director of the center, there are good prospects that, despite the lack of teachers for the psychology courses, these students will achieve good grades, thanks, above all, to the rigorous selection process in their recruitment.

Discussing the selection of students for admission to the teacher training centers, Antonio Muchenessa argued that it should be more rigorous, since it has happened up to now that these establishments have admitted students with a very poor educational foundation and with little chance of making it in the difficult teaching profession.

"Paradoxically, the students who have been best prepared have come from the districts, more than from the city," our interviewee observed. For example, he cited the fact that the city of Maputo had sent a group of students who were not producing. Obviously, these students had dropped out of the school long before.

Desired Results Come with Experience

In the current school year, the Chingussura Training Center for Primary School Teachers initiated a program for the admission of day students, for the first time in the history of teacher training in our country.

The measure, which was taken at the province level, was owing to a series of problems confronting the center, particularly with regard to food and lodging for the students. To avoid transportation problems, only students who reside near the center were admitted as day students.

"So there would be no disparities in the life at the center, we drew up a supplementary program, including special activities for the day students, as a way of preventing them from being isolated from the boarding students. Under the program, three times a week, the day students spend part of the afternoon engaging in agricultural, cultural and sports activities," the director of the center explained.

Inadequate Boarding Conditions

In a quick tour of the center's facilities, our reporter observed the precarious conditions under which the students are living.

The dining hall is not large enough to accommodate the student body of 236. There is a project to expand the facility, but work is stopped for want of building materials.

To prepare the food, a wood-burning stove has been installed temporarily, since the shortage of gas and coal prevents use of the regular equipment. The problem is that the temporary stove is in a bad location, close to a cesspool.

None of the bathrooms is usable because the entire sewer system is clogged up. "We have asked the Executive Council to take care of the problem, but no action has been taken on our request to date."

The dormitories, furnished with 100 beds and mattresses recently supplied by UNICEF, is the only sector in functioning condition.

The Chingussura Center has been in operation for 3 years and it trains first-degree primary school teachers for the first to fifth grades, in accordance with the National Education System.

6362

CSO: 3442/184

MOZAMBIQUE

FIRST TOPOGRAPHERS COMPLETE BASIC TRAINING

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 Mar 86 p 1

[Text] Ten topographers and a photogrammetrist recently completed their basic training (equivalent to ninth grade) at the Technical-Professional School of Geodesy and Cartography. On Monday, these cadres, the first Mozambican cadres in this field following independence, were placed in five national companies and institutions, Isidro Sultane, assistant director for education at that teaching institution, informed NOTICIAS.

MAGMA [National Mining Company], COTOP [Office of Technical Consultation for Public Works], the National Directorate of Geography and Survey and SETEP [Secretariat of State for Technical-Professional Education] were the institutions considered by the technical school for the placement of the recent graduates.

According to Sultane, the 11 graduates have a general background in tachymetric and planimetric surveying, mapping and aerial photography. Based on the specific activities of each company or institution in the fields of topography and photogrammetry, these recent graduates will be given a kind of review course to enable them to perform their duties to the fullest.

This year about 300 students attended the basic course, 45 of whom are finalists. Our interviewees said there are good prospects for their graduation, although the school has a shortage of topographic design and cartography teachers and a lack of teaching materials, including notebooks and ball-point pens.

Last year was pointed out as the year in which the largest number of students were failed; only 38 percent passed, not only because of the students' laxity but also because of the inadequate performance of the instructors.

The basic training was introduced in 1983, to further the country's activities in photogrammetry, cartography and topography. The elementary training (at the sixth-grade level), introduced soon after independence to overcome the lack of cadres, was abolished the following year, since the institutions using these skills had been supplied with cadres at that time.

Intermediate Training Next year

Isidro Sultane reported that the school is planning to introduce intermediate courses in 1987. The syllabuses have been written up for the technical disciplines--topography, cartography and photogrammetry--and are now awaiting approval by the Ministry of Education.

Four students will soon return from Cuba, where they attended intermediate courses in topography, map design and photogrammetry, under a grant from the Technical-Professional School of Geodesy and Cartography.

Under the same grant, 14 students in Cuba who completed the ninth grade last year were guided into intermediate courses in the same specialities at the Cuban Polytechnical School.

The same [Mozambican polytechnical] school sent 16 scholarship students to the Soviet Union to attend intermediate courses in Geodesy and Cartography. They are expected to return to Mozambique next year, Isidro Sultane said.

It is noted that the Technical-Professional School of Geodesy and Cartography is the only institution in the country devoted to the training of topographers, cartographers and photogrammetrists. The school also coordinates the assignment of students to foreign countries for intermediate training in these specialities. To this end, the school has study grants at its disposal for this decade.

6362

CSO: 3442/184

22 May 1986

MOZAMBIQUE

SPECIALIZED TRAINING FOR ELECTRICAL WORKERS

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 May 86 p 2

[Text] This year the Professional Training Center of the Mozambique Electric Power Company [CFPEDM] will carry out a series of actions to minimize the problem of the shortage of technical cadres for various areas in the production, transport and distribution of electric power. Within this framework, a specialized course for substation operators is already in progress. The classes are being taught by technicians from SWED POWER, a Swedish firm which cooperates with the EDM training center. At the same time, the conditions are being created to conduct training courses for instructors, to revitalize the functioning of the existing establishments in some locations in the country.

According to a spokesman for the directorate of the Center, these activities follow on the conclusion, last December, of another training course for technicians in the area of distribution.

The 15 technicians who were trained, most of whom are already employed in various sectors of the Maputo Area of Operations, received on-the-job training at the substation which distributes electric power to the capital city, so they would have some practical experience of the work for which they were being trained.

As part of the same process--that of providing practical experience--the students interned for several weeks in the distribution sector, but this time they worked on overhead power lines. This is because most of their previous training was with underground cables.

After this phase, they received the so-called complementary training, according to their specialization. The field work in this phase was conducted at the company's future training center [?in Matola], explained a CFPEDM source.

Substation Operators Continue Training

At this time, the third training course for substation operators is proceeding. On completion of the complementary phase, in December, the participants entered an accelerated English language course, which ended in late February.

The purpose of the English course was to prepare the participants for the next phase, because the specialized training in that phase is the responsibility of technicians from SWED POWER, the Swedish firm which is financing the courses promoted by the EDM, and the classes are conducted in English.

It is noted that, within the project for the Central-North line, transformer substations are being constructed, with Swedish consultation. According to a source in the EDM Training center, this is why SWED POWER must be involved in the specialized training for operators of these substations.

So the courses will meet the country's current needs and conditions, the manuals which have been in use are being revised. We note that the directorate of the EDM Training Center has made it possible for the students to contribute their input to the revisions to be introduced in the manuals.

Decentralized Training

The program planned by the CFPEDM for the current year provides for training courses for instructors. To this end, the EDM will rely on the collaboration of specialists from the Portuguese Electric Power Company.

Our source told us that, basically, the program is aimed at the decentralization of training. In effect, technical cadres are now trained only in Maputo.

To achieve this objective requires that the Nampula Center function [lines of type omitted]....

"Our objective is to have the Nampula Center functioning and to conduct the local phases of training there--the so-called probationary phase, from which individuals will be selected to attend the courses. On this basis, all the candidates from the northern zone would be concentrated in that region for their initial training, after which they would come to Maputo," our interviewee added.

Regarding the country's central zone, our reported learned that contacts are already taking place between the EDM Training Center and the HCB [Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Station], to arrange HCB support for training activities that would benefit the entire central region of the country.

As sources at the EDM point out, the purpose of all these actions is to minimize the shortage of cadres for the production, transport and distribution of electric power.

We should mention that, for some years now, as a result of the training programs conducted under the aegis of the training center, the EDM has been saving thousands of contos in foreign exchange, since several posts previously held by foreign technicians are now filled by Mozambican cadres.

The cadre training programs receive financing not only from the Mozambican Government but also from Norway and Sweden, through the development agencies NORAD and ASDI.

6362

CS0: 3442/184

MOZAMBIQUE

PROJECT TO SUPPLY MAPUTO WITH PRODUCE DESCRIBED

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Mar 86 p 8

[Article by Marcelino Silva]

[Text] In the next 3 years, an area taking in 1,650 hectares of arable land, in the Mahotas, could become the principal center for the production and supply of vegetables to the city of Maputo. To this end, preparations are being concluded for the execution of a drainage project. This project will be the responsibility of a consortium formed by two French firms, which will work in coordination with the Mozambican company GEOMOC, DINAGECA [National Directorate for Geography and Survey] and the DNA (National Water Directorate). The project, which is being financed by the French Central Bank for Economic Cooperation, is budgeted at 36.6 million French francs, NOTICIAS learned from Luciano Simbana, director of the Office of Green Zones.

The project, which is aimed at recovering 1,650 hectares of arable land, consists in opening a conduit which will start from the area of the Costa do Sol golf course and end near the Albasina District. Along the main trench there will be the so-called secondary trenches which will carry the water off for the irrigation of the crops.

Considering that the farming is not limited to the lowlands, the program also provides for drilling wells in the higher areas of the zone. According to our interviewee, this will ensure the development of production in the fields and farms in those areas.

Preliminary Studies in Final Phase

The feasibility studies for the project are almost completed. Before the initiation of the project proper, it still remains to determine what actions should be taken to take care of some practical matters, such as the mobilization of the local residents to give up some of their farm plots which are located in areas through which the conduits will pass and also to participate in the project. As our reporter learned, the dynamization groups and the local agencies of the Urban District will take part in this effort.

This same preliminary phase of the project includes the joint planning of actions to be developed by GEOMOC, DNA, INIA [not further expanded], DINAGECA and the

BPDA (Office for the Development of Agricultural Production), the French agency with which the two French firms are associated.

As might be inferred from the involvement of the agencies mentioned above, it is intended that the preparations be as thorough as possible, thus responding to all issues that may come up.

The established program provides that the preliminary phase will be concluded within 6 months.

"At that point, the construction of the main and secondary trenches will be initiated. The next step will be to conduct agricultural extension programs. This means that, in addition to meeting all the conditions for the initiation of production, the program will involve the reshaping of the farm plots of the local residents," our interviewee explained.

Population Major Beneficiary

The 1,650-hectare area to be covered by the project includes zones now occupied by private, cooperative and family farmers. It is these producers who will benefit from the program. It is pointed out that, among the actions to be carried out, wells will be drilled in the higher land included in the program. This will stimulate productive activity in that zone.

The director of the Office of Green Zones feels that, in terms of agricultural production, the program will result in a notable increase in yield, since such problems as the shortage of water for irrigation will be eliminated.

"We hope that, with the execution of this project, the yield per hectare will increase significantly. Without a shadow of a doubt, the principal beneficiaries of the project will be the people, in that they will have water for their farm plots, which is not the case now," our interviewee added.

According to the same official, the project will have an impact on productive activity in the capital city, particularly on the production of vegetables. This means that the zone could become the major center for production and supply of vegetables to the city.

"In this way, Maputo will no longer be dependent on other areas for its supply of vegetables," Luciano Santana said.

Aid From French Volunteers

One aspect of this project which could be considered an innovation is the participation of volunteers from the French Association of Volunteers for Progress.

This group, which should arrive here soon, includes individuals who will work in agriculture; others will work on the drainage project and still others will work with machinery.

6362

CSO: 3442/184

NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

AID TO SWAPO, ANC--The government decided today to increase slightly the aid to the liberation organizations SWAPO /South-West African People's Organization/ and ANC /African National Congress/ in southern Africa. They will receive a total of over 100 million kronor next year, compared with 90 million this year. The aid will be used, among other things, for refugees from Namibia. The government decided also to earmark 5 million kronor disaster aid to help the small farmers affected by the war in Nicaragua. /Text/ /Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1445 GMT 24 Apr 86 LD/ 12228

CSO: 3400/1604

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

LUKMAN, IRANIAN MINISTER CONFER--Geneva, 16 April, IRNA--The Iranian Oil Minister Gholam Reza Aqazadeh and his Nigerian counterpart S Lukman exchanged views on ways for reducing production ceiling as well as practical ways for allocating reduced quotas for OPEC member countries here Tuesday night. The Iranian minister said he was categorically opposed to any quota increase of member states in view of the present situation of the oil market. The Nigerian minister said it is unlikely that OPEC members agree on a strategy for production cuts. He said that the oil price decline was the result of a plot imposed on OPEC. Meanwhile, in the second session of the meet the Islamic Republic of Iran opposed a proposal to increase members quotas in order to achieve a fair share for the OPEC market. In Wednesday's session Agazadeh said that since Saudi Arabia has increased its production, OPEC members as well as non-OPEC producers have been forced to drive down their prices. He furthermore said that Iran believes that logical prices will be reached at only by reducing production of OPEC member countries. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1733 GMT 16 Apr 86 LD] /12913

CSO: 3400/1614

SENEGAL

PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY EXPLORED

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 28 Mar 86 pp 6,7

[Article by Y.N.: "The Limits of The Policy"]

[Text] No more subsidies for all products, less state interventionism in the economic domain and more freedom for private enterprise in the industrial sector. However, implementation of the New Industrial Policy (NPI) still poses huge difficulties.

"We have waited too long; it was beginning in the 1960's that we needed to think about liberalizing the Senegalese economy. If we had done so in time, instead of allowing the welfare state to develop, we would not have had many of the problems from which our economy suffers today, including an excessive debt and deficit, a very negative foreign exchange balance, and aging infrastructure. Because we waited too long, we are going to suffer more. Because the welfare state has lasted too long, it will be difficult, or even impossible, to get the people to accept that nothing will any longer be subsidized, not basic foodstuffs, not water, and not electricity, and that from now on we will have to live with the idea of an increase one day or another in the ranks of unemployed. Since even that is the necessary course for a real recovery of our economy."

These proposals were made by a specialist following the lecture organized by the Gresen on 13 March on the topic of "Privatization in Africa," a subject introduced by the banker, Jean de la Giroday. These proposals are not shared by all the local economists. To some, such as the Marxist-oriented, the idea thus expressed intensifies the "smell of a neo-liberalism that does not state its name." The social aspect remains at the center of their concerns. They see in privatization a final gaining of control by international capitalism over our economy.

What does privatizing mean? And how does one privatize? To the first question, Mr De la Giroday responds that for the state it means disengaging itself from the industrial sector. How? By partially or totally turning over its shares to the private sector, of course after having restructured the still viable enterprises. In the case of Senegal, disengagement by the state from the para-public sector would not affect the so-called strategic enterprises such as SENELEC and SONEES [Senegalese National Water and Electricity Company]. However, this would not rule out these corporations necessarily having to take a slight weight-loss cure to ease their costs and become more competitive.

Scepticism

As for the rest of the enterprises, those that are not viable would have to disappear, and the others pass partially or wholly into the hands of the private sector. A passing of the baton that promises to be difficult when you know the scepticism of businessmen in regard to the the NPI. What they want is for the Senegalese state to no longer intervene in this sector, which should be left entirely in their hands. Yet, the NPI promoters are preaching a restrained interventionism by the state. That is why our economic operators and foreign capital still show mistrust in regard to committing themselves to the process underway.

It is not only the dialogue between the state and the private sector that can make the NPI a success. The biggest problem that this new policy has to face is legal-social. Social, because there will have to be cutbacks in all the enterprises involved before turning the keys over to the buyers. However, at this level a significant legal problem arises.

Under Article 64 of the Labor Code, whose purpose is to assure that the worker is retained in the job in case of change in employer, any reduction in prospect of transfer of the enterprise is a clear violation of the law. According to this article, the Senegalese state must thus sell its enterprises with the entire personnel complement. Under the same law, neither can the buyer carry out layoffs when he receives the sale item. He must at least assume all the responsibilities turned over by the state at the moment of sale.

Birth Delivery

When you realize the excess of personnel that is the privilege of all the para-public enterprises, one may ask oneself how the NPI is going to solve this. Unless it follows the example of the French Socialists. In other words, lay off first, and when you come before the court, assign to the plaintiffs interest-damages for illegal layoffs that nevertheless take effect. The fact remains that such layoffs (indeed a whole parade of them) should be annulled because illegal.

The NPI exists. On paper it is a fine plan that can provide us long-term benefits. In practice, the difficulties it raises are great but not insurmountable. We must still exercise prudence. The firmness regarding social problems called for by Mr De la Giroday in his lecture is, theoretically at least, something desirable, but not to the point of assaulting the attitude of Senegalese, particularly those who will have to pay the cost for this new industrial policy. Especially since this is also, and above all, a matter of the stability of our country. The NPI's birth delivery will certainly be difficult, but at least let it be carried out by an extended process so that the suffering will be reduced.

9920

CS0: 3419/241

SEYCHELLES

BRIEFS

CEMENT FROM USSR--Victoria, 24 Apr (AFP)--Seychelles received 5,000 tons of cement from the Soviet Union Wednesday, part of a 5 million dollar gift for which an agreement was signed in November last year. The cement now being unloaded by a Soviet freighter was officially handed over to Youth and Defense Minister Ogilvy Berlouis by Soviet Charge d'Affaires Vladimir Anikin. Seychelles had already received 7,000 tons of fuel under the protocol signed by the two countries last November. A similar amount of fuel will be delivered next year as the second part of the gift. Mr Anikin pointed out that the latest consignment had arrived on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Victoria. /Text/
/Paris AFP in English 1200 GMT 24 Apr 86 AB/ 12228

CSO: 3400/1604

SIERRA LEONE

BRIEFS

REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES--Freetown, 19 Apr (AFP)--A total of 535 candidates have registered for the upcoming general elections scheduled for late May in Sierra Leone, a source close to the All People's Congress (APC--sole party) announced today. The breakdown per constituency of the 535 candidates who paid the registration of 500 Leones is as follows: 103 candidates for west constituency, 164 candidates for the north, 154 for the south and 114 for the east. They will run for the 103 seats in parliament. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1419 GMT 19 Apr 86 AB] /8918

ALGERIAN OIL OFFER--Freetown, 16 Apr (AFP)--An Algerian delegation led by the Algerian Vice Minister of Cooperation, Mohamed Aberkane, today began a visit to Sierra Leone aimed at strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries, it was learned in the Sierra Leonean capital. Mr Aberkane, who was received today by President Joseph Momoh, told the press that his country was willing to assist Sierra Leone in its oil supply, specifying that Algerian experts would come to the country to assess its needs. Under a trade agreement signed last March in Algiers by President Momoh--then on his maiden trip abroad since he became president--Sierra Leone should already be receiving 60,000 tons of Algerian crude oil in order to remedy the oil shortage which has seriously disturbed its activities. Mr Aberkane, who described his talks with the Sierra Leonean head of state as "fruitful," stated that the bilateral relations between Algiers and Freetown was of vital importance for the development of South-South cooperation. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1356 GMT 16 Apr 86 AB] /12913

CSO: 3400/1614

UGANDA

SOLDIERS RECEIVE TRAINING IN TANZANIA

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 4 Apr 86 p 3

[Excerpt] Dar es Salaam, Thursday--Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi has commissioned 20 soldiers from Uganda who have been trained in Tanzania, Press reports said.

The Ugandans were commissioned together with 45 from the Tanzanian army after completing their training at the Monduli Military Academy, the reports said.

The ceremony was attended by senior army officials from Uganda, Mozambique and Nigeria, as well as Tanzanian Deputy Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim, who is responsible for defence.

The Ugandans were sent for training by the former military council regime which was ousted by the

National Resistance Army (NRA) of President Yoweri Museveni in January.

Observers said the presence of officers from Kampala at the ceremony indicated that the graduates had been accepted by the new regime and would be incorporated into the NRA.

Two Ugandan soldiers and one Tanzanian received special awards for excelling in their training, they were Second-Lieutenants O.J. Ochen and N.J. Lakara from Uganda and N.L. Butamo from Tanzania.

CSO: 3400/1609

UGANDA

KISEKKA URGES SUPPORT FOR NEW BANKING INSTITUTION

EA190250 Kampala Domestic Service in English 0700 GMT 17 Apr 86

[Text] The Prime Minister, Dr Samson Kisekka, has opened a new credit institution, (Sembule) Investment Finance Company [SIFC], with a fresh call to Ugandans to willingly lend money to the government through the process of treasury bills and government stocks. Dr Kisekka told guests by doing so, Ugandans would help the government to avoid policies like those of former regimes which mishandled the economy by printing notes thereby creating massive inflation. He disclosed that by the time the NRM [National Resistance Movement] came to power, the money supply in the economy was 240,000 million shillings, compared to a mere 31,000 million in 1981.

Dr Kisekka hoped that given such ventures like the SIFC Ltd and an enterprising will of the people to sacrifice some fruits of their labor for the greater good, the people of Uganda will have a good future. The prime minister underscored the importance of mobilization of financial resources in a developing economy and commended the action of (Sembule) steel mills to set up a financial institution as a step in the right direction. The prime minister assured potential firms and individuals in [word indistinct] mobilizing their funds for the benefit of others that Uganda has the necessary manpower to guide them. He also assured them of the government's willingness to give maximum support and cooperation provided their endeavors are within and complementary to the governments policy of building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining economy.

Dr Kisseka reiterated his call to Ugandans to solve the task of rebuilding the economy with concerted efforts and appealed to those involved in mobilizing finances for development projects to realize the importance of creating an atmosphere of fairness and confidence so that potential and actual investors and customers are encouraged to be more productive. He also emphasized the need to be competitive and exemplary in the art of financing in order to encourage others to follow. The prime minister reiterated government's commitment to do everything possible to maintain a positive atmosphere of security for both internal and international investment, which is an essential prerequisite for development.

Introducing the prime minister to the guests, the Minister of Finance, Professor Ponsiano Mulema, described the opening of the bank as a bold gesture which would help bridge the gap in the banking infrastructure. He welcomed

the establishment of the new banking institution (?as) [word indistinct]. He urged banking institutions to use facilities available at the Bank of Uganda to finance long term projects, to open up more branches in the country and to educate their customers on the full range of services they offer.

The Chairman of the Bank, Mr Christoper (Sembiya), appealed to Ugandans to come forward and participate in large-scale industries instead of limiting themselves to small industries. SIFC Ltd is a privately-owned bank by (?indigenous) Ugandans, which will start with 500,000,000 shillings paid capital and 1,000 million shillings authorized capital.

/12913

CSO: 3400/1602

UGANDA

BRIEFS

SOLDIERS, VETERANS CALLED UP--Kampala, Wednesday--Defence ministry officials have ordered army officers and soldiers who served under the ousted military council government to report to the ministry headquarters here. Uganda radio reported today. The radio said the order covered all ex-soldiers not yet incorporated into the National Resistance Army (NRA) of President Yoweri Museveni, including those who had already been "cleared" by the new authorities since the NRA took power here in late January. Observers said the order likely meant the ex-soldiers would be subjected to further "screening" exercise by the country's new security forces. In a related development, the NRA commander at Kampala's Lubiri barracks, San Semakula, has also ordered all former branch chairmen and youth activists of ex-president Milton Obote's political party to report to the barracks. [Text] [Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 13 Mar 86 p 3] /12851

DEBTS TOTAL ONE BILLION--Kampala, Friday--Uganda's external debt totals about \$1 billion, but it can be repaid and does not threaten the country's economic recovery, Finance Minister Ponsiano Mulema said today. He told NEW VISION, a newly-established, government-owned weekly, that this amount includes \$300 million borrowed from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by former president Milton Obote who was ousted last July. "The IMF loans are short-term loans and cannot be rescheduled. "The other loans, from the World Bank and the International Development Association, are intermediate and long term amounting to over \$700 million. "But they are generally soft loans and do not impose any constraints on Uganda," he said. Prices would not be fixed by government decree. [Text] [Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 22 Mar 86 p 1] /12851

CSO: 3400/1609

ZAIRE

KINSHASA REPORTS ON RESTRUCTURING OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

AB181337 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1210 GMT 18 Apr 86

/Excerpts/ Without any further ado, we will call upon our correspondent /name indistinct/ at Mont Ngaliema. /name indistinct/ I suppose you have already received the ordinances or the ordinance concerning the restructuring of the Executive Council /words indistinct/.

/Correspondent/ We have the ordinances; I have here with me (Lumbara Kataka). We have quickly glanced through the ordinances and we are particularly struck by the reduction in the number of departments and also by the regrouping of the departments. These are the first things that are striking in the (?reshuffle). /Words indistinct/ in order to be more precise, it is better to give figures. For example, there were 28 commissioners in the former cabinet. They are now reduced to 23. That means that five departments were cancelled--meaning that there are five fewer state commissioners than before.

As for the secretaries of state, I would also like to bring to your attention a certain number of things. Eleven of them have retained their posts, 3 have exchanged posts, and 14 leave the Executive Council. /Passage indistinct/ One other thing which we will bring to the attention of our listeners before reading the ordinances is this compression of the departments. Not long ago, we questioned the founding chairman and the first state commissioner, who at this very moment are still together in the office of the MPR founding chairman, here in Mont Ngaliema. This compression is naturally aimed at.../changes thought/ the watchword here is efficiency. /Passage indistinct/ for example, there is the case of the department of information. So that it may achieve its aim, this department needs the support of the Posts and Telecommunications Department; it is quite normal that the posts and telecommunications department should be attached to or fused with the Department of Press and Information. What is also very practical and interesting is that it will help in avoiding conflicts--conflicts of competence that we come across sometimes.

On the other hand you will notice a break--an intelligence break--at the level of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Affairs Department has (?broken away from) the Department of Cooperation and, as the founding chairman has said, it is appropriate that at the level of external relations we are able to take care of the issues of trade. This is why we will probably find cooperation (?attached to) trade. /passage indistinct/

Ordinance No 86 /words indistinct/ of 18 April 1986 concerning the appointment of the members of the Executive Council: The MPR founding chairman and president of the Republic of Zaire, considering the Constitution, especially articles /figures indistinct/ decrees:

Art 1: The functions of the state commissioner for national defense, territorial security, and war veterans are exercised by the MPR founding chairman and president of the republic.

(?Art 2): First state commissioner	Citizen Kengo wa Dondo
(?Art 3): <u>/Passage indistinct/</u> MOPAP <u>/Political Directorate for Mobilization, Propaganda, and Political Action/</u>	Duga Kugbe Toro
Territorial Administration and Decentralization	Mwando Nsimba
Foreign Affairs	Bula Nyati
International Cooperation and External Trade	<u>/Name indistinct/</u> (Watsatana)
Justice	Kande Buloba Kasumpata
MPR Youth, Sports, and Leisure	Tsimbombo Mukuna
Women's and Family Affairs	(Mayuma Kala)
Information and Press	Ramazani Baya
Finance, Budget, and Bills	Djamboleka Loma Kitongono
Planning	(Songoi Pisabangi)
Agriculture and Rural Development	(Bo Kanuji)
National Economy and Industry	Mokonda Bonza
Mines and Energy	(Ileo Itombala)
Public Works and Territorial Administration	Thambwe Mwamba
Transport and Communications	(Kasasa Signasi Lunkati)
Land Affairs, Environment, and Preservation of Nature	Pendje Demodeto
Higher and University Education and Scientific Research	Mokolo wa Mpombo

Primary and Secondary Education	Nzege Aliazambina
Public Health and Social Welfare	Dr (Ngandu Kabega)
Civil Service	Kembukuswa Nee Nzala
Labor and Social Security	(Mbatl Mbatcha)
Culture, Arts, and Tourism	(Beyeye Djema)

Ordinance No 86/120 of 18 April 1986, on the appointment of secretaries of state of the ministries.

The MPR founding chairman and president of the Republic, considering the Constitution, especially Arts 36, 42, and 45 and considering Ordinance No 82/046 of 31 March 1982 on the organization and functioning of the Executive Council, especially Art 18, ordains:

Art 1: The following are appointed secretaries of state:

National Defense and Territorial Security	Likulia Bolongo
Veterans Affairs	(Dangalan Massia)
Territorial Administration	<u>/Name indistinct/</u>
<u>/Passage indistinct/</u>	
Primary and Secondary Education	Nzali Lopembe
Labor and Social Security	Kisolokele Wamba

Art 2: All previous provisions contrary to the present ordinance have been abrogated. The present ordinance takes effect from the date of its signing.

Issued in Kinshasa /words indistinct/ 1986

Signed: Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa za Banga

/12228

CSO: 3400/1603

ZAIRE

RSA RADIO SAYS ZIMBABWE HEADING FOR 'ETHNIC STRIFE, ECONOMIC DECAY'

MB211244 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 21 Apr 86

/Station Commentary: "Zimbabwe"/

/Text/ Zimbabwe enters its 7th year of independence with a prospect of a one-party state still hanging over the country. A one-party socialist system remains the Marxist ideal of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. To achieve this ideal he must unite his Shona-dominated ruling ZANU-PF Party with the minority Matebele ZAPU Party of Mr Joshua Nkomo, or subjugate by force the fierce Matebele nation which constitutes only 15 percent of the population but controls western Zimbabwe.

Recently Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo have been trying to heal the rift between their parties and national goals, but during the past week Mr Nkomo's bitter remarks that the country was more fear ridden than ever indicated the almost unbridgeable gulf existing between the two groups. Mr Mugabe's other stumbling block in the way of a one-party domination are the 20 parliamentary seats guaranteed for whites. But in his anniversary broadcast, Mr Mugabe gave notice that fundamental constitutional changes would be made during the next era. So as Zimbabwe heads steadily towards one party domination without recognition of important group differences such as the Matebele and white group interests, the country might be heading from recent years of at least reasonable economic stability to a new period of ethnic strife and economic decay spurred on by Mr Mugabe's recently announced 5-year development plan which he says will be a key instrument in steering Zimbabwe towards socialism.

With his ambitions for a one-party state and greater socialism, Mr Mugabe may be leading Zimbabwe towards an era of turmoil which has already caused the economic and social collapse of many other African states.

/12228

CSO: 3400/1603

ZAIRE

BRIEFS

MOBUTU MEETS WITH TINDEMANS--The misunderstanding between Belgium and Zaire has come to an end. Simone Remon has just telephoned us this minute. She is following the visit of /Belgium's/ Minister of External Affairs /Leo/ Tindemans for us and is calling us to announce that President Mobutu officially received Mr Tindemans today. The communique which rounds off the talks which Mr Tindemans has already had since the beginning of this week speaks of privileged relations between our two countries and of arranging mechanisms for bilateral consultation as well as consultations within the context of international bodies in which Belgium and Zaire are represented. On the other hand, the communique does not say a word about Sabena /Belgian National Airline/. Mr Tindemans has officially invited President Mobutu to Belgium. The date has not yet been fixed. /Text/ /Brussels Domestic Service in French 1600 GMT 23 Apr 86 LD/ 12228

UNTZA DELEGATION TO VISIT MOSCOW--Kinshasa, 17 Apr (AZAP)--The National Union of Workers of Zaire /UNTZA/ will be represented at the May Day festivities in Moscow at the invitation of the Council of Soviet Trade Unions. The UNTZA delegation, which will leave the capital at the beginning of next week, will first of all visit certain Soviet industries as well as have several contacts in order to strengthen the cooperation agreements existing between the Zairian labor union and the Soviet trade unions. It will be composed of Citizens Bomba Nzei and Mabeki, respectively national secretary in charge of the Transport Workers Federation and secretary of the workers union of Inga in Bas-Zaire. The cooperation between the UNTZA and the Soviet trade unions has already been concretized through exchanges of friendly visits to Kinshasa and Moscow as well as through an important quantity of drugs supplied by the Soviet trade unions last year to the CASOP /expansion unknown/. /Text/ /Kinshasa AZAP in French 1340 GMT 17 Apr 86 AB/ 12228

DIAMOND, GOLD EXPORT FIGURES REPORTED--Kinshasa, 15 Apr (AZAP)--Zaire's diamond and gold exports for the month of March 1986 rose respectively to 1,867,335.56 carats valued at \$19,257,379.13 and 36,308 kg of gold ore valued at 336,010.61 /figure as received/. The National Valuation Center, which gave these indications in its monthly statistics, disclosed that during that period, the approved companies exported 1,161,579.02 carats of diamonds valued at \$11,985,230, that is an average of \$10.32 for a carat. The previous month, these companies had exported 1,126,375.85 carats valued at \$11,072,876 and the average was \$9.83 for a carat. The Societe Miniere de Bakwanga (MIBA) exported in March 799,171.20

carats of diamond valued at \$6,673,079.58 against 802,557.40 carats valued at \$6,420,459.20 for the previous month. The average was \$8.35 for a carat against \$8 in February. As for the Gecamines Commerciale, its exports in March rose to 6,585.35 carats valued at \$599,069.55 against 10,664.30 carats valued at \$684,336.30 in February. Gold export fell by more than 70 percent compared to the previous month (89,128 kg valued at \$796,231.86 for February).
/Text/ /Kinshasa AZAP in French 1505 GMT 15 Apr 86 AB/ 12228

NEW INDIAN ENVOY—Kinshasa, 24 Apr (AZAP)—Mr Migam Prakash, the ambassador of India to Zaire, left Kinshasa on Thursday for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea where he is scheduled to present his letters of credence. Apart from Zaire, the Indian diplomat is also accredited as India's ambassador to Congo, CAR, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. /Excerpts/ /Kinshasa AZAP in French 1628 GMT 24 Apr 86 AB/ 12228

ENVOY TO HUNGARY—MPR—founding chairman and president of the republic, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, has just appointed Citizen Bulambo wa Mwenda as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Zaire to the Hungarian People's Republic with residence in Vienna. Citizen Bulambo wa Mwenda, who is already our ambassador to Austria, will thus have extended jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Citizen (Morahiri) Mitima Kadeni presented his credentials to His Majesty Emperor Hirohito of Japan on 25 March 1986. /Excerpt/ /Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 0600 GMT 19 Apr 86 AB/ 12228

CSO: 3400/1603

22 May 1986

ZIMBABWE

PRESIDENT BANANA UNOPPOSED FOR SECOND TERM

Harare THE HERALD in English 11 Apr 86 p 1

[Text]

PRESIDENT Banana, whose first term as president ends at midnight on Thursday next week, was the only name put forward when nominations for President closed late yesterday afternoon.

The Speaker of the House of Assembly, Cde Didymus Mutasa, said last night that Cde Banana's was the only valid nomination received.

He confirmed that the electoral college, all 100 MPs and 40 Senators, would meet next Thursday for the formal announcement of the President-elect but there was no need for a vote.

Cde Banana was also elected for his first six-year term unopposed and was sworn into office just after midnight on April 18, 1980.

In terms of the Constitution a president may serve a maximum of two terms.

/9317

CSO: 3400/1605

ZIMBABWE

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE FINDS SMITH GUILTY OF CONTEMPT

Harare THE HERALD in English 9 Apr 86 pp 1, 5

[Text] CAZ leader Mr Ian Smith harmed reconciliation between whites and blacks with his derogatory remarks about black Zimbabweans in a BBC television interview last October, a special Parliamentary committee has reported.

The eight-man committee, in a report tabled in the House of Assembly yesterday, said it believed the remarks were by inference derogatory to the representatives of blacks in Parliament and the Government and had damaged the image of Zimbabwe overseas.

The committee found that the remarks constituted a contempt of Parliament and that "it is the duty of Parliament to take such steps as it sees fit to prevent Mr Smith making similar statements in future."

The committee, chaired by Mr Bill Irvine (IZG, Marlborough), was set up last year as a result of an amended motion passed by the Assembly. The committee was asked to investigate "statements which are derogatory to this Government and the African people which Mr Smith made recently while abroad."

The committee recommended that Mr Smith be asked to make an unqualified apology to the Speaker for the contempt of Parliament he committed on November 27 and that those CAZ MPs who stayed out of the chamber on the same day should also make unqualified written apologies to the Speaker.

Two senior CAZ MPs, Mr Mark Partridge and Mr Lou Ankers, gave evasive and suspect evidence, the committee said, and recommended that the Speaker should seek both MPs at his discretion.

Two members of the committee, Mr G. Biffen (CAZ, Bulawayo South), and Mr S.A. Locke (CAZ, Western), objected to much of the report and Cde Byron Hove (Zanu-PF, Gokwe East), objected to sections criticising Mr Partridge and Mr Ankers.

The committee viewed a video recording of the BBC interview on John Nicolson's Open to Question screened in Britain on October 8, studied transcripts of the programme and called several witnesses, including Mr Smith, to give evidence.

While a number of Mr Smith's comments were of concern to the committee, three answers were of specific concern.

During the interview Mr Smith was asked: "You didn't have one man one vote?"

Mr Smith said: "Well, I think one man one vote is a negation of democracy... I believe in a meritocracy." He said qualifications were needed for driving and flying. "But a far more important thing is exercising a vote of his country. You say 'no qualifications'! What could be more insane than that?"

He added later: "...The most intelligent, the most honourable, the most skilled man in your country has no more say in the government of your country than the most [word blurred] unintelligent man of your country and that is what one man one vote does: that the biggest gangster, the biggest crook in your country has the same say as your finest person. Is it not madness?"

Mr Smith was questioned by the committee on the statement and asked who he was referring to as the most intelligent, honourable and skilled man.

Mr Smith said he was not referring to a particular person and said the remark had nothing to do with race or colour and that there were many white people he did not think should have the vote.

Replying to another question he said he did not have any particular person in mind when referring to the most unskilled and unintelligent person in the country. He also said he had not thought about it when asked if he agreed that the Government included some of the most intelligent people.

In spite of Mr Smith's evidence that his remarks referred to people of all races, the committee felt that in the context of the whole interview, he was referring to whites as the most intelligent, honourable and skilled group and by implication was referring to blacks as the most unskilled and unintelligent.

"Your committee, therefore, is of the opinion that in this instance Mr Smith's remarks were derogatory to the black people of this country and have been widely construed to be so."

In answering another television question, Mr Smith used the phrase: "And I just make another point to you: I believe that there is something

other than education that is needed to qualify people for a vote, to qualify them for being civilised. I think that is something that takes time."

The committee asked Mr Smith if he thought most blacks were civilised in 1980 and he said, after a digression on the term "civilised": "Well, not to the extent that I thought they could use the vote under the democratic system." He agreed that the majority of the people were not civilised for the purpose of the 1980 election.

Answering another question in the television interview: "Are you calling black people backward?" Mr Smith replied: "The majority of them have had no schooling, no education. They can neither read nor write. They don't understand the political system foisted upon them. They have been brought up under a completely different system — a tribal system and they have got to have this willy nilly."

Questioned by the committee, Mr Smith first

said that the majority of people he associated with as a farmer did not understand the system although it was put to him that as a former prime minister he would be aware of what the people of the country were like.

He later said that most people had not had the benefit of "that wonderful education system" and that in the past many people had refused to send their children to school. Eventually Mr Smith said it was a fair comment to say that the majority of Zimbabwean adults could not read and write.

The report then deals with evidence from the Secretary for Education, Dr E. J. Chanakira, and accepted that at the time of the 1980 general election 70.93 percent of the people entitled to vote were literate and could read and write in their mother tongue. (2 065 430 out of 2 909 490.)

The committee had no doubt that when he said "the majority of them... can neither read nor write" he was referring to the black electorate of

1980 and this remark was thus untrue.

"Your committee also believes that Mr Smith's claim that the black electorate in 1980 was not civilised is equally spurious.

"Your committee, therefore, is of the opinion that on the above two points, Mr Smith was again being derogatory to the black people of Zimbabwe."

While not looking in depth at other points made by Mr Smith in the interview, the committee believed "that the tone adopted by Mr Smith during the interview as a whole was derogatory to the black people of Zimbabwe".

The committee had access to an opinion produced for the Speaker by parliamentary counsel on whether the comments made in the television interview were a breach of parliamentary privilege.

The report quotes from the opinion which includes the sentence: "A reasonable man of ordinary intelligence would therefore understand Mr Smith's statement as saying that black Members are incompetent to run the Government of Zimbabwe."

The committee concurred with the counsel's opinion that Mr Smith was guilty of a breach of parliamentary privilege but that the decision to make this finding was vested in Parliament itself.

The report then dealt with the events of November 27 last year. Mr Smith was due to move a private member's motion under

his name on the order paper.

But Mr Smith declined to move the motion and argued with the Deputy Speaker then presiding. Cde Byron Hove was then asked to speak to his amendment (the amendment which led to the setting up of the committee). Mr Smith and the majority of his colleagues in the CAZ then rose and left the chamber.

The next day the Speaker announced that Mr Smith's conduct the previous day amounted to contempt of Parliament. On December 5, two days after the committee was set up, Mr Smith made a personal statement in which he said he believed his behaviour did not amount to contempt but that if it did he apologised unreservedly.

The committee was in no doubt that the statement contained contentious matter and so was an infringement of parliamentary rules and believed that the likelihood of the committee investigation caused Mr Smith to make the statement and qualified apology.

"Your committee does not believe that Mr Smith's personal explanation in any way mitigates the contempt of Parliament ruling, nor does it constitute a full and unqualified apology."

The committee also investigated the CAZ walkout, taking evidence from Mr Smith, Mr Partridge, Mr Ankers, Mr D. C. Mitchell (CAZ, South-

ern), Mr C. W. Duke (CAZ, Highlands) and Mr S. Dyson (CAZ, Kopje). Mr Duke and Mr Mitchell said they had been beckoned out by Mr Ankers and Mr Dyson said the three had been beckoned out by Mr Partridge or Mr Ankers.

Mr Partridge, whose evidence was described as "most unsatisfactory and evasive" and who said on at least 10 occasions that he could not remember, did accept that he had beckoned out two or three members.

He said the walkout was a consensus, "more or less of people leaving spontaneously" although the committee was clear that the walkout could not have been completely spontaneous if Mr Partridge had to beckon some members out.

All CAZ witnesses said CAZ MPs left the chamber as they did not want to get involved in a racial debate. The committee thought that could have been achieved by MPs remaining seated and keeping silent.

"It is the opinion of your committee that there was an agreement between Mr Smith, Mr Ankers and Mr Partridge to keep CAZ members out of the chamber. The fact that the walkout of CAZ members was simultaneous might mean that it was spontaneous, but their continued absence from the chamber was deliberate and, in the opinion of your committee, was in contempt of the Speaker."

ZIMBABWE

ZAPU MP MALUNGA SAID TO HAVE 'CASE TO ANSWER'

Harare THE HERALD in English 7 Apr 86 pp 1, 7

[Text]

THE trial of the Zapu chief whip and Mpopoma MP, Sidney Malunga, on two counts of helping dissidents continued at the regional court, Harare, yesterday, after an application for discharge was dismissed on Saturday, in what is probably the first such Sunday hearing.

Malunga, who is alleged to have provided \$90 to buy clothes and cigarettes for dissidents in the Lupane area, north-east of Bulawayo in 1982, has pleaded not guilty to both counts.

The defence yesterday withdrew allegations that soldiers operating in Lupane in 1982 might have committed atrocities.

This followed an application by the State to reopen its case by calling members of the army to testify. The State also applied for a former chief police superintendent, Mr Morgan Sibanda, to testify on circumstances surrounding Malunga's release from detention in April 1983.

Malunga had told the court that on the day of his release from custody he had been told by the chief superintendent that he had no case to answer.

Public prosecutor Mr Godwill Misimirembwa said that the release did not mean that Malunga had no case to answer, adding that if the opposite was true the defence had to support it with evidence.

In his ruling on the issue, regional magistrate Mr Paddington Garwe said: "It was my intention to call the superintendent to give evidence that would clear the circumstances surrounding the release of the accused after being held on charges similar to the present."

Despite the dismissal of the discharge application, Malunga yesterday said

that the evidence given by State witnesses had been so full of discrepancies that the State should have withdrawn its case from the beginning.

At the last hearing in Gweru, Mr David Coltart for Malunga applied to have the case dropped on grounds that the State had failed to show that Malunga knew or had reason to believe that the \$90 he had given was going to end up aiding dissidents.

But on Saturday, Mr Garwe said he was not satisfied that a prima facie case did not exist and asked whether Malunga thought the money was being sent to "the SPCA or Red Cross".

Witnesses who testified earlier in the case and, may not be named following a court order, said letters had been written by armed men to Malunga.

The letters, the witnesses said, were conveyed to the MP in Bulawayo by villagers from Lupane.

Mr Garwe said although one witness was unreliable, the State evidence was not of poor quality, and dismissed the application.

Giving evidence following the dismissal of the application, Malunga said the charges were "a false political frame-up made to keep me out of circulation".

Malunga said he was an outspoken critic of detention without trial and Mr Coltart, quoting ex-

tensively the MP's parliamentary contributions, highlighted Malunga's opposition to the renewal of the State of Emergency and his allegations about army atrocities in Matabeleland.

Mr Coltart said Malunga was "a veteran of detentions and prisons", citing his intermittent detention before and after independence.

He contended that the trial was political and that "it was Zapu that was being tried".

Malunga said one of the witnesses who had claimed that he knew the MP as his Zapu political leader because he saw Malunga addressing political meetings in Bulawayo between 1974 and 1980 was lying because "I was in detention at that time".

Malunga claimed that he was tortured when he was detained for the second time after independence in 1983.

He denied knowing one of the State witnesses who had claimed to be a Zapu branch chairman in

Lupane.

The witness had also lied because he had later denied being a party official, Malunga said.

The prosecutor objected to linking Zapu with the trial, saying the charges were against Malunga as an individual.

Malunga said the State should have dropped the case because portions of the indictment were based "on hearsay" and witnesses were not telling the truth.

An alleged conduit between Malunga and the bandits had not been brought before the court, and Malunga said this was an anomaly.

He also said when he was detained for the first time on suspicion of the same charge in 1983, he had been told by superintendent Sibanda that he had nothing to answer and released.

He said he was surprised that the matter had been re-opened after such a long time. — Herald Reporter-Ziana.

/9317

CSO: 3400/1605

SOUTH AFRICA

FRG'S BRANDT MEETS WITH BOTHA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Apr 86 p 4

[Article by Andreas Razumovsky: "Brandt and Botha Do Not Take a Fancy to One Another: A 'Disastrous' Meeting: Talk With Mandela Refused"]

[Text] Johannesburg, 22 Apr--South African President Botha and Willy Brandt did not take much of a fancy to one another. Even though both men were reserved in their comments after the nearly one-hour talk on Monday--Brandt spoke of a "presentation of sufficiently well-known views, offered with a considerable amount of obstinacy"--reports of a "heated collision" in Cape Town should be given credence. SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] representative Verheugen spoke of a "disastrous" encounter: "He didn't even offer us coffee..."

The chances of a harmonious discussion between the two politicians with vastly different points of view were small. At best, an earlier encounter, about which Brandt reported, might have helped matters. In 1963, as the mayor of Berlin, he had received then-South African Defense Minister Botha, who has regrettably forgotten this meeting: "That was at a time in which I was building human bridges because others had built a horrible wall. The difficult task of working together with all sorts of partners of the most diverse political convictions played a role in my thinking. Sensible politics cannot be postponed until that moment when all people have the same political convictions."

The fact that Botha's attitude towards Brandt was from the outset a most unfriendly one can no doubt be attributed in part to the latter's role as chairman of the "South Africa meeting" of the "Socialist Internationale" the weekend before in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, thus in a place that the South Africans are accustomed to regarding as the front of their own power structure, and where they are not prepared to tolerate "outside interference." It was said in Johannesburg that Brandt was not nearly as "pragmatic" at this socialist meeting as elsewhere in southern Africa. Brandt told journalists that the gathering had asked him to convey to Botha that it views it "as insufficient to reform apartheid, but rather that it must be abolished." He did convey this message, he said. And Brandt added with a touch of sarcasm, "He did not agree." Botha also "distinctly did not agree" with Brandt's conception of South Africa's future, according to Brandt.

Botha reportedly countered the observation that South Africa is slipping into an inescapably vicious cycle of violence, saying that there is no "White violence," merely "protective measures by the White police to prevent attacks by Black perpetrators of violence on other Blacks." It is regrettable, Brandt said, that President Botha "is apparently not inclined to accept that friends of his country can express their thoughts about that country's future by expressing concern and combining it with serious warnings."

Brandt's request to also visit the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela, who has been in prison for over 20 years, was refused by Botha personally. Without this request, which has already become a set routine for progressives, Brandt could scarcely have shown his face before the "Socialist Internationale" and his partners in the ANC. The refusal of this formal request on the part of President Botha, who is increasingly under pressure from rightist Boers--who hardly fear anything more than the release of Mandela, which was planned only a few weeks ago--scarcely came as a surprise to Brandt. The government, Brandt said, depicts Mandela as "a communist and a terrorist." People such as former Conservative Prime Minister Frazer of Australia, who travelled to South Africa as a member of a Commonwealth commission and visited Mandela, got entirely opposite information from Mandela: "It was an honest answer, whatever his position may have been earlier." Brandt concluded with the observation: "If I had been allowed to speak with Mandela, my report at home would have been a little more positive."

12271

CSO: 3420/26

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE TRANSKEI MISUSE OF FUNDS

East London DAILY DISPATCH in English 11 Apr 86 p 1

[Text] Umtata--A judicial commission of inquiry, set to investigate the finances of all parastatal bodies under the Transkei Department of Commerce, will hear evidence of the possible misuse of funds totalling R120 million.

The commission was formed to probe the conduct of the Department of Commerce, Tourism and Industry and will investigate the alleged misappropriation of public money.

In his outline of general evidence yesterday, a member of the commission's legal team, Mr A. Findlay, SC, said the vastness of the investigation was shown by the fact that the original figure of about F11 million to be checked had increased to more than R120 million.

The commission would investigate senior officials of the department who authorised irregular payments, accountants and auditors who allowed irregular claims to pass and civil servants who were either persuaded to make payments or unintentionally made these payments.

The commission will investigate the role played by members of the department and other departments to establish whether they were negligent in their duties.

It must also report on the financial management in the department and the loss of state funds.

Evidence on the siphoning of R1,5 million from state funds would be given by a top official of the Auditor-General's office, Mr Findlay said.

In his address before the commission's first sitting, Mr Findlay said top Transkei Government officials had formed companies and used state cash set aside for industrial incentives for their private businesses.

Some of the officials had acted in league with industrialists who claimed inflated incentives benefits from the department.

He cited the case of a senior official in the department who had used his influence and formed a company dealing with a sawmill project.

Claims of up to R1,5 million were made within 18 months. The money was channelled into a bus company which is still under investigation.

Mr Findlay said the official had other flourishing businesses but the labourers at the sawmill were living on subsistence as they had not been paid for months.

He told the commission that a senior former employee of the Transkei Development Corporation would give evidence that the same official had, on several occasions, requested that certain incentive claims be paid out.

These claims were so inflated that junior officials had queried them. However, because of his seniority, the official had overruled their objections and the sums had been paid out.

Mr Findlay said all Transkei parastatal bodies, including the Transkei Development Corporation, were to be investigated because they all drew incentives from the Department of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.

About 12 industrialists in Transkei were still under investigation, he said.

Industrialists are entitled to incentive claims after they have established their businesses in Transkei and have presented their financial statements.

The commission is chaired by the Chief Justice, Mr Justice Van Reenen.

/12851

CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

GROWING INFLUENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY EXAMINED

Connection with ANC

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 11-17 Apr 86 pp 14, 15

[Article by Patrick Laurence]

[Text] THE hoisting of the red flag at funerals of black people killed in the township rebellion poses the question once again of the influence of the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union over the African National Congress.

When the flags of the SACP and the Soviet Union were raised at the funeral in Cradock last July of Matthew Goniwe and his three slain comrades, they were seen in some quarters as proof of the government view that communism is the driving force behind both the ANC and the rebellion sweeping across the country.

Not long afterwards President PW Botha spoke of the ANC's "enslavement to the South African Communist Party and its economic objectives". At about the same time his Law and Order Minister, Louis Le Grange, talked of a "communist assault" orchestrated by the SACP-ANC alliance, adding: "The head office of the alliance is in London under direct instructions from Moscow."

So neatly did the spectre of the red flags fit the official assertion that communists are behind black discontent that some observers even speculated that the flags had been planted at the funeral by Security Police or their agents in a bid to discredit radical black leaders.

But eight young men were subsequently charged under the Internal Security Act for raising the flags at Cradock. Since then red flags have appeared at several subsequent funerals.

The appearance of the red flags alongside ANC flags and banners is *prima facie* evidence of some support for communism in the black population. But whether that support is pervasive is another question.

Nor is it *per se* proof that the SACP is the dominant party in the tripartite alliance between it, the ANC and the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

There is no evidence that the flags were raised at the behest of the underground and, as far as is known, largely exiled SACP, rather than a spontaneous action by young black men acting on their own initiative. The pending trial of the eight Cradock men may provide more information.

Dr Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand, who is working on a study of the SACP, thought it more likely to be a spontaneous decision. The SACP is a small vanguard party which is not committed to mass recruitment in South Africa, he said in an interview. It tends rather to select its recruits from the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the fighting arm of the ANC, he added.

"I suspect it was local enthusiasm," Lodge said of the Cradock incident. "The red flag is a potent symbol of rebellion ... an eloquent expression of defiance."

Just as the ANC flag has been hoisted at funerals as visible testimony of the people's appreciation of its premier role in the struggle against apartheid, so the SACP flag has been raised as a reminder that the SACP — and, with it, the Soviet Union — is part of the alliance seeking the overthrow of the existing order in South Africa.

A top Security Police officer, however, took a different view. He agreed that the red flag was raised to show that the SACP is part of the ANC alliance but he doubted whether it was a spontaneous action. "Very little happens that is spontaneous," he said.

But whatever the precise details of the motivation for raising the red flag, there is little doubt that the SACP is an influential, though not necessarily dominant, force in the "liberation struggle".

The SACP is, however, largely a secret organisation, whose leadership, let alone rank-

and-file members, is largely unknown. It is thus difficult and even hazardous to appraise its role, except in the most general terms.

It helped to forge Umkhonto we Sizwe in the early 1960s when the decision to launch "armed struggle" was first taken. Since then it has endured in exile and, perhaps clandestinely in South Africa, to become a dynamic component of the ANC-centred alliance.

Of the 30 members elected to the ANC national executive in Kabwe, Zambia, last year, Lodge estimated that nearly half are SACP members. The Security Police officer calculated that nearly two-thirds were communists.

One of the communist members of the executive is Joe Slovo, who is thought to have been recently elected chairman of the CP central committee.

Even if Lodge's figure is too high — he details his reasoning meticulously — the SACP is undoubtedly a major factor in the ANC alliance. The revolts by Africanists against "leftist domination" of the ANC — the first led by Robert Sobukwe in 1958-59 and the second by Tennyson Makiwane in 1975 — is indirect evidence of the important role of communists in the ANC alliance.

Lodge, however, warned against equating the SACP influence with the number of its representatives on the ANC national executive.

Many communists are members of both the SACP and the ANC, meaning, presumably, that they would have to take account of ANC views and sentiments *per se*, even where these are in conflict with SACP policy. Further, some of the key positions in the national executive are held by non-communists. The ANC president, Oliver Tambo, is the pre-eminent example. Tambo, who was once a candidate for the Anglican ministry, was acknowledged as a non-communist by the Security Police officer interviewed by Weekly Mail.

Crai, Williamson, the former Security Police officer who penetrated the ANC while purporting to be a radical, spoke with respect for the political skills of the SACP. He labelled its strategic thinking "most sophisticated" and "years ahead" of that of the established parties.

Its power within the ANC-alliance was demonstrated by its ability to recruit men from Umkhonto we Sizwe and its control over the most successful of the MK units, the Special Operations unit, Williamson said.

Its "game plan" was not to assert itself against the non-communists but to support the ANC in the quest for a nonracial South Africa based on the Freedom Charter while building up a talented elite of dedicated communists ready to press on to the

second stage of the revolution — the creation of a socialist society.

The jailed Nelson Mandela could, of course, tip the ideological balance one way or another. Mandela declared himself forthrightly on the matter at his trial more than 20 years ago.

"It is true that there has often been close co-operation between the ANC and the Communist Party," he said.

"But co-operation is merely proof of a common goal — in this case the removal of white supremacy — and is not proof of a complete community of interests.

"The history of the world is full of similar examples. Perhaps the most striking illustration is to be found in the co-operation between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in the fight against Hitler."

Mandela went on to express admiration for "bourgeois" democracy, including specifically the British parliament and the American congress.

There is no evidence that Mandela has radically changed his stance and his influence appears to be consistent with that of Tambo's, whom Lodge described as a "man of consensus rather than extremes".

Against that, however, it must be conceded that the popular political culture of the townships abounds with strong socialist sentiments, manifest by condemnations of US imperialism and the chanting "vivas" for Slovo.

It is interesting to recall that before the old legal Communist Party of South Africa was banned in 1950, it resolved to relate the "struggle against racial discrimination to the struggle against capitalism by showing that the colour bar is primarily a technique of exploitation for private profit".

Today the equation between apartheid and capitalism is an axiom in the ideology of radical organisations from the United Democratic Front to the rival Azanian People's Organisation.

But the antipathy to capitalism in the townships is not so much the result of SACP propaganda as the product of South Africa's policy of "racial capitalism", in which nearly all the benefits of capitalism accrued to white capitalists and in which, until recently, aspirant black capitalists were largely hamstrung (except in the "homelands").

But the large and growing socialist constituency provides a potentially fertile area for SACP recruitment, should the SACP abandon its elite vanguard role and seek to become a mass-based party.

22 May 1986

Increasing Profile Within Country Notes

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 11-17 Apr 86 pp 14, 15

[Article by Howard Barrell]

[Text] **IT IS perhaps difficult for white South Africans, with an ingrained prejudice against communism, to understand why experienced African politicians so readily accept communists as their friends ... For many decades communists were the only political group which was prepared to eat with us, talk with us, live with us and work with us. They were the only political group which was prepared to work with**

the Africans for the attainment of political rights and a stake in society. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to equate freedom with communism. They are supported in this belief by a legislature which brands all exponents of democratic government and African freedom as communists ... ?

NELSON MANDELA (Speech at the Rivonia Trial, June 1964)

IN mid-1984, a sticker proclaiming South African Communist Party support for the campaign against the tricameral parliament appeared in a toilet at Wits University.

Some incredulous opponent of the new constitution scrawled across it: "Right wing smear!"

He obviously thought the sticker was a conservative attempt to portray the campaign against the new constitution as a red plot.

But a subsequent edition of the SACP's quarterly journal, the African Communist, revealed the sticker was, indeed, the real thing.

Presumably, it had been placed by a member of this outlawed party, which has now survived in some form for 33 years — underground inside the country and in exile.

The incident illustrates at least two things: that the party had become something of a stranger to the public mind, and that the scrawler was, ironically, to some extent, also a victim of the government's xenophobic anti-communism.

Now, both these patterns seem to be changing.

The Communist Party has again raised its profile; it is back in the news; and conditions have probably never been more favourable for its growth.

There are convincing indications that the recent increase in the SACP's profile is partly the result of a conscious decision taken at its last congress, held in London in late 1984.

Indications are that the SACP concluded the best way for it to strengthen the African National Congress alliance was to concentrate more of its forces on building its own strength as the SACP. This would relate to its view that the organisation of workers must be strengthened in order to ensure the leading role of the working class in the "national liberation struggle".

Its flag, a hammer and sickle on a red background, is now appearing inside the country with increased frequency alongside the black,

green and gold of its ally, the ANC. Its pamphlets have begun to appear again fairly regularly and apparently in quite large numbers.

And it has started producing a long quarterly agitational pamphlet, called "Umsebenzi" (The Worker), which includes instruction on both political issues and underground work.

The rise in black worker militancy in recent years, in which the SACP has no doubt played some role, has created conditions favouring the party's growth.

Government fulmination against communists and the SACP has, ironically, long served to bolster its image among the aggrieved — and never more so than now.

Why now?

There are probably two main reasons:

One, because never before has there been so broad a consensus among militants that post-apartheid society must include far-reaching economic restructuring — a view pioneered by the SACP and its legal forerunner, until its banning in 1950, of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA);

Two, because the experience of the past two years of revolt has shown the need for highly disciplined organisation. And it is a reasonable observation that there is probably no more experienced and professional a practitioner of the politics of conspiracy in South Africa today than the SACP.

Observers believe the SACP will take care to ensure that the raising of its profile as an autonomous entity does not in any way disturb the fabric of its formal alliance with the ANC, an alliance in which the ANC is the acknowledged senior partner.

Its overlap with the ANC is substantial, and has been so for at least the past 30 years.

This was amply illustrated by Moses Mabhida, SACP general secretary, who was buried in Maputo at the weekend. Besides being a leader of

the SACP, he also sat on the national executives of the ANC and the SA Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).

However, the claim that about half the members of the 30-person ANC national executive committee are SACP members, like the claim that the SACP controls the ANC, remains a matter of contentious conjecture rather than ascertainable fact.

As a self-conscious "national liberation movement", the ANC places great stress on what it sees as the need that it comprise a wide range of ideological emphases united around its two main thrusts, the Freedom Charter and its Strategy and Tactics. The ANC spectrum embraces militant liberals, variegated social democrats, radical socialists and communists — and a few Trotskyites still manage to survive too.

The SACP is probably the most powerful single emphasis within this "national liberation alliance", though there is no convincing indication it constitutes a majority capable of dominating the others — or that it would want (even in the long term) to disrupt a broadly-based "united front" approach which tolerates these differences in emphasis.

Why? Because the SACP appears to be a committed follower of a particular Leninist tradition which holds that a communist party must as far as possible incur the involvement of not only the working class but other strata as well. Forty years after coming to power, a number of East European communist parties still follow the united front approach.

Although working to strengthen the ANC-led alliance, the Communist Party retains its organisational and ideological autonomy within the alliance as (so the terminology has it) the "revolutionary political vanguard party of the working class". It is understood to have its own officials and finances, its own cells and publications, and its own methods of communications.

As a standard "vanguard" party, the SACP selects its membership after a period of probation on the basis of how it assesses candidates' dedication, discipline and understanding of its theory. And its organisational principle of "democratic centralism" — in which discussion is

supposed to be widespread but any subsequent decision is binding on all — makes for a relatively powerful unity of purpose.

Its objective is, obviously, the construction of a socialist South Africa on the road to communism. So, by all accounts, the SACP's very long-term perspective would include an attempt to win over others in the ANC-led alliance to the view that South Africa must be taken beyond the vision of the Freedom Charter. Nonetheless, it is clear the SACP considers the Freedom Charter is revolutionary in the current South African context.

From this, one can deduce the SACP would insist that after the envisaged seizure of state power by the ANC-led alliance, a wholly new set of national political institutions reflecting, and capable of protecting, working class political authority must be put in place.

Secondly, the party would insist that the struggle to achieve the socialism it envisages cannot be postponed to some date *after* the seizure of state power. Instead, its view would be that the forces for socialism must be developed now, within the struggle for what is termed "national liberation".

In 1950, the Communist Party of South Africa (or CPSA), the legal predecessor of the SACP, became the first of what is now a long list of organisations to be outlawed under apartheid rule.

But a number of communists now went all out to strengthen the ANC as the "national liberation movement". In the ensuing 10 years — which embraced the Defiance Campaign and the Congress of the People, and which culminated in the banning of the ANC in 1960 — the bonds between communists and the ANC were firmly established.

By 1953, a new, clandestine party, the South African Communist Party (or SACP) had been established and its members operated both underground and through legal organisations and institutions.

In 1961, the SACP was an important partner with the ANC in the decision to adopt armed struggle and form Umkhonto we Sizwe.

At the ANC consultative conference at Morogoro in Tanzania in 1969, the SACP and the ANC reached a formal alliance and several leading communists have, since then, been elected to important positions in the ANC.

Portrait of Slovo

Johannesburg WEEKLY MAIL in English 11-17 Apr 86 p 15

[Article by Howard Barrell]

[Text] JOE SLOVO, it is said, is quaintly upset at being accused by South African government supporters of being a KGB colonel with his own country dacha somewhere out in the wilds of the Soviet

Union.

He is said to feel his accusers should have done him the justice of taking the absurdity further by charging he is at least a KGB general.

An affable and humorous man, Slovo is, in real life, the very antithesis of the mammoth political ghoul striding the shadows of South African politics that government propaganda portrays him as.

He is popular within the ANC external mission and, to judge from the chants in his honour at black political meetings inside the country, he has similar popularity as a symbol among many other black people.

Although government estimates of his importance in the alliance between the African National Congress, South African Communist Party and the South African Congress of Trade Unions appear excessive, there is no doubt he carries some weight.

At the last congress of the South African Communist Party — held in London in late 1984 — he is widely believed finally to have achieved the position that government officials have so incorrectly and for so long said he occupied. That is, chairman of the Communist Party — the successor to Dr Yusuf Dadoo.

His colleagues in the ANC say he takes a very dim view of the Stalin era, with its personality cults and bloody purges, believing it seriously set back the socialist cause. They add that, although he is a senior official in a party whose organisational pillar is discipline, he has a horror of "apparatchiks" and aggressively conformist political behaviour.

He is also said to be a strong supporter of Soviet Communist Party general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to modernise and regenerate socialism in that country.

Slovo, whose father was a van driver, managed to get to university because as a World War II ex-serviceman he could get a bursary. He then studied law at Wits University and, after qualifying, was involved in the defence teams in a number of political trials.

A founder member of the Congress of Democrats, he represented it on the national consultative committee of the Congress Alliance. After being banned in 1954, Slovo continued his political work clandestinely. He was subsequently one of the accused in the marathon Treason Trial which started in 1956.

During the State of Emergency in 1960, he was detained for four months and, in 1963, he was instructed to join the external missions of the African National Congress and SACP.

He became one of the key figures in the ANC operational machinery, the Revolutionary Council, set up after the 1969 ANC national consultative conference in Morogoro, Tanzania.

His wife, Ruth First, was assassinated in a parcel bomb explosion in Maputo, for which the ANC blamed South African agents, in 1982.

As far as can be ascertained, Slovo is currently chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe. This makes him number three in the ANC military hierarchy, below Umkhonto commander Joe Modise and deputy commander/political commissar Chris Hani.

At the ANC national consultative conference held in Kabwe in Zambia in June last year, Slovo became the first and only white to be elected to the ANC national executive committee.

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CSO: 3400/1637

SOUTH AFRICA

HOMELAND MASSES JOIN POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 21 Apr 86 p 10

[Article by Jo-Anne Collinge]

[Text] Cycles of township resistance since 1976 have made the Nationalists realise that urban blacks have to be accommodated politically outside the homelands. The State President's Rubicon 2 speech indicated that the reform scenario would be stretched in an attempt to do this.

Now battles against apartheid are being waged at a mass level inside the homelands, challenging the very foundations of grand apartheid.

Even the more "liberal" of these satellite "countries" — Bophuthatswana, kaNgwane, Gazankulu and, especially, Lebowa — are having to deal with popular resistance.

Workers for relief and development organisations inside Lebowa say political resistance and police repression of this activism have reached unprecedented levels.

Operation Hunger, which functions throughout Lebowa, says there is hardly an area where the young people are in their classrooms. Clinic staff tell of the scores of injured children they treat after clashes with the police.

Mrs Ina Perlman, director of Operation Hunger, says violence motivated by superstition and belief in witchcraft has also risen alarmingly and several multiple killings have never been reported in the media.

The United Democratic Front refers to a "simmering rural revolt throughout the Transvaal" but distances itself from the practice of witchcraft and the extraordinarily violent response of superstitious people to this.

The Northern Transvaal is the UDF's newest region — formally constituted

at the beginning of the year and centred on Lebowa. It now has about 100 affiliated organisations.

Among the most coherently organised areas is Lebowa's Sekhukhuneland — where the Boers had many bloody clashes with the northern tribes during the last century. It was also the scene of the Sebatakgomo peasant revolt of the 1950s.

It is here that two members of Parliament and a number of chiefs are rumoured to have resigned their positions, allegedly in protest at the treatment of their people at the hands of the Lebowa police.

The two MPs, Mr MS Masha of Apiesboom and Mr J Seopela of Schoonoord, are said to have decided to quit at a public meeting called to form the Sekhukhune Parents' Crisis Committee in the wake of police action against mourners at the funeral of Lucas Toekoane Molopo in mid-March.

"At the meeting we called for the resignation of the Lebowa police, who our people, and for the resignation of Lebowa MPs because the police get their mandate from Parliament," Mr Japhta Thobejane, co-ordinator of the Sekhukhune Youth Organisation, said recently.

"We pointed out that the government the MPs are serving does not serve the people but its own purposes."

The Star has been unable to obtain official confirmation of the resignations, but other MPs and senior government officials are aware of the claims that some of their colleagues have quit.

There are activists who assert that the old spirit of Sekhukhuneland is reas-



serting itself, and that chiefs who have lain low since the 1950s have been encouraged to show their sympathies by the re-emergence of a national movement against apartheid.

This may be a factor. But resistance in Sekhukhune and the rest of Lebowa has much in common with the style of anti-apartheid organisations in the urban townships.

The most widespread form of organisation is the youth congress, which may include school pupils but is usually spearheaded by young workers and unemployed young men.

In the Sekhukhune area the Sekhukhune Youth Organisation is an umbrella body, with about 30 individual youth congresses, organised at village level, affiliated to it.

Within particular villages — as for instance in Steelpoort — the youth congress co-ordinates its work with women's, pupils', workers' and civic organisations.

The structures, activists point out, are a rural equivalent of the street committees and neighbourhood organisations established in the urban townships since the state of emergency was announced last year.

Popular organisations in Lebowa have taken up the national education issues and they have posed themselves as an "alternative" civic body by handling public projects such as clean-up campaigns.

They have also taken up distinctly local issues — such as protest against enforced contributions to a company-owned recreation club in Kerstegeluk, protest against a chief at GaPasha who allegedly failed to pay women workers and spent public funds "on a building meant just for the collection of more money, like Lebowa taxes".

Many protests and campaigns have allegedly provoked police intervention and the cycle of violence familiar to the townships has set in. Since the blanket ban on outdoor gatherings holds good in Lebowa, action against "illegal gatherings" is inevitable.

As crowds are dispersed with tear-gas and sjamboks, arrests are made, which result in protest boycotts of classes, demonstrations at court appearances — and further police intervention. Lives have been lost and funerals have inevitably yielded additional victims.

Violence has escalated on both sides. You'as have burnt homes of policemen and government buildings, set buses alight and stoned vehicles.

For instance, the car and home of the Minister of Education, Mr S P KwaKwa, were set alight in Mahwelereng. Two buses of the Lebowa Development Corporation were burnt in the Tafelkop area because the corporation was perceived to have collaborated with police at a funeral where six activists were shot dead.

There has been a number of reports recently of concerted campaigns of assault (sjambokkings and beatings) on Lebowa residents, from Seshego in the north, to Namakgale in the east and Mahwelereng in the south.

The injuries have been severe. *The Star* has seen two victims who have lost the vision of one eye and has interviewed a teenager who required a week in hospital after a sjambokking.

UDF affiliates claim that between 40 and 50 civilians have lost their lives in recent political violence in the Northern Transvaal. If the troubled Moutse/Dennilton area is taken into account, this figure is not out of line with deaths reported to the Press.

Two political figures have died within hours of being detained and two key activists' homes have been bombed by unknown persons.

The Deputy Commissioner of Police for Lebowa, Colonel P Moloto, says statistics on political deaths in the homeland have been compiled but they will not be available until presented in the Legislative Assembly.

He concedes there has been a dra-

matic upsurge of violence. "What has happening in other areas is now happening in Lebowa."

The secretary-general of the South African Council of Churches, Dr Beyers Naude, puts it more strongly: "There is a situation of civil war in the Northern Transvaal in which innocent and defenceless people are confronted daily with the spectre of brutal repression in the form of apartheid's war machinery — helicopters, Casspirs, Buffels, etc.

"The people in the area no longer feel safe in the presence of the police. Many are fugitives in their own villages — they have fled and are now living in the mountains in caves. The old people in the villages are terrified — many are being beaten up. Even chiefs have been detained and beaten."

Colonel Moloto said he did not want to comment in detail on the extent of political resistance and the form of response.

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22 May 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

VIGILANTE GROUP PHENOMENON ANALYZED

Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English 14 Apr 86 p 6

[Text] CAPE TOWN — Illegal vigilante groups implemented "a kind of terror that police were not capable of", attorney Nicholas Haysom told a workshop on police-vigilante repression here.

Mr Haysom, of Witwatersrand University's Centre for Applied Legal Studies, said police activity tended not to be well targeted, whereas vigilante action was "specifically targeted".

Mr Haysom, author of a recent book alleging tacit police support for right-wing vigilante groups, said he "did not rule out the possibility" that vigilante groups were orchestrated by the police, but it was more likely police were "drawn in as a collaborating authority".

Two variants of the vigilante phenomenon had emerged in 1985 — homeland vigilantes and urban vigilantes.

The former were "classical versions of fascist brownshirts" — tribal police enforcing systems that were regarded as authoritarian and undemocratic.

OBSCURE

Little was done to obscure their "clear affilia-

tion" to homeland authorities.

Mr Haysom said the driving forces behind urban vigilantes were community councillors, viewed as potential prime motivators of "artificial power for blacks".

Main targets of those vigilantes were youth groups — of which many were United Democratic Front affiliates — and civic organisations.

The legal response to vigilante activities was "generally not effective". Interim interdicts granted did not necessarily stop their perpetration.

ATTEMPTS

Referring to future vigilante patterns, Mr Haysom said attempts were under way to incorporate such groups in the legal apparatus — these included amalgamation with "community guards" and the formation of defence commands, as had occurred with a white vigilante group in Queenstown.

People in townships were getting "increasingly disillusioned with the law" and this would lead to a growing spiral of violence through the emergence of armed "counter-vigilantes".

SOUTH AFRICA

KANGWANE'S CHIEF MINISTER SPEAKS OUT ON CURRENT ISSUES

Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 10 Apr 86 p 8.

[Article by Simon Ngomane]

[Text] Enos Mabuza is not a typical "bantustan boss". He's been to Lusaka, talked to the ANC, and wants Mandela freed. He's even prepared to step down "when the time is right". But for the moment he wants to use his position to make sure that Pretoria hears the real views of the people.

**KANGWANE'S
Chief Minister,
Enos Mabuza,
has suddenly be-
come the most
interesting and
incredible home-
land leader .**

He boasts not only the support of the people of Ka-Ngwane, but is also admired and respected by those who should hate him -- but who cannot ignore his unconventional stand.

The charismatic ex-teacher has not only called repeatedly for the unbanning of the African National Congress, release of political prisoners like Nelson Mandela and negotiations between the ANC and the South African Government -- but recently he went to Lusaka where he had what

he termed "fruitful talks" with the ANC.

**'Bantu
education was
meant to be
inferior.'**

"The ANC is the most authentic political organisation in the country. The frequency of hoisting of ANC flags at funerals of unrest victims bears witness that the youth has actually "unbanned" the ANC and further proves its popularity with the people.

"Any form of power sharing must be done with the active participation of the ANC.

"The present national crises are multifaceted as they are an expression of the people's anger and frustrations,

caused by their socio-economic problems and bantu education.

"Bantu education, since its inception has done more harm than good, as it was meant to be inferior.

**'We condemn
all bantustan
created trade
unions.'**

"Delays by government to bring about changes worsen the situation. When the homeland system started in 1974, I said homelands were not immune to the country's national problems, as they are also directly affected. The recent situation in the country shows the struggle in the

homelands. And that comes as no surprise to me," Mabuza said.

His solutions for the KaNgwane educational crisis are twofold: long term and short term.

"Short term solutions include the introduction of truly democratic student representative councils, abolition of school fees and the reduction of friction within school premises by keeping the police away. Long term solutions are for the government to introduce a uniform educational system for all"

He welcomed the resolutions adopted at the National Education Crisis Committee conference in Durban recently as "an historic step towards a better education for the people".

The organisations who called on him to resign are, in his opinion, justified in making such a call. "I have never justified the homeland system, as it is based on apartheid."

'Inyandza welcomed the birth of the UDF...and they went to Lusaka.'

"But I believe I have a role to play and, at this time, stepping down will not be in the interests of the struggle."

"But when the time comes I will resign, as I have already asked my cabinet to follow suit when the time comes," the articulate chief minister says.

"If a Mabuza were to step down from his seat, the government would find another person to succeed me who might hamper the course of the struggle, or even declare the region a no-go area with a clamp-down on political activities."

"But if all bantustan leaders resigned, realization will dawn and bring the government to its senses. Progressive organisations and trade unions are welcome in KaNgwane and we condemn all bantustan-created unions," Mabuza said.

"There is no connection between Inyandza and Inkatha or SABA (SA Black Alliance), as we are operating independently."

"Chief Gatsha Buthelezi spelt it out in recent newspaper reports -- our views are fundamentally different and cannot be reconciled."

"The belief that Inyandza youth is pursuing homeland politics is wrong. Inyandza welcomed the birth of the UDF, congratulated the UDF for opposing the tri-cameral parliament and is a very militant

organization, whose national youth council members were among the delegates in the entourage that went to Lusaka, where they met their ANC

'Trade unions should take the initiative in deciding the issue of investment.'

counterparts.

"It is not in the same category as Inkatha Youth Brigade, as it is prepared to co-operate with progressive organisations."

"Trade unions should take the initiative in deciding the issue of investment or disinvestment, since it falls in their area and directly affects them more than anyone else."

"Lowveld Youth Movement (Loyomo) and Inyandza have a relationship of understanding and co-ordination, as they both play a complementary role in mobilizing the youth and do not view each other as adversaries," he continued.

In his recent statement to other homeland leaders, he said the homeland system was meant to make the leaders partners with Pretoria.

"I urge them to be realistic about history, both past and current, and they

must take the events of Haiti and the Philippines as examples.

"They should read the barometer in South Africa and side with the people that they are representing and have their aspirations at heart, without fearing that they might displease the government.

"This will drive a message home to the authorities that they must consult the people when making decisions."

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CSO: 3400/1636

SOUTH AFRICA

BOPHUTHATSWANA REFUSAL OF MASS FUNERAL CRITICIZED

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 13 Apr 86 p 2

[Text] April 13, 1986--The refusal by the Bophuthatswana authorities to release the bodies of eleven people killed in recent unrest for burial, was a typical demonstration of abuse of power by the homelands police authorities.

This assertion that no mass funerals will take place on the homeland's soil indicates the arrogance that can only have the effect of escalating violence that has been part and parcel of the communities there.

Surely if the community elects to give their dead a mass funeral its a decision that should not only be respected, but one that the police must ensure is carried out without unjustifiable interference.

We would have thought that the homeland, boasting as it does a Bill of Rights, would have its hands full hunting down vigilantes that are burning down the houses of its leading citizens, instead of repressing its communities as they did this week.

This type of behavior is foreign to black people where the dead can be a subject of such cruel actions with which to punish their relatives and communities.

We hope, even at this late stage, that Chief Lucas Mangope will see his way clear to intervene on the side of the communities.

He urgently needs to read the riot act to his police chiefs.

/12851

CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

REPORTERS REVEAL COMRADE ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN TRANSVAAL

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 20 Apr 86 p 9

[Article by Allan Soule and Samkelo Kumalo]

[Text]

THE site has become a macabre landmark of sorts. The place, where 32 aged villagers, some blind and infirm, were brutally slaughtered, has been given its own sinister name — the locals have dubbed it the "pits of death".

It was, some villagers say, the greatest single witch-hunt in living memory.

For them, the assumption that those who died were involved in witchcraft is easily understood and accepted. But the true genesis of the bloody purge lies within a vaguely concocted blend of adolescent revolt against the old order, a naive grasp of black protest politics and primitive tribal justice.

Lately two chilling words have been added to the vocabulary of the inhabitants of the rural villages of the Northern Transvaal: "comrade" and the "necklace".

Since Christmas, the forces of change have been gathering in the poverty-stricken homeland of Lebowa. On one hot day this week the worlds of the old and the new collided in a flash of naked violence.

The "comrades" swept through the twin villages of Pasha and Apel randomly meting out the death sentence.

Scared

During the course of one wretched night and a day 21 villagers were herded onto the rocky slopes of the Sekhukhune mountains in the remote Lebowa settlement. They were thrust into shallow death pits. Then, during a frenzied ritual, the victims were executed.

With petrol-doused tyres draped around their necks they were burnt in rough-hewn depressions.

The killings began after dark on Wednesday and carried on into the night. Then, at dawn, the bloody round-up was once again resumed. According to police, the remaining 11 victims were either murdered before or after the day of the 21 killings.

During the course of the week, Lebowa police detained 180 youths in connection with the mass murder. They have all appeared in court and are all residents of the two villages which lie in the hilly country about 100 km south-east of Pietersburg.

Chief Richard Moloke Nchabeleng, the tribal head of Apel, together with the Northern Transvaal president of the UDF, Mr Peter Nchabeleng, were among those detained during the police swoop.

Chief Nchabeleng was released two days later after allegedly being tortured by the Lebowa police. His cousin Peter, a former political detainee, died in detention. Police say he died as a result of natural causes.

In an interview this week the chief — whose once tranquil and staid tribal world now lies in tatters — spoke of the rapid disintegration of his supreme authority.

"The elders of my village have lost control. The youth have taken charge and we are scared. They have come to hear of what is happening in the big cities.

"They sometimes read about unrest and the trouble. I don't think they understand what it is all about, but they have become restless.

"Now they have brought fire and death to our land."

He says all the schools in the two villages have remained closed since the beginning of the year. Pupils have compiled a list of demands which has been handed to the authorities.

"My councillors and I are powerless to do anything. We stand alone and are afraid of the comrades who threaten to burn down our homes if we defy them."

Chief Nchabeleng, like many other tribal rulers in the region, has become a victim of changing times. He remains trapped between the rising tide of young black aspirations and the uncompromising stance of the homeland authorities. Perhaps as much a victim of violent change as those who died.

"The police came and took me away and beat me in the cells because they say it was my duty to report the killings. But there was nothing I could do.

"The comrades sent messages to me threatening to kill me and burn my house if I spoke to the police."

Terror

He admits that he does not know who the comrades are or what they stand for.

"They are shadows in the night. Shadows we have all come to fear."

Chief Nchabeleng is not the only one whose world has been catapulted into confusion and fear. A shroud of terror has descended on the two villages.

Said one woman: "We hear these city words spoken by the youths. They talk of 'comrades' and the 'necklace'. We do not understand them, but we fear them deeply."

Witchcraft

It was in Chief Stephen Pasha's village, which butts on Apel, where 30 of the killings took place. Yet he refuses to speak to the Press.

It is in his village where the void between the ruler and his people is evident. He and his family live in an new, modern, two-storey home. It is one of the few dwellings in the village supplied with electricity and a telephone.

Several of the victims were taken from his kraal and executed less than 200m from his home. Yet he denies knowing about the killings until told by the police.

In a UDF statement this week, officials denied that the deaths were politically related.

Mr Peter Mokaba, a Northern Transvaal UDF official, blamed the killings on witchcraft.

In the past, ritual killings have taken place in the region. However, they have in most cases been preceded by a lightning strike on a village hut which was interpreted as an act of witchcraft.

Innocent

This week the families of victims interviewed denied that those who were burnt were in any way connected to the occult.

Said Mrs Ramatsobane Rachidi, whose sister was necklaced: "My sister was innocent — she was not a witch.

"When they came for my sister, she was asleep. The comrades took her to a clearing about 50m from the house where they put tyres around her and burnt her."

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CSO: 3400/1636

SOUTH AFRICA

CROSSROADS RESIDENTS COMMITTEE SEEKING TO OUST LEADER

Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English 5 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Tony Weaver: "Bid to Oust 'Leader' of Crossroads"]

[Text]

A COMMITTEE of leading Crossroads residents has called on "progressive organizations", including the UDF, the Western Cape Civic Association, the United Womens' Congress and the Cape Youth Congress to help them oust embattled Crossroads "leader", Mr Johnson Ngxobongwana.

They have also called on Nobel Peace Prize winner, Bishop Desmond Tutu, and UDF patron Dr Allan Boesak to help them in their attempts to organize the squatter community under the UDF banner and bring peace to the area.

The committee, who asked not to be identified for fear of violent attacks against them, say they are "sick and tired" of Mr Ngxobongwana who they claimed was "forcing our community to fight against our brothers and sisters in other areas".

The formation of the new committee comes in the wake of several vigilante raids on New Crossroads, Nyanga and KTC allegedly organized by Mr Ngxobongwana and his chief lieutenant, Mr Sam Ndima.

Sick of the dying

During a night-time meeting with the Cape Times in Guguletu this week and again in Nyanga Bush yesterday, the committee produced the alleged minutes of a meeting held in Crossroads on March 20 which preceded a raid by "witdoek" vigilantes on New Crossroads.

Seven vigilantes died in the attack, and the committee claimed that Crossroads residents were "sick and tired of the fighting and the dying".

The "minutes" said that a large number of "witdoeke" voiced objections to alleged orders from Mr Ngxobongwana and Mr Ndima that they accompany three New Crossroads committee members to recover possessions from their homes in New Crossroads.

But, the "minutes" said, Mr Ngxobongwana allegedly replied: "You can ask questions when you come back." The "minutes" continued: "Mr Ngxobongwana said whoever did not go, his particulars will be taken, as will be the particulars of his house, so that when we get back we will deal with them."

Refusal to bury men

The committee — some of whom took part in the raid — claimed that "people were forced to go on this raid, where they died in the fight. They went because of the fear there is for Ngxobongwana".

They said that the Crossroads community was refusing to bury the seven men who died two weeks ago, saying Mr Ngxobongwana should take the blame.

They claimed that this was the third time such a raid had led people to their death and the committee demanded that Mr Ngxobongwana — who is a partner in Bantu Funeral Services — bury the dead men free of charge.

The new committee alleged that persons who voted in the recent elections to choose Mr Ngxobongwana's committee — less than 6 000 voted — had to pay R15 each to vote, and those who refused to pay "had their shacks demolished".

● Mr Ngxobongwana, whose office was destroyed by fire last year, no longer has a telephone and attempts to contact him for comment this week were unsuccessful. Crossroads sources alleged that since the night of the "witdoek" raid he has "disappeared into thin air" and is "nowhere to be seen".

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CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION PROTECTS ALEXANDRA HOUSING POLICY

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 13 Apr 86 p. 11

[Letter to the Editor: "Housing for all in Alex a Right, Not a Privilege"]

[Text]

LAST WEEK in The Sunday Star, Sam Buti replied to certain remarks made about him.

Mr Buti is only there, together with the other councillors, to advance the interests of a certain stratum of blacks in the urban areas. It is this class that we struggle against — we are not much interested in Sam Buti the individual.

Of course, this means that we have to struggle against the State, because the State is for that class and helps them along all the time. The councillors are particularly dangerous because they represent the capitalist class, they control a riot squad and a number of vigilantes, and they collaborate with the SAP and SADF.

It makes us laugh to hear councillors speak about "developing" Alexandra, or providing houses. It has always been known that incomes in Alex are very low, yet the re-development plan that these men drew up is a prestige plan.

It produces houses that sell for R40 000; and even the new match-box houses, which are cramped and badly built, carry rentals that are crazily high.

Imagine a family whose combined income is R200 a month.

If they have to pay R139 for a house, there will remain R61 for food, clothes, transport, medical expenses, light and water, etc.

Such low incomes are not unusual; in fact hundreds of families in Alex earn less than that.

High rent is a method of changing Alex into a middle-class suburb. When it is filled with bank-clerks, social workers, teachers, supervisors, priests, police, lawyers and businessmen, it will be a secure political base for these present councillors, and the low-paid workers will be dispersed into hostels, homelands and as tenants in the rooms of others' houses.

Another effect of high rent is to enable some people to become landlords and sublet at high prices.

We demand adequate housing at affordable rents. It is our view that housing is a right, not a privilege.

Our rule of thumb is that rent should be about R40 for a four-room house, and R50 for a six-room house.

But if those amounts are too high for some families, they should pay even less. No one should have to spend more than 10 percent of the family income, on housing.

Since the violence of February, Alex residents have become far more conscious of the need to organise

The new action committee has greatly enlarged the area under local worker control, by setting up committees in many yards and streets.

Of course, the middle-class is not idle.

We believe their next step will be to try to enforce rent-collection by threat of eviction.

But residents won't be chased from their homes without a fierce struggle.

Steve Magagula (president),
Phineas Sithagu (co-ordinator),
Jerry Molea (secretary), and
Mvuleni Khambule (treasurer)
Alexandra Residents
Association,
Alexandra.

/12851

CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

PORT ELIZABETH BOYCOTT LEADER EXPLAINS GOALS

Port Elizabeth EVENING POST in English 7 Apr 86 p 3

[Text]

THE use of intimidation to enforce the black boycott of white shops, which started in Port Elizabeth today, has been rejected by the spokesman for the PE Consumer Boycott Committee, Mr Mkhuseli Jack.

"We don't want anyone intimidating anyone."

He did not think intimidation would occur, because the boycott had the full support of the community.

It had been explained that the boycott period would be difficult — "but the people are prepared to take it to see the realisation of their demands".

The committee had not distributed pamphlets because the police presence, when the "whole township was teargassed", had been "sufficient announcement".

"An end to the killings of our people" was, he said, the main reason for the boycott.

A Press conference would be called soon when the committee would spell out a full list of demands.

These included the unbanning of organisations including the ANC, the release of political prisoners and detainees, the scrapping of apartheid, the creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa, the "bringing to book" of the killers of Matthew Goniwe and others, and the disclosure of the whereabouts of

three missing PE Black Civic Organisation leaders.

Mr Jack said the boycott would continue until the demands were met.

● The Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (Pebco) disclosed today that it would take action against anyone using intimidation to enforce the boycott.

This was said by Pebco's publicity secretary, Mr Stone Sizani, during an interview with Evening Post about the role of the "street committees" in the townships. (See Page 10 for a full report).

These committees have been accused of enforcing stayaways and boycotts.

When the boycott was introduced last year, Mr Sizani said, there were instances of youths searching buses and cars.

"That has been stopped and no-one is being allowed to force anyone to come along with us."

A directive to this effect had gone out and "corrective action" to be decided on by the Pebco executive would be taken against anyone found using force.

He said people in the townships had a right to disagree with the street committees, and would be left alone.

"No one must be forced to do things against his will."

SOUTH AFRICA

ROLE OF PORT ELIZABETH STREET COMMITTEES EXPLAINED

Port Elizabeth EVENING POST in English 7 Apr 86 p 11

[Article by Kin Bentley: "'Street Committees Are Our Democracy'"]

[Text]

UNITED Democratic Front affiliate organisations have repeatedly been accused by the Government and sections of the media of working — together with the ANC — to make the black townships "ungovernable."

The publicity secretary of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (a UDF affiliate), Mr Stone Sizani, was asked to explain the workings of the so-called "street committees" which are seen as an integral part of this strategy.

Mr Sizani argued that the new system of "street committees" and "area committees" was a democratisation of black society which was not permitted under the apartheid system. It was aimed at "lessening the burden" of those suffering from "exploitation and oppression".

He said grievances reached a head in November, 1983, with the formation of the Kayamnandi (now Ibhayi) Town Council, under Mr Thamsanqa Linda, who set up vigilante groups which, for instance, imposed a curfew in front of his house.

(In a highly unpopular move, Mr Linda took over an eight-roomed house in Veeplaas after its pre-

vious occupant, Mrs Alice Mavela, a widowed mother of seven, was evicted. She has since been allowed to return to the house, after Mr Linda left PE in the wake of widespread rejection.)

Mr Sizani said: "Nothing was done by the police to stop this sort of thing."

He said Pebco, which is the mother body of the street, area and zone committees, was born of the frustration experienced by township residents.

Other major grievances he cited were related to rent hikes, lack of adequate services and a difficulty in acquiring licences to run taxis and shebeens.

He said the reason so many taxis in the townships were unlicensed was not due to unwillingness, but to opposition from, among others, PE Tramways and SA Transport Services.

Similarly, he said, shebeens had to fulfil numerous requirements before they could be licensed. These included: a dividing wall between patron and living areas in a four-roomed house, high walls between the shebeen and neighbouring houses, two toilets, two kitchens and so on.

He said shebeens were usually only started by people who were unemployed, yet it would cost them some R20 000 to set up if they complied with these requirements. Hence many were unlicensed.

Arising from this, he asked: "How do you expect them to support a free enterprise system?"

Mr Sizani said the main aim of the street committees was to try to lessen the burden of the black people. "When you hear of 'the struggle', it means the struggle to do away with oppression and exploitation".

But are the street committees democratic? Mr Sizani believes they are.

Explaining their formation, he said Pebco officials canvassed each house "and tried to interest people to come together voluntarily to join a street committee." House meetings were held for this purpose.

He wouldn't say how many such committees there were, adding that it was an on-going process.

Referring to the charge that the committees were responsible for the enforcement of boycotts and stay-aways, Mr Sizani said during the state of emergency last year, when the first boycott was introduced, there had been cases of youths getting on to buses and searching parcels, cars and so on.

"That situation has been stopped now and no-one is allowed to force anyone to come along with us." He added that a special directive to this effect had been issued and said corrective action, to be decided on by the organisation, would be taken against those people using violence.

Dismissing the use of coercion, he said the organisation could not guarantee 100% loyalty to it, "nor can we say

there is no criminal element, but all those who are loyal to our organisations will act responsibly in this period".

He said people in the township had a right to differ with the committee and would be left alone. "No-one must be forced to do things against his will."

He said many people who initially were reluctant to join the committees, joined voluntarily later, when they saw the fruit of their work — such as identifying the needy in a street and assisting them. They also tried to reduce the crime rate.

A recent popular decision, he said, was to limit shebeen hours from 6am to 6pm. Thereafter, he said, they could act only as "take-aways". This was to encourage people to drink at home and so obviate fights and robberies, which usually took place after 9pm.

"There has already been a considerable drop in the (alcohol-related) violence," he said.

Denying that these committees were linked to the so-called kangaroo courts, Mr Sizani said they never "meted out punishment".

Asked how "cases" were settled, he said the committees first tried to reconcile the opposing parties. If this was not successful they would refer the case to an "area committee". If this failed the matter would go to the executive committee of Pebco, which, he claimed, thus far had a 100% success rate in sorting out such differences peacefully.

The parties could then go to the regional executive of the UDF. He pointed out that several companies in the town had already approached the UDF office for assistance when they had experienced problems with employees.

But who elected Mr Edgar Ngoyi (East Cape president of the UDF) and Mr Henry Fazzie (vice-president) and the rest of the UDF Eastern Cape executive?

Mr Sizani said two delegates from each affiliated body (of which there are now about 40 in the Eastern Cape, including civic, student, women's, youth, worker, sporting, church and service organisations) came together in a regional general council to elect the regional executive.

At town or city level, he said, executives of civic bodies such as Pebco, or youth bodies like the PE Youth Congress, headed by Mr Mkhuseleli Jack, were elected at general meetings of residents.

A major grievance of all UDF affiliates has been the difficulty in getting permission to hold such meetings — all outdoor meetings are banned for a year and can only be held with magisterial permission.

The leaders have repeatedly stressed the need to "gauge the mood of the people" or "get a mandate from the people" or "report back to the people".

When such meetings have been convened, the attendances have regularly been high. However, funerals have often provided the only legal outdoor meeting opportunity.

Asked if the street committee system was linked to the M-Plan, or cell-system, of ANC leader Nelson Mandela, which operated in the early 1950s, Mr Sizani, who is 32, said he was too young to have experienced that system.

The new structures were, however, "answering the demands of the time: that everyone should get involved to try

to do away with oppression and exploitation from street level, to area level, to zone level, to city level."

Was this not a "Mafia" style of control, as Government sources had claimed?

Mr Sizani rejected the allegation. On the contrary, he believed it was an attempt at "some form of democratic representation in decision-making," which was not available under the apartheid system.

And what about the national level? How should South Africa sort out the mess it is in?

Mr Sizani repeated the list of demands which have become something of a litany: release Mandela and other political prisoners; unban the ANC and other organisations; allow the free return of exiles.

The role of a political Opposition? He said the UDF subscribed to the Freedom Charter, which didn't say how many parties there would be, "but it says the people should govern on the basis of these structures."

He said if everyone participated democratically in the decision-making process in a non-racial, unitary system, there need be no fear of domination.

He rejected any group basis for the future South Africa, and was not interested in a federal system.

Once the political parties had been unbanned, he foresaw a period, not of negotiation, but of "talks between the people and the State" aimed at a "shared future in a non-racial, democratic South Africa".

He also pointed to the Freedom Charter as being the basis of the UDF's economic proposals and cited the end to monopolies as one of the major aspects.

SOUTH AFRICA

PORT ELIZABETH BOYCOTT CRITICIZED AS UNPRODUCTIVE

Port Elizabeth WEEKEND POST in English 9 Apr 86 p 10

[Editorial: "Boycott Divides Potential Allies Against Apartheid"]

[Text]

IT seems ridiculous, but on Monday potential allies against apartheid will be divided on an issue which should really bring them together. We refer to the black people of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage and the white businessmen they are going to boycott, in spite of the emphatic stand business leaders have taken for fundamental political change.

There can be no question that a protracted boycott will cause tremendous hardship to many people at a time when Port Elizabeth and the surrounding areas are already in the grip of a recession which is draining vitality from the community. With the motor industry in a desperate state and the region battling to retain other industries in the face of unfair Government concessions to neighbouring areas, the last thing it is equipped to endure now is this self-inflicted blow. At this late hour, it can only be hoped that circumstances will soon change to the extent that the boycott can be lifted before irreparable damage is done.

It is an obvious generalisation to say white businessmen oppose apartheid. Self-interest and last year's boycott have led many of them to change their views, but two major organisations — the

Federated Chamber of Industries and the Association of Chambers of Commerce — have recently come out powerfully against apartheid. And Eastern Cape business leaders, including Mr Denis Creighton and Mr Rocky Ridgway, have been among their most prominent spokesmen.

At a local level, there has been remarkable rapport between representatives of the commercial section and black community leaders, yet this has not been sufficient to stave off a boycott which can only cause deep wounds and lasting scars.

Black leaders are conscious that they are going to hurt the wrong people, including fellow blacks and some whites who have intervened personally with the Government and the police on their behalf. But the issues, it seems, are bigger than the individual.

Mr Mkhuseleli Jack, the young man who has emerged as an influential leader in the region, sees the boycott strategy as the only effective weapon available to the black community in their fight for political rights. Whatever the suffering it would cause, he said this week, there was no peaceful alternative. So it is that the local white businessman — and particularly

the small trader — will take the blow intended for the Government. The boycott is being used because "it is the language the Government understands best".

Tragically, though, the Government is most unlikely to respond to this kind of pressure, and if the boycott continues for any length of time the result is all too predictable: more shop closures, worsening unemployment, a deterioration in race relations and a

strengthening of political radicals on both sides.

The Government's persistent intransigence makes it a naive hope that black leaders might take up the suggestion of PE's Citizen of the Year, Mr Harold Davidson, published in this newspaper today, and consider working *with* concerned whites against apartheid. The crisis appears to have passed the stage when that might have been a proposition.

/12851

CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

CITY PRESS CALLS NATAL INDABA GOAL ANOTHER BANTUSTAN

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 6 Apr 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Who Really Cares Column"]

[Text]

A POLITICAL non-event of monumental irrelevance has begun at the Durban City Hall.

Amidst the pomp and glare of the international Press, the conference is being bandied about as a new and dynamic initiative to seek an alternative political structure for South Africa.

Totally symptomatic of the politics of division that have dominated this land, we can see this much-flaunted indaba as nothing else but the creation of a glorified bantustan out of the Province of Natal.

The variation from traditional bantustans – the "Natal option" – will be a conglomeration of apartheid, separate development, plural relations and tribal dances, spiced with Halaal dishes.

And if you think all of this sounds mind-boggling, consider the horrendous prospect that the organisers of this indaba have budgeted for eight

months of talk, talk, talk! All of this when the country is ablaze with conflict and crying out for urgent solutions that will unite our nation, and thereby end the bloody violence that has torn the soul of this nation.

Speak of Rip Van Winkel sleeping through a revolution! These people have nothing on Nero playing the fiddle while Rome was burning!

To say, as the organisers so painfully tried to, that the Natal indaba is a new and ingenious prelude to a new political dispensation for South Africa, is to indulge in the most sinister art of deception.

It is nothing of the sort.

It is merely a perpetuation of the politics of division that will compound, rather than simplify an already overloaded system of racism.

Co-opting white people into bantustans is not the answer to our problems.

/12851

CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

AZAPO PREDICTS INCREASED 'REPRESSION' OF LEGAL OPPOSITION

Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English 6 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Mudini Maivha: "The Boot is Coming Down, Warns Azapo"]

[Text]

THE era of legitimate public opposition by overt organisations is nearing an end, the Azanian People's Organisation's Planning Congress concluded in Durban at the weekend.

The PC warned that the dawn of "wholesale repression reminiscent of the 1960s" is imminent.

The conclusion was reinforced by the Government's blanket ban on open-air meetings.

"It's becoming increasingly clear that the oppressive SA regime is bent on repressing all overt opposition by extra-parliamentary forces," said publicity secretary Muntu Myeza.

In the light of such repression Azapo condemned "imperialist" US support of SA through "constructive engagement", he said.

The US is supporting "destabilising and reactionary forces" in Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Lebanon said Myeza.

Azapo pledged solidarity with Libya and commended the solidarity of the Arab states against "imperialist aggression".

The congress also took resolutions on attacks on members, the National Education Crisis Conference, imperialism, and the one-year ban on meetings.

● Myeza told a Johannesburg Press conference that some "reactionary, irredentist and opportunistic" organisations have resolved to harass, maim or kill Azapo members.

"To date Azapo has not been responsible for initiating any violence on mem-

bers of organisations with which we disagree ideologically," said Myeza.

The PC gave the Central Committee a mandate to defend and protect the organisation and its members in keeping with Azapo's declared policies. This was based on the "Four Cs" - "Conscientize the apathetic, Collaborate with the co-operative, Consolidate the conscientized, and Confront the hostile".

New action against the attacks on Azapo's "cadres" would be based on the Four C's and would include confrontation through the media, open meetings or person to person.

● If Inkatha had attacked the National Forum conference last weekend, Azapo would have defended itself, said Myeza.

He said Azapo was faced with a "Stalinist and sectarian tendency" both internally and externally. The media, and *City Press* in particular, was guilty of "deliberately creating a sectarian viewpoint". The paper was accused of "journalistic buccaneering" and distorting information about Black Consciousness.

"If one reads CP exclusively, one would believe there was only one organisation in this country," said Myeza.

● The PC resolved to use all means at its disposal to protect black people in Natal against Inkatha's "Amabutho".

It resolved to continue the struggle for a democratic, anti-racist, socialist Azania.

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

BLACK SHOPKEEPER PRICES-Black shopkeepers have undertaken to display lists of prices and also make lists available to customers to ensure that there is no overcharging. The president of the Eastern Cape African Chamber of Commerce (Ecacoc), Mr Monwabisi Mkaza, said this was decided at a meeting with members of the Consumer Boycott Committee. Spokesman for the Consumer Boycott Committee, Mr Mkhuseleli Jack, said he was pleased with the outcome of the talks which revealed excellent relations between his committee and traders. Mr Mkaza said the traders had decided to "keep prices uniform" to ensure that there was no overcharging. He said they had promised not to go above a 15% markup on staple foods. Mr Mkaza said a price monitoring committee would be established. "I want to assure our people that our customers will be looked after." He said efforts would be made to keep shops as clean as possible but there were problem areas because there were so many untarred roads. Dust easily filtered into the shops. Mr Mkaza said that it would not be possible for black traders to offer prices comparable those at hyper and supermarkets. "Our prices for staple foods are lower but for the rest the big stores can buy in bulk cheaply." Mr Mkaza said when traders applied for trading sites, they were given sites that did not allow space for expansion and loans were not as easily available to them as to other races. He said Ecacoc was also planning to ask wholesalers to employ more Africans as most of their business was done with African traders. [By Jimmy Matyu] [Text] [Port Elizabeth WEEKEND POST in English 5 Apr 86 p 2] /12851

CSO: 3400/34

SOUTH AFRICA

MP, MINISTER DISCUSS FOREIGN JOURNALISTS' ACCESS TO RSA

MP Condemns Lack of Access

MB241336 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1327 GMT 24 Apr 86

[Text] House of Assembly, April 24, SAPA--Giving only selected journalists access to South Africa was the worst possible way of ensuring that a true picture of the country was projected overseas, Mr Tiaan van der Merwe (PFP Progressive Federal Party] Green Point) said today.

Speaking on the home affairs vote in the committee stage of the budget, he said it appeared that the government was "getting rough" with foreign journalists to enter the country dealt with between June and December last year, the 332 refused almost equalled the 350 approved.

"This is bad news," said Mr van der Merwe. "It is significant that the reply also mentioned the fact that since June 1985 statistics are kept specifically of journalists who apply to enter the country while such statistics are not kept in respect of other occupational groups."

Minister Explains Visas Policy

MB241759 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1741 GMT 24 Apr 86

[Text] House of Assembly, April 24, SAPA--When foreign journalists applied for work permit renewals they were treated as new applications, the minister for home affairs, Mr Stoffel Botha said today.

Replying to debate on his vote in the committee stage of the budget, he said he made "no apologies" for his actions affecting foreign journalists.

West German journalists, like journalists from any other country, would still have to apply for visas in spite [of] the recent agreement with that country foregoing the need for visas for businessmen and tourists.

/8918
CSO: 3400/1586

SOUTH AFRICA

FRONTLINE EDITOR DISCUSSES DEMOCRACY AS 'VIABLE ALTERNATIVE'

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 22 Apr 86 p 16

[Article by Denis Beckett]

[Text] Dr Van Zyl Slabbert (*The Star*, April 11) suggests that my proposal for intensive democracy puts the cart before the horse. First get rid of apartheid, he says, then work out what takes its place.

To me, this is the reason we are in the trouble we are.

White people hear daily calls to "scrap apartheid", but hear little in the way of what happens thereafter.

Many believe that what happens thereafter is the replacement of minority tyranny by majority tyranny; the replacement of "white" South Africa by "black" South Africa, with all the well-known deterring images this conjures up.

An ultra-democratic structure, with a full web of interacting local, regional and national authorities, provides something to replace apartheid. It guarantees the elimination of tyranny; it assures effective rights for minorities; and it removes the prospect of "the blacks" lining up in monolithic opposition to "the whites".

It is not simply one man, one vote, with the connotation of majority dominance.

It gives maximum effectiveness to every vote — including the votes of Jaap Marais, Andries Treurnicht and the legions of black people who are more conservative than the radical left, and even liberals such as Dr Slabbert and I, might like them to be.

Dr Slabbert scorns the idea that the Government might introduce democracy, saying that its record has pointed in the opposite direction.

However, its record has been formed in a context where one man, one vote was taken to represent black victory and white defeat.

Now, firstly, it is in terrible trouble and ripe for a dramatic break. Secondly, there is a route available which reconciles black liberation with white security — a route with

the potential, once properly placed on the map, of gripping the imaginations of South Africans across the board.

He says that even if the Government wanted to, its own systems make it incapable of accommodating black voters.

This is difficult to understand. Parliament is sovereign. It changed the Constitution once. There is no technical barrier against it changing it again, to establish a single democratic society.

Dr Slabbert's main concern is that democracy cannot come into being until after "free association" is allowed.

FREE ASSOCIATION

Here it is important to establish which is horse and which is cart. Obviously, there is no democracy without free association. But I can't see how South Africa can acquire free association without democracy.

Free association without democracy would mean:

- The currently exiled bodies can mobilise legally without competing at the polls. They spread the ethic of ungovernability, denounce those who take part in constitutional forums as traitors, and entrench the belief that real liberation means their own ascent to power.

- Alternative forms of order — street committees, etc — flourish. Calling themselves "democratic", they impose the will of the activists on the rest. The rule of the most muscular triumphs in the townships.

- True support remains impossible to gauge. Most people do not belong to political parties. In a democracy they vote for what they see as giving them something they want. Without democracy support is measured by the numbers of activists who attend meetings.

● Normal social institutions cannot grow. Organisations are divided into those which co-operate with the official structures and those which do not.

● Whites, and blacks who fear ANC domination, take increasing fright, giving rise to the prospect of military mutiny or right-wing coup along with increased "vigilante" and "culling" adventures, emigration, capital flight, and economic collapse.

When what remains of the country eventually goes to an election, the result is a foregone conclusion. It takes peculiar courage for an ordinary black person to stand against the dominant tendency, or even to want to.

The environment ensures that "black interests" are closely tied to the dominant party, which is then installed amid post-revolutionary fervour, and the chances of any real democracy emerging are slim indeed.

Clearly, the Government is not about to permit "free association" with this prospect in store, no matter how earnest the calls on it to do so.

Contrast this with freedom in intensive democracy:

● The ANC & Co return as normal political players to seek voting support in a constitutional structure. (If they reject it, they forfeit the claim to be seeking democracy, and lose influence as democratic institutions emerge.)

● The ruinous split between "collaborationist" and authentic black parties is no more.

● "White politics" and "black politics" cease to exist as separate entities. People can mobilise in whatever forms they choose, but they are all part of a single political system.

● Self-proclaimed "democratic committees" are displaced by secret ballots within a constitutional structure.

● Much political energy is put into local and regional affairs, which is where most of the matters which affect people's day-to-day lives are decided. Democratic formations emerge in localised areas, with their various affiliations and strategies dislodging adherence to mass party lines.

● National elections take place in an ordered context. People are free to vote for whom they wish — effectively free and not merely nominally free.

I do not see the establishment of democracy as something to be thought about "afterwards", but as the key to any real prospect of getting rid of apartheid.

/13104

CSO: 3400/1623

WITS ACADEMIC DISCUSSES NATAL/KWAZULU OPTION

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 4-10 Apr 86 pp 12-13

[Article by Daryl Glaser]

[Text]

A PROMINENT financial journal proclaimed in a recent article: "There is a way out. With all SA calling for solutions to its grave and fundamental problems, one option presents itself as a realistic, low-risk starting point to a new future: it has been called the Natal/KwaZulu option."

Optimism about the "KwaNatal" option has become infectious of late. A whole range of influential "moderates" — politicians, academics, businessmen — have embraced the cause. And even the central government, after publicly snubbing the advocates of KwaNatal for several years, appears poised to leap on the bandwagon.

The KwaNatal option proceeds from two ideas. One is that Pretoria, instead of imposing its own solutions on Natal and KwaZulu, should allow "moderate" forces in that region to pursue their own political solutions and exercise greater authority over the region's affairs. The other is that Natal and KwaZulu should combine to form an integrated administrative, planning and political entity called KwaNatal.

To some these goals may sound unobjectionable. To others the initiative may look like a quirky attempt by white Natalians to regain the autonomy they lost in 1910. But it is in fact something more — and arguably more sinister — than either of these responses allows. It is an attempt to provide what its advocates call a "realistic" model for constitutional reform throughout the country. By realistic, however, they appear to mean a conservative model that can defuse political conflict while leaving largely intact the existing distribution of political and economic power. It has already been rejected for this reason by most credible black representatives.

The vision of KwaNatal was hatched in the second half of the 70s, in opposition to central government attempts to fit Natal and KwaZulu into the apartheid straitjacket. Pretoria wanted to consolidate the fragmented KwaZulu bantustan into 10 units instead of 48, forcibly resettling

perhaps half a million Africans in the process. And they wanted KwaZulu to accept political "dependence".

A whole range of vested interests in Natal/KwaZulu rejected this formula. Provincial bosses warned that it would lead to administrative chaos by forcing Natal and KwaZulu to duplicate infrastructures they could share in common. The sugar barons argued that it would create inefficiency in their industry, which could not afford any disruptions to the continuous flow of sugar cane needed to keep their capital-intensive mills running profitably. Many farmers complained about losing land to consolidation. KwaZulu insisted that it would never accept "independence". And almost everybody predicted that a straightforward apartheid solution in Natal and KwaZulu would lead to conflict and political instability.

In its place they pleaded for a KwaNatal option.

In 1980, calls for a regional solution found expression in two major commissions. The Lombard plan, sponsored mainly by the sugar industry, was the more conservative of the two. Taking apartheid territorial divisions as its starting point, it suggested that KwaZulu, "white" rural Natal and the Durban metropolitan area should have separate but equal representation in a common legislature, coupled to institutional protections for the white minority and the "right" of different races to "voluntary exclusivity".

The slightly more "radical" Buthelezi commission began its work in the same year and reported in 1982. Advertised as the first "black initiative" in the game of constitutional reform, the commission was sponsored by Zulu chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement through the KwaZulu legislative assembly. In contrast to the parochial efforts of the University of Pretoria academics who produced the Lombard report, the Buthelezi Commission's star-studded cast included top businessmen, influential local

and overseas academics and numerous politicians and technocrats.

The Buthelezi commission called for a "consociational" solution in Natal/KwaZulu. What this label meant was that the provincial administration, the KwaZulu government and local Indian politicians should collaborate via an executive coalition or "elite cartel". Beneath them should be a legislature entailing disproportionately large representation for minority groups, minority vetoes, an independent judiciary and other minority "protections".

The commission rejected "compulsory" in favour of "voluntary" group association, and favoured "geographical" over "ethnic" units of representation. But it did not question apartheid's premise that the central political challenge is containing conflict between "cultural segments." And while the commission called for a "mixed market economy" in which the state would intervene to satisfy basic needs, as well as joint planning between Natal and KwaZulu in fields like health, education and the provision of infrastructure, it did not even begin to outline ways in which the existing distribution of socio-economic resources could be decisively altered to the benefit of the impoverished black majority.

The central government, having refused to participate in the Buthelezi commission's deliberations, initially distanced itself from the commission's findings. Even National Party "verligtes" preferred to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, while in public successive NP Natal leaders — Owen Horwood, then Stoffel Botha — ridiculed Buthelezi's pretensions. The NP was clearly not then ready to embrace any significant departure from its existing policies.

The New Republic Party — while Natal's dominant party — responded cautiously. It endorsed administrative co-operation between Natal and KwaZulu (MEC Frank Martin has campaigned for it since 1977) but, fearful of losing its provincial power base, it has rejected political fusion. Other influential reformers, however — Natal businessmen, the PFP, liberal academics, conservative Indian politicians — endorsed all of the Buthelezi commission's major goals, and began to step up their pressure on Pretoria.

In 1985 the central government appeared to change its mind. Two cabinet ministers, Gerrit Viljoen and Chris Heunis, sent clear and positive signals to the KwaNatal crusaders. The ministers "agreed" that Natal was different; that it should get a special dispensation; and that the Buthelezi commission could form a basis for negotiating future constitutional models. Earlier, in late 1984, the government had appointed a joint planning council to carve out a role for itself in the KwaNatal build-up.

The central government has not, however, given the KwaNatal initiative its unqualified embrace. Its refusal to consider a common legislature for

Natal and KwaZulu, even while conceding a common administration and executive, has infuriated reformers; so did the recently tabled proposals for KwaZulu land consolidation; and the resignation of joint planning council chairman Louis Rive, allegedly over central government intransigence, has added to tensions. But despite these setbacks, the KwaNatal crusaders have been greatly emboldened.



Scattered fragments that will be pulled together by the KwaNatal option.

Even the NRP has now joined the KwaNatal roadshow, arguing, with reborn fervour, for a fully politically unified region. No doubt the imminent phasing out of provincial government — and therefore the NRP's Natal power base — helped to concentrate minds.

While all these battles have been going on, direct "co-operation" between Natal and KwaZulu has been proceeding anyway. In fact it began — initially at a purely administrative level — as far back as 1980. It accelerated in 1984, when the KwaNatal campaigners began to force the central government's hand. Following the grandly-titled "Ulundi Accord" of November 1984, KwaZulu and the provincial administration began to convene meetings to map out the transition to a fully politically integrated KwaNatal.

Plans for a single legislative body are currently being finalised at the KwaNatal "indaba", with NP observers in attendance. However, given the relatively conservative character of both the Lombard and Buthelezi commissions, and the refusal by most black organisations to participate in the indaba, it seems unlikely that the final product will be acceptable to KwaNatal's black majority.

It is extremely unlikely that representatives of the region's black majority — other than Inkatha itself — will submit to the KwaNatal game plan. The ANC, UDF, Natal Indian Congress and Azapo have already rejected the initiative, which they see as an attempt to bolster Buthelezi, seduce them into acceptance of a white-dominated federal-confederal system and to divert them from the goal of a unitary political system. These suspicions are solidly grounded.

KwaNatal advocates insist that their project is non-partisan. Their claim is not entirely plausible. The indaba is the culmination of a deal struck between KwaZulu and Natal's provincial bosses. And there is strong evidence that KwaNatal campaigners are consciously seeking to promote Buthelezi. One quote, from the Buthelezi Commission's political and constitutional subcommittee, will suffice to make the point:

"We are particularly mindful of the fact that one black leader of moderate and co-operative inclinations (Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha) should not have his position undermined by heightened radical mobilisation ... and we feel bound to make such proposals as will protect the position of the leadership that exists." (Vol II, p 116)

Attitude surveys show that Inkatha is losing ground fast in all black urban areas, including those inside KwaZulu. Any attempt to foist Buthelezi on Natal/KwaZulu is certain to spark a Zulu-versus-Zulu conflict that could permanently scar the region.

It should also be noted that Schlemmer and others have called quite openly for a "cartel" of black and white "elites". In practice this is likely to amount to an agreement forged behind the backs of the region's inhabitants, who will be offered, if they are lucky, an opportunity passively to ratify the new dispensation. (The first open session of the KwaNatal indaba had seating for precisely 720

people; most of the rest will be behind closed doors.)

Nor does the Buthelezi commission break cleanly with the apartheid concept of group representation. A future KwaNatal is likely to contain built-in "minority protections" to safeguard the position of whites. The Buthelezi commission favours separate representation for culturally defined segments in the executive and block representation in the legislature, a minority veto in educational and cultural matters and so on.

The commission disingenuously treats whites as one minority amongst many, ignoring that minority's entrenched and privileged position. Its chief concern appears to be to protect, not minority rights, but minority privileges.

Through minority protections and other mechanisms, the advocates of KwaNatal seek to prevent the black majority from acting as a unified force in the struggle for a real redistribution of power and amelioration of the region's glaring socio-economic inequalities. The consociational model seeks to "share, diffuse, separate, divide, decentralise and limit power" and to ensure that there are "areas from which the parliamentary majority is barred" (Buthelezi Commission, vol II, p 125). The Buthelezi commissioners also call for the creation of allegiances based on "classes and regions" in order to prevent collective black action against white minority interests. (Vol II, p 107). At best, it seems, the black majority can hope for relief from apartheid's more gross features — such as forced removals — while the black middle class and white big business will find new opportunities for expansion.

Even opposition to land consolidation, dressed in impeccably anti-apartheid rhetoric, would be likely, if it succeeded, to freeze the existing, iniquitous distribution of land in Natal/KwaZulu.

[A Discreet Nod From Pretoria]

[Text] WHY has Pretoria given the green light to KwaNatal? A careful reading of official documents and statements suggests that the answer lies in the government's goal of "regionalisation". Nowadays even the government and NP recognise that bantustan "independence" cannot serve as a lasting political solution for the country, but pressures from the right and left have eroded their ability to take initiatives. It serves their interests to give less hamstrung "moderates" in the regions and localities leeway to devise new formulae, thereby clearing a path to — and buying time for — future national "solutions". By giving blacks a role in regional dispensations and metropolitan

and local government, the central government hopes to deflect political pressure from itself.

The KwaNatal initiative fits in neatly with the government's Good Hope regional development plan. Both are accompanied by rhetoric about "devolution of power" and "cross-border co-operation" between South Africa and its bantustan satellites. Many conservative reformers, including National Party "verligtes" and the New Republic Party, see KwaNatal and the Good Hope Plan as providing the scaffolding for a future confederal-constitutional model which they hope can be sold to South Africa's blacks, and to the world at large, as a legitimate substitute for majority rule.

[A Favourite Alternative to Apartheid]

[Text] WHY has Natal/KwaZulu become the frontline of constitutional "reform" in South Africa?

It alone features politically dominant white groups outside National Party control and a contender for black political leadership — Buthelezi and Inkatha — with a base in state structures and a fair-sized constituency outside of them. It is this combination which makes possible a multiracial elite initiative outside the aegis of the central government — an initiative which, at the same time, can aspire to a degree of popular legitimacy and to serve as a laboratory for "reform" elsewhere in the country.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Chief Buthelezi is the lynchpin of the whole KwaNatal drive: without his participation it would be impossible for white Natal's conservative reformers to find a formula that is both "moderate" and credible. Buthelezi, for his part, must see a multiracial KwaNatal as offering a stronger and more defensible launching pad for his — and Inkatha's — national ambitions than does the KwaZulu bantustan.

Natal/KwaZulu has another feature underlining its claim to special treatment, and underpinning Buthelezi's importance to a "moderate" political settlement in the region. On the Reef, the majority of blacks live in "white" areas outside the bantustans. In Natal, nearly all urban blacks live in KwaZulu, in dormitory townships and informal settlements abutting "white" urban centres.

This has buttressed arguments about the need for direct administrative co-ordination between Natal and KwaZulu. It has also facilitated the political side of the KwaNatal initiative. On the Reef the majority of urban blacks have no links with, and many have never seen, the bantustans to which they are assigned. In Natal/KwaZulu, however, most urban blacks fall under the control of the KwaZulu capital of Ulundi. Even where they do not support Inkatha, they are vulnerable to its patronage or political coercion. A deal with Buthelezi thus raises the hope in white Natalians that the majority of Natal's Zulus can be "persuaded" — by one means or another — to play ball with the KwaNatal initiative.

It was in fact the growing challenge to Inkatha from rival, more radical black groups which provided the immediate context for the Buthelezi commission in 1980. The Zimbabwe African National Union's electoral triumph, evidence of growing black sympathy for the ANC's stepped-up guerrilla warfare in a region that provides ideal terrain for insurgents, and spreading student and school boycotts all intensified the fear amongst conservative reformers that Buthelezi would go the same way as Muzorewa. The Buthelezi commission represented an explicit attempt to supply the controversial Inkatha chief with the breakthrough he would need in his coming battles with political rivals.

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CSO: 3400/1624

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW YOUTH GROUP LAUNCHED AT UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 28 Apr 86 p 13

[Article by Susan Fleming]

[Text] A moderate youth organisation with a largely Afrikaner membership list was launched at the University of Pretoria at the weekend.

Called Jeugkrug (Youth Power), the new organisation aims to contribute towards the creation of a "just, democratic" South Africa by forging better understanding between race groups in this country.

The launch was met with strong opposition by about 50 members of the right-wing student group, the Afrikaner-Studentefront (ASF).

Before the meeting ASF members demonstrated, holding placards bearing slogans such as "Bly blank. Dis jou plig. Dis jou reg", "Hou Tjks blank" and "Whites unite for truth and right".

Minutes before the launch, ASF members dispersed and held discussions under some trees near the hall.

Jeugkrug is headed by the president of the Afrikaanse Studentebond, Mr Marthinus van Schalkwyk (26). The new organisation will not be affiliated to any political party.

Although most of the members would probably be Afrikaans-speaking, Mr van Schalkwyk said Jeugkrug was

open to anyone between the ages of 18 and 35. It would not be an "exclusively Afrikaans" organisation, he stressed.

About 200 people attended the launch and there was heated debate over whether Jeugkrug should hold talks with the African National Congress. After 30 minutes discussion it was decided that Jeugkrug would speak only to groups who believed in "peaceful change".

Other issues discussed included the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Separate Amenities Act. A motion was passed to examine this legislation.

Mr van Schalkwyk said Jeugkrug planned to develop a strong relationship with the Inkatha Youth Brigade. The two youth organisations plan to hold a joint political congress next month.

After this congress the Inkatha Youth Brigade and Jeugkrug will send a joint political memorandum to the State President. Mr van Schalkwyk described this memorandum as a "historic venture".

"The time for talking is over," said Mr Van Schalkwyk. "We need to travel a lot further down the road of reform."

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SOUTH AFRICA

EDUCATION REPORTER EXAMINES SCHOOL SUBSIDY PLAN

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 22 Apr 86 p 16

[Article by Susan Fleming]

[Text] Private schools countrywide have been offered financial aid by the Government from this month — but the "strings-attached" subsidy scheme and the strict re-registration regulations have been scorned by most principals.

Last year's announcement by the Minister of National Education, Mr F W de Klerk, that private schools would receive generous subsidies from this year came at a time when many private schools were struggling to survive.

The Jewish schools, for example, last year faced closure unless R20 million was found. In six months R13 million was raised, but continual financial assistance is needed. Aside from the Jewish schools, many other private schools face deep financial problems.

The private schools have asked the Government for financial help for many years. Although some form of subsidy has been given to private schools in the Cape, Natal and Free State, most Transvaal schools have been denied this privilege since 1953.

Concern

Only Transvaal schools which received help before 1953 have been subsidised and most of those received about only R20 a year for each pupil.

Most private school heads expressed relief when it was announced that subsidies would

soon be given. But this relief turned to concern this month when the Minister of white education, Mr Piet Clase, said strict regulations would have to be met before aid was granted.

The Government's insistence that private schools re-register under new regulations has also caused deep concern. Schools fear they will lose their independence and be subject to strict State control if they accept the new registration formula.

Only when schools have registered will they be allowed to apply for one of the two subsidy schemes offered. The regulation which states that the admission of pupils who are not white must be done "in accordance with the new Constitution" is the most controversial.

This racial requirement has been slammed by most private schools; and the Progressive Federal Party has described this clause as "racial blackmail".

If a school refuses to register the Minister may order the closure of that school.

Some school principals have suggested that the control of white private schools should be moved from the racial "own affairs" education department to the Department of National Education.

The strongest opposition to the racial registration regulation has come from the Catholic schools.

Last week about 65 Catholic private schools — accommodating 22 000 pupils — announced that they would refuse to re-register their schools until the racial clause had been removed.

This refusal to register means that these 65 schools are illegal and could be closed by the Minister, leaving 22 000 pupils in the cold.

The Catholic schools believe that by opening up their classrooms to children of all race groups they are making a contribution to breaking down racial barriers in this country.

The majority of the English-medium private schools — 143 out of 170 — accept pupils who are not white and all of these will be affected by the racial requirements incorporated in the registration and subsidisation regulations.

The subsidy scheme has been divided into two categories — 15 percent of what it cost to educate a white child annually or 45 percent of that amount. The 45 percent offer sets stricter regulations than the 15 percent deal.

The conditions for the 15 percent subsidy include:

- The pupil composition must be determined by the white Ministers' Council.
- The total remuneration package of the teaching staff must be comparable to those employed by the State education department.
- The head of education may at any time order a financial audit of the management and spending of

moneys by authorised officials.

The 45 percent subsidy has more stringent conditions. Aside from stricter racial regulations, the 45 percent deal requires that teaching staff must be registered with a statutory professional body.

Statutory

The heads of many private schools have expressed anger at the requirement that staff must be registered with a statutory professional body. "We have not been told which teachers' body our staff will have to join. I know there will be problems if they are asked to join an organisation which is not non-racial. Our teachers should have the right to choose which organisation they plan to join," said one headmaster.

The racial requirements in the registration and subsidisation of private schools remains the most controversial. But the fight to keep private schools open to all race-groups is not a new one.

In September 1982 attempts were made to impose some form of quota on the private schools in the Cape and Natal. The threat that financial assistance could be withdrawn because racial quotas were not correct was strongly objected to. Some schools, though not all, who exceeded the given quota had their subsidies withdrawn.

The Government has said little about the new regulations and Mr Clase told *The Star* recently that full details about the scheme would be released in May.

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CSO: 3400/1624

SOUTH AFRICA

TEACHERS WELCOME PAY BOOST

Durban POST NATAL in English 16-19 Apr 86 p 1

[Article by Khalil Aniff]

[Text]

SOUTH AFRICA'S 220 000 teachers will be smiling all the way to the bank on payday this month with a 23 percent increase which includes a 12 percent living allowance.

More good news for teachers is that the Commission for Administration has decided to reinstate their full bonus, which was axed by one-third last year at the height of the country's economic crisis.

There are an estimated 120 000 African, 40 000 coloured, 40 000 white, and 12 000 Indian teachers in the country.

The new pay scales are effective from April 1, according to a confidential circular sent to all rectors of colleges, school principals, and department heads.

Under the new pay structures, some teachers — such as the executive director of Indian education, his deputies, and education planners — will earn between R5 000 and R6 000 a month.

The new pay structure does not include other perks such as housing subsidies (as much as 60 percent of the monthly repayment), medical aid, pension benefits, boarding benefits, and retirement benefits.

Teachers were jubilant this week, saying they deserved the new package. But they stressed that their salaries were still lagging behind the private sector.

The president of the Teachers' Association of South Africa, Mr Pat Samuels, said while teachers welcomed the increase, it was nevertheless still lower

than expected.

He said the 12 percent living allowance made it look attractive, but in fact the increase was only 10 percent across the board.

"We waited for two years to get this rise. Last year teachers did not get increases. In fact they had to take a one-third cut in bonuses."

Mr Samuels said the salaries of teachers were not commensurate with what they should be earning — he claimed they were 27 percent below public sector salaries.

He said TASA was perturbed at the "low pay scale" which teachers had to endure, and this had prompted his organisation

to make representations to the Government-created Research Organisation of the Committee for Education Structures (Reces) calling for an improvement in the service conditions of teachers, including the upgrading of salaries.

"A quick look at teacher training colleges would show that not many males are now entering the profession. They have been put off by low pay structures."

Mr Samuels said the "living allowance", which was previously referred to as a temporary allowance, was being given to "make up" for the poor salary scales.

Mr Austin Green-

Thompson, president of the Society of Natal Teachers (Sonat) and vice-president of Union of Teachers' Association of South Africa (Utasa), welcomed the increases but said they were "not good enough".

"There is no question about it. We are far behind the private sector and the pay gap will continue to widen until such time teachers are given a better deal."

He said he was also disappointed at the "deal" given to underqualified teachers.

"These teachers have given many years of yeoman service to the profession and they should have been treated better."

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SOUTH AFRICA

BURGEONING MILITANCY IN LABOR UNIONS DISCUSSED

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 4-10 Apr 86 p 9

[Article by Phillip Van Niekerk]

[Text] MORE than half a million working days were lost through industrial action in South Africa in the first three months of this year, setting the scene for the biggest challenge for organised labour, employers and the state since the renaissance of black unionism in the Durban strikes of 1973.

In the next three months the labour scene will be kept boiling by supercharged wage talks in the metal and mining industries, the launch of an Inkatha union body as a direct rival to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the prospect of four days of national stayaway action.

Dates which unionists are already marking in their diaries include:

April 15: Start of the annual metal negotiations.

April 17: National day of action called by the Metal and Allied Workers Union (Mawu).

May 1: May Day stayaway and the launch of the United Workers Union of South Africa (Uwusa).

June 16, 17, 18: Proposed three-day stayaway over the education crisis.

July 1: Target day for implementation of annual increases on the mines.

All these dates take on an added significance because of the events of the past three months, which have seen the most sustained expression of worker militancy since 1973.

Metalworkers and others have occupied their factories for weeks, the mines have been hit by more than 30

strikes — with evidence suggesting the isolated worlds of the mining compounds have been penetrated by the political mood of the townships — and stayaways in outlying areas have become common. Employers have grown increasingly alarmed at what they see as an attempt by workers to make the factories ungovernable — beyond the control of management and union officials.

A number of different factors have been trotted out to explain these trends, but perhaps the crucial one is the effect of the overall political climate and the impetus given to politics in the labour movement by the formation of Cosatu four months ago.

At the same time conflicts over wages have sharpened.

Both Cosatu and employers face a big challenge on May 1, workers' day, when Cosatu has called for workers to take the day off and hold rallies throughout the country. Some employers, accepting the inevitability of the stayaway, which this year will commemorate "100 years of exploitation" to coincide with the Johannesburg centenary, are adopting a "no work, no pay" approach. The Chamber of Mines has taken the May Day issue to the industrial court.

May 1 will be an interesting prelude to a potential three-day stayaway starting on June 16 over the education issue, which has displaced pass laws as Cosatu's first major campaign.

Endorsement of the National

Education Crisis Committee's recommendation of a stayaway still depends on a Cosatu executive committee meeting next week, but at this stage there is nothing to suggest it won't be approved.

If employers are unable to live with May Day, an effective three-day general strike in June on the 10th anniversary of the Soweto uprising is likely to contain even more potential for massive conflict.

Further exacerbating the conflict on May 1 will be the rally launching Uwusa at Durban's Kings Park stadium and the potential violent clashes that might flow from it.

An earlier sign of worker mobilisation will be Mawu's national day of action on April 17, two days after the start of annual industrial council wage talks with the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation (Seifsa). The union plans to kick off with rallies in the townships next week to discuss this year's wage demands.

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) will also be meeting shortly to discuss its wage demands and speculation has again started over whether this year will see a conflagration on the mines if there is no agreement on wages.

Already more workers have been on strike this year than took part in the 1946 miners' strike or the NUM's legal strikes of 1984 and 1985. The Chamber of Mines' industrial

relations advisor Johann Liebenberg says that less than two percent of the working days that could have been worked have been lost since January through industrial action.


But two percent still amounts to an average of 11 000 workers on strike each day and is reflected in a huge decline in gold production for the first two months of this year.

According to Liebenberg there have been strikes on 23 collieries as well as the widely-publicised action at Vaal Reefs and Blyvooruitzicht gold mines. In addition there has been industrial action at Impala Platinum Mines, Phalaborwa Mining Corporation, Foskor, the Employment Bureau of Africa (Teba), six strikes at the Nuclear Fuel Corporation (Nufcor) and go-slows at three De Beers diamond mines in Namaqualand.

Issues have varied. At Impala Platinum they centred around wages and recognition of the NUM which was banned in Bophuthatswana.

But issues such as the migrant labour system (the right to live with families) and demands for non-racialism — no preferential treatment for white workers — also surfaced, opening up whole new areas of demands.

There have been disputes over other issues. At Rand Mines' Wolwekrans colliery, workers struck on three occasions over a white supervisor who threatened a black worker with a gun.



For the first two months of 1986, more man-hours were lost than in 1985. The figure dropped during March, but is likely to rise again within a few weeks

Statistics: ANDREW LEVY

Nowhere has there been more of a direct link between the 20-month long unrest in the country's townships and unrest in the mine hostels than in the coal mines around Witbank where industrial action has coincided with the intense political climate which swept the Eastern Transvaal this year.

For a century mine hostels have been isolated communities, removed from the main currents of political development in the townships. In the first three months of 1986 that has changed dramatically.

One management source said he believed that when the NUM came out with an unequivocal political line for the first time in August last year — calling for consumer boycotts in support of the broader struggle — it "lit the fuse of a bomb".

Some management officials have attributed political militancy to the spill-over effect, the result of the broader political battle encroaching on the mines and on employer-employee relations.

Liebenberg, for instance, says employers have been warning for a long time that if labour reforms giving employees some rights don't take place alongside political reforms, political aspirations will be expressed through the only channels available to blacks — trade unions.

NUM officials have countered that the mine compounds, with cramped quarters for single migrant workers, are as much a visible sign of apartheid as the townships and the lack of a vote.

Marcel Golding, the NUM's press officer, says that what has been happening in the mining industry is the emergence of a new confidence among workers.

He denies claims that the union has no control of the situation. "The union is not head office. It is the shaft stewards and the workers who are taking the action. They are the union."

Much of the industrial action on the mines is still of short duration, but there has been a growing sophistication in tactics and some strikes are lasting much longer.

At Duvha open-cast colliery workers struck for two weeks before returning, at De Beers in Namaqualand they launched tightly-disciplined go-slows, while at Blyvooruitzicht and Vaal Reefs workers staged underground sit-ins.

These are signs, not of a loss of control, but growing organisation, closely coinciding with developments in the metal industry where, at factory after factory, workers have been sitting in. There have been sit-ins at 10 plants since the beginning of the year, the longest being three weeks at Haggie Rand.

Employers say privately that factory occupation is nothing to fear and, if affected, they are prepared to wait for it to blow over. But it has been a rough few months for many employers. As workers have adopted new tactics, so employers have had to look for new ways of facing the challenge. Supreme court orders evicting workers from factory and mine premises and lock-outs are among the measures adopted.

One company, Townsend Engineering, has been involved in a legal lockout — the converse of a legal strike — of Mawu members for four weeks now. Two more companies, Dorbyl and Metal Box, have declared disputes with Mawu.

Earlier this year, Rand Mines closed its Blyvooruitzicht mine and Anglo American shut a number of shafts at its Vaal Reefs mine after go-slows by workers disrupted production.

Supreme Court orders have come fast and furious, chiefly to evict Mawu members, to put a stop to factory occupations. But legal pieces of paper have proved insufficient to stop factory sit-ins and one company, GB Engineering, called in the police and more than 60 workers were arrested.

More threatening are moves by some employers to claim damages from unions for illegal strikes, a measure which could prove costly to financially strapped unions.

Labour consultant Andrew Levy says measures such as court orders and lock-outs are only being resorted to "out of desperation".

He says the unions are in many cases incapable of controlling their members and employers are being forced to consider lock-outs and court orders as they cannot get anywhere through the prescribed channels.

"For employers, the situation is simply that now they accept the legitimacy of trade unions and collective bargaining, they are dealing with a player who's not playing according to the agreed rules. Unions are not acting in a legitimate way, so, by applying to the Supreme Court, employers are merely asking for a referee."

SOUTH AFRICA

WHITES TO SELL HOMES TO INDIANS

Durban POST NATAL in English 2-5 Apr 86 p 5

[Article by Khalil Aniff]

[Text]

SCORES of whites have placed their homes — many of them palatial with swimming pools — on the open market for Indians, but Government regulations are preventing sales taking place.

A spokesman for estate agents Hallied Realtors this week disclosed they have 165 white-owned properties on the market for sale to Indians.

The homes, according to Mrs Sylvi Pillay, are in areas like Warner Beach, Morningside, Yellowwood Park, Berea, Westville, Glenwood, Durban North, La Lucia and Umhlanga Rocks.

She said homes on the Bluff, Cowies Hill, Red Hill and other areas have also been offered to Indians.

The prices, Mrs Pillay said, ranged from R28 000 for a bachelor flat to R350 000 for an executive home with a swimming pool.

The average selling price of many of the white homes, with swimming pools, is R85 000, Mrs Pillay said.

The rush to sell to Indians started shortly after the Government announced the opening of the Central Business District (CBD) to all races.

This announcement gave rise to speculation that the Government was likely to scrap the Group Areas Act.

Mrs Pillay confirmed that many of her white clients were convinced that the introduction of mixed areas was on the cards and that an announcement was imminent.

"Many whites, whose properties are on my books, are even prepared to sell to Indians and then stay on as tenants.

"Some are even prepared to act as nominees until the Group Areas Act is repealed," she said.

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CSO: 3400/1623

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

PRO-LIBYAN DEMONSTRATION--Durban police have broken up a pro-Libyan student demonstration outside the American Consulate. About 50 students belonging to the Muslim Students Association delivered a letter for President Reagan protesting the U.S. Raids on Libya and afterwards held a placard demonstration outside the consulate building. Police took action and nine were arrested for holding an illegal procession. They were warned to pay an admission of guilt fine or appear in court. A pro-Libyan meeting is scheduled to take place in the Cape Peninsula tonight. [Text] [Umtata Capital Radio in English 1500 GMT 23 Apr 86 MB] /8918

NEW CONSTITUTION BROADENS DEMOCRACY--House of Delegates, April 23, SAPA--The state President Mr P.W. Botha was correct in saying the new constitution broadened the base of democracy, Mr Amichand Rajbansi, chairman of the Ministers Council, said today. Speaking in the state president's budget vote debate, he said the president's opening of parliament speech in January this year would go down in history as an important event. But even if Mr Botha, in his speech, supported one-man-one-vote, he would still be attacked by some people. Mr Rajbansi said as a cabinet minister he was "very close" to Mr Botha and was satisfied he was a reformist. Referring to the tricameral elections 2 years ago, Mr Rajbansi said those who opposed the new dispensation had not only engaged in a "reign of terror" but had also physically prevented voters from getting to the polls. He was satisfied the "silent majority" was following the path of peaceful evolution. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 2117 GMT 23 Apr 86 MB] /8918

ACTION AGAINST UDF PROTESTED--Johannesburg, April 25, SAPA--About 40 students from the University of the Witwatersrand today staged a peaceful picket demonstration on the east side of Jan Smut's Avenue during peak rush hour traffic to protest government actions against the United Democratic Front. A spokesman for the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) said the picket had been peaceful and there had been no police action. The students--mostly white--held placards saying "stop apartheid killing," "Kill apartheid not people" and "who killed UDF leaders." The spokesman said they were mostly NUSAS members who wanted to inform the public of the "iniquitous" acts of the government. A police liaison officer for the Witwatersrand said that as far as he knew there had been no police action. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 1005 GMT 25 Apr 86 MB] /8918

CSO: 3400/1586

SOUTH AFRICA

RADIO REITERATES ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE OF REGION

MB231046 Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 23 Apr 86

[Station Commentary]

[Text] Certainly when one examines statistics pertaining to interdependence in the region, it is realised that policies of good neighborliness make good sense. For example, some 99 percent of Lesotho's imports come from South Africa. In the case of Swaziland, more than 90 percent of its imports go through South Africa, while 88 percent of Botswana's imports are routed through South Africa.

As for Zimbabwe, 68 percent of its imports and 65 percent of its exports go through South Africa. Malawi has 60 percent of its imports and 50 percent of its exports routed through this country. Even Zaire routes 57 percent of its imports through South Africa. Of its exports, 45 percent of its copper, 60 percent of its lead, and 40 percent of its cobalt go through the Republic of South Africa.

What these figures illustrate is that the southern African region is very much an economic entity, with South Africa, as the most developed state, acting as a catalyst for development. This is also a role which South Africa is more than willing to play in the region.

Against this background, it is clear that other states in southern Africa dare not stand aloof from campaigns to introduce disinvestment and sanctions against South Africa. As the campaign against South Africa intensifies, it has also become necessary for this country's neighbors to raise their voices in growing concern over both the campaign and the effect on their economies.

South Africa is the main generator of development in the subcontinent. If it is harmed, the effects on its neighbors would be disastrous.

/8918
CSO: 3400/1582

SOUTH AFRICA

BOTHA SAYS OIL CRISIS BEHIND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

MB242015 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2014 GMT 24 Apr 86

[Text] Vereeniging, April 24, SAPA--At the height of the oil crisis, South Africa had enough oil to satisfy its needs for only 1 week, the state president, Mr P.W. Botha, revealed at a public meeting tonight.

He said that between 1973 to 1984--the years spanning the oil crisis--South Africa had to pay R22 billion more for oil than it would normally have spent.

He was sketching some of the contributory reasons for South Africa's current financial difficulties and said the full story on how South Africa survived the worst days of the oil crisis will still have to be told.

"Then we will see what it cost us to keep our country supplied with oil from day to day.

"There were times when it was reported to me that we had enough oil for only a week.

"We were foundering about the battling because SASOL [South African Coal, Gas and Oil Cooperation] was not yet on full production and we had to build up our reserves and keep the wheels rolling.

"It is an epoch making take of how we succeed to keep those wheels turning," Mr Botha said.

"Just think what we could have done if we had that R22 billion today.... What could have been done in the areas?

"But we had to spend it because we couldn't bring our motor cars and our diesel locomotives to a standstill as our economic life would have collapsed.

"We paid a price, which we are still suffering from today," Mr Botha said. The oil crisis had further repercussions in bringing about the world recession and leaving South Africa's newly improved harbours empty. "As if that was not enough, we then suffered a 3-to-4 year drought, which cost us R1 billion in drought assistance," he said. Eventually this led to negative growth rate but the country could now, in spite of boycotts, look forward to a modest 3 per cent growth rate in the coming year.

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CSO: 3400/1582

SOUTH AFRICA

OIL PRICE DROP NOT REFLECTED IN TIRE PRICES

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 15 Apr 86 p 6

[Editorial: "Where Price is Strategic"]

[Text]

THAT the full effects of the rand's deterioration have yet to be felt must have become obvious to motorists this week with the announcement that tyre prices would go up yet again. This, the fourth rise in 12 months, makes a total increase of more than 30% in that period.

It is difficult to fault the tyre manufacturers, who have absorbed some of the 40% increase in the price of their inputs in the past year.

But it is at the very least ironic that this coincides with two trends which should be pushing down the prices of imported oil-based chemicals — a recovery in the rand from its lows of last September, and a decline in the price of oil (in real terms to pre-1973 levels).

One explanation for this apparent anomaly lies in the strategic requirements of an increasingly beleaguered South Africa. Because they are considered strategic commodities, stockpiles of both synthetic rubber and tyres are considerably larger than they would be on straight economic considerations.

To a degree, therefore, what we are feeling now is the result of high prices experienced at varying times during the past 12 to 18 months. Some of the raw materials now being used were purchased when the rand was worth \$0,40, for example.

By the same token, any advan-

tage of currently lower import prices will not be felt for some months. And then, such is the nature of things, they will probably be submerged in the general welter of other rising prices — and the consumer may never feel them.

Another factor in the equation is that Karbochem's Asprene synthetic rubber plant in Newcastle is a long way from delivering the 70% self-sufficiency in rubber that was promised eight years ago: when the project was in the planning stage. Today, 60% of its rubber is still produced from imported raw materials.

Depending on the type of tyre, synthetic rubber accounts for up to 25% of the cost of production, nylon roughly 12% and carbon black about 5%. All are products affected by the cost of imported oil.

However, the production of petrochemicals locally from coal does not necessarily lead to significantly lower prices, even when oil prices are high. In a market situation, all that is necessary is that the local product is offered at a price marginally below or competitive with the landed cost of oil-based products — much as Sasol is able to do with ethylene.

By now, the South African consumer has become used to the fact that strategic self-sufficiency is precisely that. It is not a formula for lower prices.

SOUTH AFRICA

ORANGE RIVER IRRIGATION PROJECT TO BE SPEEDED UP

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAILY in English 15 Apr 86 p 7

[Article by Chris Cairncross]

[Text] GOVERNMENT has decided to speed up drastically development of the Orange River irrigation scheme.

It will also be substantially expanded.

The decision was taken this year but details of the revised R540m project, which now comprises three linked schemes, were contained in a recently-released report in Cape Town.

It says the implementation of the three schemes — two of which have not been mentioned before — have been "drastically" advanced for various reasons, the main one being unemployment relief.

New project

The project now includes the original proposal, the Lower Sundays River Government Water Scheme, and two new projects — namely the Lower Fish River Government Water Scheme and the Orange-Douglas Government Water Scheme.

The purpose behind the Lower Sundays River Scheme is to bring 11 000ha under irrigation, in addition to about 9 500ha now controlled by the Sundays River Irrigation Board.

The main components of the scheme include 75km of new or upgraded canals, 2km of tunnels, two balancing dams and extensive piped water distribution systems.

This project is scheduled for completion by 1992.

Budgeted cost of the original scheme was R197m. The revised figure is now about R369m. The increase has mainly been incurred to cover the enlargement of the project.

The Lower Fish River Scheme will make it possible to develop about 3 000ha of irrigable land along the Great Fish River in the Committee's Drift area north-east of Grahamstown.

The reason for the project is also to bring land under irrigation and to make additional water available to Grahamstown.

The main works are a 5km diversion tunnel near Fort Brown, an off-channel storage dam, a 13km canal and a pipe distribution system for irrigation water.

Estimated total building cost is around R97m. Construction has already started and is expected to be completed by January 1990.

Owing to the shortage of water in the Vaal River system, the Douglas Co-operative constructed an emergency scheme to supply water from the Orange River to the Douglas Weir, serving irrigable land near Douglas.

Emergency scheme

It is now proposed that the State takes over this emergency scheme and expand it to serve a possible additional 4 000ha.

This takeover is expected to remove the crippling debt incurred by the co-op in constructing the scheme, relieve the pressure on the already over-committed resources of the Vaal River and promote higher agricultural production.

Total cost of the takeover and the further additions to the scheme is estimated at R48m.

Construction on the additions are scheduled to start next year and be completed by 1991.

SOUTH AFRICA

COAL PRICE INCREASED, CONTROLS ELIMINATED

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAILY in English 11 Apr 86 pp 1, 2

[Article by Chris Cairncross and Linda Ensor]

[Text] GOVERNMENT increased the price of pithead coal by 19,9% yesterday and announced immediate deregulation of price control at wholesale and retail level.

Industry leaders welcomed both moves, but the Federated Chamber of Industries expressed disappointment that the increase was higher than the rate of inflation.

The price increases — the highest in recent years — comes into effect today.

It is estimated the increase will contribute to an increase to the consumer of about 5,5% on the Reef and 3% in Cape Town. The pithead price is a small proportion of the retail price, which is made up mainly of transportation and distribution costs and retailers' margins.

The Transvaal Coal Owners' Association (TCOA) — the marketing arm of major coal producers in the province — welcomed the price rise, saying it would help ease the accumulated burden of unrecovered costs which the industry is bearing, with minimal effects on inflation.

"The erosion of coal prices over the past decade had been reducing the return on domestic coal sales to an unacceptable level," TCOA MD Les Weiss said, adding that major investments for the exploitation of new coal reserves had become unviable.

The new price would not, he said, compensate fully for the shortfall.

Mineral and Energy Affairs Director-General Louw Alberts said that unless the continuous lag of production costs behind price adjustments were rectified to some extent, the long-term availability of coal, and thousands of jobs, would be jeopardised.

He said the decision was taken after recommendations by the Coal Advisory Committee.

Over the past 10 years, said Alberts, production costs had increased by 16% on average — due mainly to rapid escalation of labour costs — while prices had increased by an average of 12%.


Government would monitor the situation closely, he added, and if consumers were being exploited, it would not hesitate to re-instate price control.

Another feature of the new price structure is the larger differential introduced between high and low grades, intended — said Weiss — to encourage greater use of the low grades. SA's reserves of high grade coal are limited, he added.

The price of low-grade coal, used basically for cooking and heating, will rise by less than 15% at the pithead.

Price increases for Natal collieries — determined on a colliery-to-colliery basis — amount on average to the 19,9% average granted for the Transvaal and OFS collieries.

**COMPARISON PRICE INCREASES
1978 — 1988**



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CSO: 3400/37

SOUTH AFRICA

KHUTALA COAL MINE TO SUPPLY NEW POWER STATION

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR FINANCE in English 13 Apr 86 p 8

[Article by John Orpen, mining editor]

[Text] NOW being developed at a cost of at least R400 million on the Eastern Transvaal Highveld near Kendal is Khutala coal mine, in the Rand Mines Group.

Situated on the Bombardie-Cologne coal field, the new mine is being established to supply coal to Escom's new 4 032-MW Kendal power station — the biggest known thermal power station in the world.

Production is scheduled to last over a 40-year period and should begin next year. Ultimately production will build up to 12,3 million tons a year by September 1992, when the power station will be fully operational and contributing in a major way to the country's electricity grid.

The first 872-MW generating set at Kendal is due to be commissioned in June 1988, nine months later than originally planned. The reason for this is that Escom is now anticipating a slowdown in the growth of electricity demand as a result of the economic recession.

It has accordingly put the brakes on its capital expansion programme — at least to a degree.

Khutala is the second Escom-tied coal mine to be developed by Rand Mines, whose Witbank Collieries holds 70 percent of the equity. The first was Duvha open-cast mine, near Witbank, which is providing all the coal for Escom's 3 600-MW Duvha power station.

A third Escom-tied mine, Majuba, is also being developed by Rand Mines. Situated near the Transvaal town of Amersfoort, it will supply coal to the 3 942-MW Majuba power station.

Apart from producing coal for Kendal, Khutala has also been granted a 2,5 million-tons-a-year export permit, scheduled for Phase Four-A of the Richards Bay coal-terminal expansion programme. This coal will come from the No 5 seam, which does not form part of the contract with Escom.

The first shaft-sinking contract at Khutala went to RUC Shaft Sinking and Tunneling, a company originally known as Roberts Union Corporation and owned jointly by Murray & Roberts and Gencor.

The R10,5-million contract was for the sinking, lining and commissioning of two vertical shafts and an incline shaft, together with the construction of four large underground coal bunkers and certain ancillary development work.

All necessary underground infrastructure, including stations and coal-storage bunkers, was scheduled to be available for use by last month.

In sinking the incline shaft, RUC scored a first for South Africa by using a R1,6-million Westfalia WAV300 road-header. No incline shaft has been sunk in South Africa before by means of mechanical mining. The machine cut through 500 m of sandstone, carbonaceous

shales and coal over a period of six months.

Connections between the No 2 and No 4 seam horizons have also been completed.

The bigger of the two vertical shafts is the 124-m deep service shaft, which gives access to two coal seams. This shaft has a diameter of 12,5 m and will accommodate a 60-t cage, believed to be the largest of its kind in the industry.

The other vertical shaft is a 10-m diameter ventilation shaft that drops to 105 m underground.

The incline shaft has a slope of 15 degrees. It is 530 m long, 8 m wide and 2,5 m high, and is to be

equipped with two conveyor belts. These will take the coal from No 2 and No 4 seams in the mine to Kendal power station.

Work on the infrastructure for the provision of services and housing is virtually complete.

Fifty-four homes were due for completion by the end of last year, while the surface buildings, changehouses, shaft administration block, stores and main administration building were all due for completion last month.

Once in full operation, the Khutala mine will employ some 3 150 people, including 2 700 black workers.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

BUILDING INDUSTRY PROBLEMS--Johannesburg--The traumas facing building and construction have again been brought into focus by industry leaders who are unanimous that the combined threat of unemployment, company crashes and spiraling costs have created an unparalleled crisis situation. The ancillary professions, too, are feeling the crunch and Mr Arthur van der Westhuizen, president of the Transvaal Institute of Architects, said a survey had revealed that 30 to 40 percent of architectural practices could close down if no upturn comes soon. Insolvency seems certain, too, among consulting engineers who are experiencing a 22 percent drop in orders. Mr Peter Jacobsen, vice president of the Building Industries Federation and newly retired chairman of LTA Construction, said: "Costs last year showed increases in materials of 17 percent and labour 13 percent and the unions have foregone pay rises in an attempt to help the situation. "The longer the delay, the greater the convulsion and any upturn must be kept gradual, otherwise a 'bust to boom' change will produce a dangerous situation." His successor at LTA, Mr Brian Hackney, underlining the problems facing the civil engineering industry in particular, said its workforce had dropped from 135,000 in 1982 to 90,000 last year -- "losses of skilled personnel which tend to be permanent." With predictions of building cost rises of more than 30 percent over the next year and tenders even lower than three years ago, there is little doubt that, despite the current mood of uncertainty in the private sector, this is still the time to build. [By Frank Jeans] [Text] [Cape Town THE ARGUS in English 7 Apr 86 p 7] /12851

BLACK MARKET FOR TOILETRIES--The South African toiletries market is undergoing a profound change, becoming increasingly dominated by black purchasing power. In 1975 only 40 percent of black households used deodorants -- in 1985 usage of these products had increased to 87 percent. There is also a trend in some categories by blacks for more expensive brands which has led to a shift in the entire market structure. A Market Research Africa survey shows that specific sectors of the market are recording astonishing growth. A particularly dramatic example comes from the hair care sector. Black expenditure here grew by 93 percent during 1985 to R35 million (excluding salon treatments). In the conditioner category particularly, black volume growth of 39 percent was accompanied by a move to more expensive products, with a resultant tripling of market value. With white/Asian/coloured expenditure growing at a more modest 22 percent, the black share of total hair care expenditure increased from

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25 percent in 1984 to 34 percent in 1985; at the same time, the value of the total market (all race groups) grew by 39 percent compared with 1984. In the deodorant category continuing black market growth has seen an increase in the share of the roll-on segment (which is 71 percent black) to 34 percent of the total category, with roll-on deodorants showing volume growth of 11 percent in only six months. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Apr 86 p 16] /12851

BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT INCREASE--Unemployment among blacks rose by an average of 6,3 percent in January this year when compared with the same month in 1985, says the Central Statistical Services. Unemployment among males increased by 10,5 percent and among females by 2,8 percent. Out of an estimated economically active population of 6,448,000 blacks, 555,000 were unemployed in January this year compared to 522,000 in January 1985. This means the unemployment rate stood at 8,6 percent at the start of 1986, said the CSS. There were 51,752 men and women registered as workseekers with the Department of Manpower in November last year compared to 35,281 the previous year. The large difference between the number of unemployed people registered with the Department as workseekers and those identified in the CSS's population survey as jobless could be attributed to the fact that many did not realise the benefits of registration. Also, many, such as domestic and agricultural workers, were not contributors and were therefore not entitled to benefits, said the CSS. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Apr 86 p 4] /12851

GOLD COMPANIES PERFORMANCE--A combination of factors adversely affected Gencor's quarterly results and income after tax plummeted from R236,7 million in the previous quarter to R147,0 million in the past quarter. Quarterly results released yesterday for the 12 gold mining companies owned by the group show that apart from the lower rand gold price, average performance of the mines was lower than the previous quarter. Tonnage milled by the group's mines dropped by 6,1 percent to 5,2 million tons from 5,5 million tons. Grade fell to 5,2 g/t on average from 5,3 g/t, although grades on Buffelsfontein, Winkelhaak, Beatrix and Unisel improved. Average cost per ton milled increased by 28 percent to \$215 an ounce from the previous \$168 an ounce. None of the mines managed to reduce or contain costs with MARIEVALE showing the greatest increase in costs -- \$318 compared with \$235. Working revenue on the mines increased from \$322 an ounce to \$339 an increase of 5,3 percent. Average capital expenditure for the mines decreased by 20,3 percent to R30,9 million (R38,8 million). Mines which recorded substantial decreases were West Rand Cons, R510,000 (R2,7 million) Marievale, R74,000 (R182,000) and St Helena, R7,1 million (R12,6 million). Capex increased on Stilfontein, R1,9 million (R1,7 million), Winkelhaak, R4,1 million (R2,4 million), Bracken, R148,000 (R73,000) and Unisel, R2,2 million (R1,4 million). Income after tax and capex showed as 32,3 percent decrease to R94,3 million from the previous quarter's figure of R139,3 million. [By Madden Cole] [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Apr 86 p 23] /12851

MINERAL SALES--Mineral sales in January, as recorded by the Minerals Bureau, were worth nearly R2,6bn -- with R2,2bn being realised from exports. Gold continued to lead the field, contributing 62.4% (R1,6bn) to the total from the sale of 52,4 tons, followed by coal with R417,1m, of which R258m (3,4 tons) came from overseas sales. Ahead of the announcement of a price increase, diamond sales were worth R197,5m (R116,2m from exports). However, only exports of 1,3m carats are disclosed as local sales are classified. Platinum and the group metals have for some time been classified, with no date available for general distribution. Last year, SA mineral sales values jumped 40% to R20,3bn, boosted by the weak rand, with gold's contribution rising from R11,6bn in 1984 to R15,3bn last year. It was coal, however, that claimed the 1985 success story -- nearly doubling its sales value from R1,7bn to R3,1bn. [By Roy Bennetts] [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAILY in English 14 Apr 86 p 1] /12851

PLATINUM REFINERY UNDER CONSIDERATION--A decision on whether to build a platinum refinery at an estimated cost of between R150 million and R250 million near Rustenburg will be taken when a feasibility study has been completed by the third quarter of this year. Mr Rex Apleton, manager, administration, for Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, says that this is a proposed joint venture between JCI, Rustenburg Platinum Mines and the British-South African consortium Matthey Rustenburg Refiners. Its aim will be to provide a fourth refinery which will render South Africa self-sufficient in its refining needs, enhance the product that is exported and create more semi-skilled jobs. Because platinum is a "secretive" industry, he says he cannot divulge details of how much this will save SA. Some of its platinum is refined abroad as refineries sited at Wadeville, Springs and Brakpan cannot meet all the refining requirements of platinum producers in SA and Bophuthatswana. It is estimated that of the 2,9 million ounces of platinum produced in the world in 1985, South Africa delivered 2,4 million. Rustplats "primary platinum" is estimated to make up about 60 percent of this country's output. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR FINANCE in English 6 Apr 86 p 3] /12851

UNAUTHORISED SPENDING REPORTED--Umtata, April 23, SAPA--The chairman of the sessional committee on public accounts which was appointed by the National Assembly last year, Mr Harold Zibi, today tabled his committee's reports which showed a total of R13.7 million unauthorised expenditure for 1983/84. Mr Zibi pleaded with members of the assembly not to ignore the resolutions adopted by the committee, as this would be sacrificing the practical interests of the people represented in parliament. "It is a matter of regret that I have to report some departmental officials studiously defy some of these resolutions. It was not an easy task for the committee, as most of the accounting officers failed to come up with satisfactory replies and had to be sent back to redraft their replies," he said. Mr Zibi said his committee, having made inquiry into the circumstances leading to the unauthorised expenditure, had recommended that the amount of R13,759,846 be appropriated by the National Assembly. [Text] [Johannesburg SAPA in English 2342 GMT 23 Apr 86 MB] /8918

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SOUTH AFRICA

OPTICAL FIBER CABLE PLANT SHOWING STRONG PERFORMANCE

Port Elizabeth EVENING POST in English 9 Apr 86 p 15

[Text]

GROWTH prospects for one of Port Elizabeth's newest high-technology industries — the manufacture of optical fibre cable — look set to sprint far ahead of the general economic trend this year.

Orders totalling R7 million have already been placed in the first three months of this year with Contronics Cables in Markman industrial township, and the operation is tipped to become star performer in the R195-million-turnover Aberdare Group.

Mr Bev Pyke, chief executive of the group, says in its annual report that while demand for cable products in general this year will be lower than in 1985, substantial volume increases are anticipated in optical cable production.

The report adds that the the range of products offered by the specialist Port Elizabeth factory "has the major potential for growth within the Aberdare group".

"With the total South African telecommunications and process control markets estimated at R935 million and R200 million respectively, and annual growth rates of 12%, the Aberdare group's strategy of further penetration in these markets is sound."

Expanding on prospects in an interview, Mr Pyke said that orders re-

ceived this year included one of R5 million from the Post Office. Together with smaller contracts, the operation's order book now stood at R7 million.

Employment strength had grown to 400 since the opening of the R1.5-million Markman township plant last year.

More positive news for the Eastern Cape — to which the Aberdare group was fully committed — was that 50 new jobs had also been created on the belt-cable line at the Standford Road factory, said Mr Pyke.

Reviewing the group's financial situation in the annual report, Mr Pyke says the R195 million turnover can be considered a "satisfactory performance in the light of current economic conditions and the labour problems which beset certain areas of our group".

Earnings had increased by 13.2% despite a decrease in pre-tax profit margins to 5.3%.

In his review, group chairman Mr Louis van Biljon notes that while it is encouraging that several leading economic indicators suggest an upswing in 1986, "we should bear in mind that this can only be short-lived unless political stability is returned to our country and a strict restraint on the money supply be implemented, to help reduce the inflation rate".

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

HIGH-VOLTAGE TESTING CAGE--Work is nearing completion on a Faraday cage structure for the SA Bureau of Standards at its Apollo electrical testing station near Olifantsfontein, Midrand. The R2,1 million contract being carried out by Murray and Roberts Engineering (Tvl & OFS) is the largest structure of its kind in the Southern Hemisphere, and has an internal volume of 68,000 cu m. It is 37 m high and covers an area of 2,200 sq m. The function of the Faraday cage is to provide an electrically noise-free environment for sensitive testing equipment in the electro-magnetically hostile area created by nearby power lines and distribution stations. The structure also prevents electrical noise generated inside it from escaping and interfering with radio and TV reception. The cage is used to conduct tests on large, high-voltage equipment such as that used by Escom for the transmission and conversion of energy. Testing will be carried out for Escom and other generating authorities, and for the electrical industry associated with the manufacture of high-voltage hardware. The structure is made entirely of steel. The walls consist of columns supporting two layers of sheeting, subject to strict requirements to provide the necessary interference screening. The floor is a 200 mm thick concrete slab, at the base of which is a mesh sandwich between two layers of bitumen. It can sustain the pressure of equipment weighing up to 50 tons. The building has no windows and is ventilated by natural updraught in the space between the cladding walls, which also provides for three levels of walkways. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR FINANCE in English 13 Apr 86 p 9] /12851

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